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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY 
Much of what we know we know because someone told us so. In fact, a high 
proportion of our knowledge about the world, and indeed about ourselves, we 
know only from the testimony of other people. It would often be costly and in 
many cases even impossible to acquire knowledge about something without 
appealing to the spoken or written words of those around us. 
This seems to be an obvious notion concerning historical knowledge, as for 
example that there were two World Wars in the twentieth century, or for 
geographical knowledge, such as that Tokyo is the capital city of Japan. It is not 
necessary for anybody to have witnessed the events that constituted the World 
Wars or to have travelled to Tokyo for them to know about these facts. But 
knowledge through testimony is of no less importance in our everyday lives, like 
when we want to find out about what a friend had for lunch, the identity of our 
parents and even the date of our own birthday. If testimony could not yield 
knowledge, our lives would certainly be radically impoverished, both 
intellectually and practically (cf. Audi 1998: 128-129). 
The epistemology of testimony must therefore be concerned with the role 
testimony plays in the acquisition of belief and knowledge as we generally 
conceive it. Put differently, the task is to find a theory which matches our pre-
philosophical intuitions of how we can obtain knowledge from others. In the 
philosophical debate, this enterprise has been virtually ignored up until very 
recently and testimony as a source of knowledge has not found much favour. As 
John Locke notoriously wrote in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding: 
“For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other men's eyes as to 
know by other men’s understandings. So much as we ourselves consider 
and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true 
knowledge. The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains makes us 
not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in 
them was science, is in us but opiniatrety.” (Locke 1894: Book I, ch. 4, 
sect. 23) 
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Such philosophical disdain of testimony, it has been argued,1 was due in large part 
to an underlying presumption of epistemic individualism. Accordingly, 
knowledge was intimately associated with a quest for certainty in our beliefs and 
such certainty was believed to be accomplished through sources which are 
immediately available to the subject. Therefore, the traditional account spans three 
sources of knowledge – perception, memory, and inference2 – while regarding 
testimony as a derivative form of seeking information. Consequently, actual 
knowledge would have to come from “onboard sources” (Craig 1990: 11) which 
confirm, for an individual knower, the truth of a proposition. 
It is apparent, however, that under such a description, much of what we seem 
to know by our common-sense intuition would be lost. Imagine that someone tells 
me that Bob Dylan was just on the radio, that Spain won the last football World 
Cup, or that π is an irrational number. It seems intuitively right to say that I know 
these things even in case I have not heard the song myself, I cannot remember the 
event myself, or I have never performed the inference myself. If such knowledge 
is to count merely as a belief about the propositions in question the paradigm 
account of what it is to know something would have to be significantly revised 
(cf. e.g. Faulkner 1998: 303; Stevenson 1993: 429). 
As a result, testimony appears to be an astoundingly rich source of 
knowledge. It is safe to say that this is the standard opinion in modern 
epistemology.3 Indeed it has been argued on many occasions that testimonial 
knowledge is precisely what makes our lives prolific and colourful. As Tyler 
Burge puts it: 
“If we did not acquire a massive number of beliefs from others, our 
cognitive lives would be little different from the animals’.” (Burge 1993: 
466) 
                                                
1 Cf. esp. Coady (1992). 
2 Additionally, introspection is often mentioned as a source of knowledge and inference may 
arguably be split up into inductive and deductive reasoning. Yet, this need not concern us here. 
3 Much of the current endorsement of testimony as a rich source of knowledge can be traced back 
to the seminal works of Tony Coady (1992) and Steven Shapin (1994). 
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Yet, there remains a certain prima facie appeal to the idea that the answer to the 
question »How do you know this?« is more solid when it is »Because I saw it 
happen« as opposed to »Because someone told me so«. The main questions in the 
epistemology of testimony will thus be concerned with the circumstances under 
which it is epistemically legitimate to believe a proffered statement and with the 
reasons which may duly provide a justification to accept another person’s word. 
My goal for this thesis is to tackle these questions and present my own views by 
grappling with Jennifer Lackey’s outstanding and novel account in her (2008) 
Learning from Words. 
1.2. TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE AND ITS JUSTIFICATION 
In order to provide an analysis of testimonial knowledge it is important to be as 
clear as possible about the scope of the subject matter of the investigation. Before 
dealing with the conditions under which testimony may lead to hearer-knowledge, 
I shall therefore make explicit how I will use each of the two parts of this term. 
Knowledge, on the one side, has traditionally been understood as justified 
true belief. We may complement this definition and demand that the belief, in 
addition to its being true and justified, must not be Gettierized, that is the process 
which leads to the formation of the belief must not be fortuitous or accidental in a 
significant way.4 A certain controversy about this definition notwithstanding, I 
will presume throughout this text that knowledge is indeed a special kind of 
belief. In this respect, a person’s justification will be the key feature which 
distinguishes a mere belief from knowledge. In turn, I shall try to avoid many of 
the complex problems related to the truth-condition of knowledge. 
Testimony, on the other side, may appear easier to capture, but there is 
nonetheless significant disagreement among philosophers about how narrowly or 
widely it should be defined. As in the case of knowledge, I will try to keep the 
complexities to a minimum and focus on those aspects which are of direct 
relevance to my argumentation. The narrowest conception of testimony derives 
                                                
4 Cf. Edmund Gettier (1963) for the original formulation of the problem that justified true belief 
may well fall short of amounting to knowledge. 
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from its formal application in the notion of courtroom testimony. In this sense, 
testimony may be understood as any statement that p proffered by a person who 
expresses, sincerely and competently, her belief that p on an unresolved question. 
Her testimony thus serves as evidence that p for an audience who seeks to be 
informed about the matter (Coady 1992: 25-53). This adequately captures the 
notion of “formal testimony” (ibid.) as it is applied in the legal context but it is 
certainly too restrictive for ordinary conversations. In contrast, it has been 
suggested that every utterance from a person who expresses a thought amounts to 
testimony (e.g. Audi 1997, 1998). This seems appropriate for an analysis which 
includes everyday situations, yet Peter Graham rightfully points out that this 
understanding needs to be qualified to exclude cases which are not meant to 
convey actual information: 
“[I]t should be noted that mere statements are not testimony. Saying ‘It is a 
nice day’ is not usually taken as testimony about the weather (though it is 
when said by the weatherman). Repeating what you have already said over 
and over does not count as testimony either, unless you have forgotten 
each previous utterance. […] Surely simply saying something out of the 
blue that others find useful is not testimony unless you intend it to be 
considered epistemically useful.” (Graham 1997: 231) 
Thus, excluding such non-informational utterances,5 testimony can be understood, 
roughly, as every instance of a person who conveys the information that p by the 
intelligible expression of her thought that p through proffering the statement that p 
as her competent and sincere belief that p. Lackey does not fully agree with this 
definition of the realm of testimony and I will argue at a later stage that her own 
understanding of what constitutes an instance of testimony is responsible for one 
part of my disagreement with her account. 
Having spelled out my understanding of the scope and limits of testimonial 
knowledge the crucial question for any epistemology of testimony then is: how 
can it be the case that knowledge is acquired from the tellings of other people? 
Knowledge can indeed be spread through language, but the nature of this process 
                                                
5 On these grounds it should be clear that a sigh and a joke would not count as testimony, either. 
This precludes, inter alia, parts of the argumentation Paul Faulkner presents in his (2000). 
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has fostered a complex and controversial philosophical debate. Whenever a 
hearer6 comes to form a belief on the basis of a speaker’s report, the question 
arises whether or not the hearer is entitled to her belief. Therefore, we need a 
theory to explain under what circumstances such an entitlement exists. 
It is universally acknowledged that people, in light of their respective beliefs 
and desires, may have a myriad of different reasons to proffer a certain statement. 
Therefore, by simply accepting a report, without any concept concerning the 
nature and constitution of the report, a hearer is obviously subject to the inherent 
fallibility of the word of others. There is a widespread risk of both incompetence 
and mendacity which requires that we employ a discriminating theory to 
distinguish when (not) to accept testimony (Kusch and Lipton 2002). 
The ultimate goal of any epistemology of testimony is thus to make explicit 
the conditions under which a hearer is justified to accept a speaker’s assertion. 
Roughly speaking, the arena where this issue is disputed is divided into two 
camps: on the one hand, there are advocates of the idea that the general 
conception of humans as cooperative social beings comes with a general tendency 
towards sincerity and veracity when we speak. As a corollary, it would be the 
natural attitude to display trust in the word of others unless there are obvious 
reasons not to do so. On the other hand, the sheer volume of false testimony 
appears to be undeniable given the many motivations and opportunities for people 
to lie and deceive, or to speak about things they do not know. Under the 
impression that a significant degree of the testimony we receive is actually false, it 
can thus be argued that, in order for a hearer to be justified in accepting another 
person’s report, positive complementary (non-testimonial) evidence is needed. 
1.3. CREDULITY VERSUS SCEPTICISM 
This issue of how a person can reasonably obtain a justified testimonial belief is 
precisely the realm of controversy in the debate which seems to be leading up to 
                                                
6 I will use terms like »hearer« and »speaker« throughout this thesis although it should be clear 
that testimony comprises not only cases of spoken language but equally written and non-verbal 
expressions of a thought. 
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either credulity or scepticism. In the tradition of David Hume, »reductionists« 
have argued that it is reasonable to believe a proffered statement in view of the 
substantive body of inductive evidence that is provided by experience.7 In this 
sense, as responsible hearers, we have accumulated a posteriori reasons from 
which to infer testimony’s truth-conduciveness. The acceptance of testimony is 
justified because our experience has established a correlation between what is 
reported and what is the case. 
A paradigm scenario under this description would be a physics teacher 
telling her high-school student that, when a vehicle with a siren approaches, the 
received frequency is higher than the actually emitted frequency because the 
source is moving towards the observer. In this case, the student can be credited 
with a justified testimonial belief because her experience with the institution 
school, this teacher, scholars talking about their field, and people presenting 
information in a calm voice and so forth provide her with a rationale to believe 
what she is told. Yet, this view has been frowned upon for being too restrictive 
and for placing too heavy a burden onto the hearer. For reductionists, a hearer has 
to have independent evidence for believing in the veracity of testimony and this 
evidence has to be attained by relying solely on one’s personal faculties. 
Essentially, this may undermine a large portion of our knowledge since our 
individual capacities are limited in many forms. The Humean view seems to 
describe hearers as overly sceptical. 
In contrast to this, »non-reductionists« in the tradition of Thomas Reid have 
argued that the default-position when confronted with a piece of testimony is to 
believe the report even without further evidence for its veracity.8 Accordingly, we 
are justified to accept a statement as true not because there are independent 
reasons which indicate its truth-value but because we are a priori justified to do 
so. Unless there is empirical evidence which would render the acceptance of a 
report irrational, testimony is accepted as a source of knowledge in its own right. 
                                                
7 Cf. most notably Adler (1994, 2002) and Fricker (1987, 1994, 1995) for current reductionist 
positions. The original account is from Hume’s (2000) Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding. 
8 Cf. most notably Burge (1993, 1997) and McDowell (1998) for modern descriptions of this 
understanding. The original formulation of non-reductionism is associated with Reid’s (1983) 
Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man. 
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A paradigm case under this description would be my friend telling me that 
she has a philosophy class this afternoon. Here, I can be credited with a justified 
testimonial belief because I have a default entitlement to trust a speaker if I can 
understand her statement. Accordingly, I do not need any additional non-
testimonial evidence to back up my belief that my friend has a class today. I can 
be said to know this as long as there are no reasons which override my default 
entitlement. However, this understanding can be criticised as being too forgiving 
with regards to the hearer. As soon as a hearer seems to understand a report, it 
may be accepted as true. The recipient has no epistemic work to do over and 
above being sensitive to defeating empirical evidence. As a result, the speaker is 
encumbered with all the attention in an assessment of the testimonial scenario. 
The Reidian view seems to describe hearers as overly credulous. 
1.4. TRANSMISSIVE AND GENERATIVE VIEWS OF TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE 
The question of how testimonial knowledge is justified is accompanied by the 
question of how testimonial knowledge compares to knowledge from perception, 
memory and inference. The orthodox view is that while perception and inference 
generate knowledge, memory and testimony, by their very nature, preserve 
knowledge (cf. Graham 2006). 
There is an intuitive plausibility in the idea that memory is needed to 
preserve knowledge from the past so that it may be retained and retrieved in the 
present. Likewise, according to the standard theory, testimony is said to preserve 
knowledge by transferring the content of a certain proposition from one knower to 
another. The picture here is that of a “bucket brigade” (Lackey 2008: 1): each 
person in the chain can acquire knowledge from the »previous« person who must 
have the knowledge in question in order to be able to pass it along. Additionally, 
at least one person in the chain must have acquired the knowledge from another 
source, independent of the bucket brigade. By contrast, perception and inference 
are said to create knowledge beyond the things already known. Thus, perception 
and inference can generate new knowledge which can be fed into a chain like the 
one just described. An important corollary of this orthodoxy is that testimony can 
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only transmit knowledge and therefore a speaker always has to know that p in 
order for a hearer to get to know that p from her say-so.9 
Alternatively, testimony has been conceptualised as a generative source of 
knowledge to emphasise the inherent social character of knowledge. The 
underlying thought is that testimony does not only preserve (transmit) knowledge 
but it also creates (generates) knowledge which has not previously existed. 
Proponents of this progressive view have presented their accounts from a variety 
of angles. John Hardwig (1985, 1991), to begin with, focuses on the critical roles 
communication and trust play in science. Michael Welbourne (1986, 1994), in a 
comparable fashion, maintains that the key characteristic of knowledge is that it is 
“commonable” (1986: 1). On his grounds, testimony serves to make knowledge 
the common possession of a group of people. As such, testimony is constitutive of 
a knowledge community. Martin Kusch (2002) proposes that testimony is 
generative of knowledge because knowledge must be conceived as a social status. 
Acts of communication may therefore generate a state of agreement between 
individuals in a community. This is especially apparent in the case of 
performative testimony, as, for example, when a marriage is pronounced. 
Lackey also criticises the established view that testimony is only a means of 
transmission. Throughout her (2008), her stance on what testimony can and 
cannot do are the basis for her argumentation against the view that a hearer can 
only get to know that p via testimony from a speaker who knows that p. What is 
more, Lackey applies many of the subtle facets of the debate between 
»individualists« (testimony is transmissive) and »comunitarians« (testimony is 
generative) to the distinction between beliefs and statements. Similar to Graham 
(2000a, 2000b), who proposes to speak of »information« – rather than knowledge 
– that is »conveyed« – rather than transmitted –, Lackey advocates a theory 
according to which statements should be the centrepiece of any epistemological 
analysis. 
                                                
9 Cf. e.g. Audi (1997, 1998), Dummet (1994), Plantinga (1994). 
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1.5. THE AIM AND STRUCTURE OF THIS DIPLOMA THESIS 
As indicated before, the aim of this thesis is to present my views on how 
knowledge may be obtained through the testimony of others. Given its many 
complexities and technicalities, the topic has raised substantial disagreement in 
the recent philosophical literature, a high proportion of which is due to differences 
in the understanding of what constitutes a paradigm testimonial scenario. My goal 
is therefore to present, in an independent way, a structured interpretation and 
assessment of the current philosophical landscape on the issue. Lackey’s (2008) 
will serve as my main point of reference for this enterprise. 
In Learning from Words, Lackey offers a novel perspective on the 
epistemology of testimony by providing a compelling argumentation of 
progressive and provoking theses towards an independent theory. Like Paul 
Faulkner (2009: 484) writes: “Learning from Words is admirably clear and 
densely argued.” For these reasons the text is well worth grappling with as it 
provides a rich basis for a thorough engagement with unresolved epistemological 
questions. I shall aim at providing a detailed and comprehensive critique of 
Lackey’s argumentation with the objective of arguing against her key revisions of 
the notion of testimony. 
Lackey’s endeavour is twofold: firstly, her attempt is to reject the established 
view of testimony as a transmission of knowledge from a speaker to a hearer. Her 
goal is to rebuff the standard focus on beliefs in interlocution and instead focus on 
the statements from which, according to her position, hearers can come to know. 
Secondly, Lackey wants to promote a novel, collaborative approach to the 
epistemology of testimony, which she labels »dualism«. Distributing the 
epistemic work between the speaker and the hearer, dualism offers an in-between 
of reductionism and non-reductionism, which may help to solve the problems of 
each individual view. 
The methodological approach Lackey chooses is a refutation by means of 
philosophical counterexamples. Throughout her text, Lackey employs no less than 
31 counterexamples (plus five more in the annex) each of which is intended to 
make explicit a discrepancy in judgement between common intuition and a certain 
theory. In case that, one, there is a universal unequivocal intuition of how to 
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assess the scenario and, two, this assessment is clearly at odds with a certain 
theory, this theory can be given up as a result of its counterintuitive appraisal of 
the presented case. Throughout this thesis I shall try to show, case by case, that 
Lackey does not succeed to accomplish this desideratum on many occasions. 
The structure of this thesis follows Lackey’s presentation to a certain extent. 
Chapter Two deals with the transmission view of testimony. Lackey wants to 
refute the picture of an epistemic bucket brigade and describe testimony as a truly 
generative source of knowledge. Her main argument is that a speaker’s beliefs 
(and thus her knowledge) concerning p are not relevant for the question of 
whether or not a hearer can obtain the knowledge that p from this speaker. Rather, 
the question is to be answered by looking at the statement proffered by the 
speaker. Accordingly, the problem of testimony would be best conceptualised as 
the transmission of a statement, without referring to it as the expression of a 
belief. 
The position Lackey has as a target is that testimony involves a transmission 
of the content as well as a transmission of the epistemic credentials, so that if a 
speaker knows that p and tells a hearer that p the hearer would thereby come to 
know that p. As long as there is no deficiency in the interlocution, whenever a 
speaker believes that p with justification she transmits both p and her justification 
to a hearer via testimony. Lackey refutes this view by arguing that a speaker’s 
justified belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for a hearer to obtain knowledge 
from her report. This idea is outlined in section 2.1. 
In section 2.2, I endorse Lackey’s proposal that reliable believers may fall 
short of being reliable testifiers. The upshot is that speaker-knowledge is indeed 
not sufficient for hearer-knowledge. In contrast, in section 2.3, I oppose her more 
controversial rejection of the view that speaker-knowledge is a necessary 
condition for hearer-knowledge. Her claim that it is well possible for a speaker to 
reliably testify that p without holding the belief that p appears to be misguided. 
Judging from the provided counterexamples, it does not seem plausible in any of 
the scenarios for a hearer to come to know that p on the basis of the unknowing 
speaker’s testimony. 
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Lackey’s rejection by means of counterexamples is not convincing enough to 
provide a basis from which to discard beliefs as epistemically irrelevant. While I 
agree with Lackey that a speaker’s epistemic credentials are not simply 
transmitted to a hearer via testimony, her claim that a speaker’s beliefs do not 
matter epistemically for the hearer contradicts the notion that the concept of a 
person is a key component of a substantive epistemology of testimony – a point 
which Lackey explicitly acknowledges. A person’s intentional attitudes, and thus 
prominently a person’s beliefs, have a role to play in speaker-hearer scenarios. 
Therefore, I argue in section 2.4 that Lackey oversimplifies the epistemology of 
testimony by sweeping the speaker’s intentional attitudes under the carpet. 
Ultimately, one part of the hearer’s contribution to a successful act of testimony 
must be to identify whether the report stems from a person, who intends to convey 
the message that p as true. 
Chapter Three is about the nature of this very contribution. This is a question 
which can be summed up as the epistemological debate of reductionism versus 
non-reductionism. I begin by introducing Lackey’s understanding and criticism of 
reductionism (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2) and then present my objections to her 
views in section 3.1.3. My main disagreement is with her proposed 
counterexample in which Lackey tries to show that a hearer may not be justified 
in accepting a report in spite of possessing adequate empirical reasons for 
accepting it. 
In a similar manner, sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 illustrate Lackey’s 
understanding and criticism of non-reductionism, before I argue against her 
position in section 3.2.3. Lackey attempts to present two examples of testimonial 
scenarios in which a hearer has no reasons whatsoever to assess a particular 
report. Consequently, so the idea, it would be irrational to accept the report for 
there are no indications of its truth-conduciveness at all. Yet, I disagree with 
Lackey and maintain that her counterexamples fail to provide more than an 
unpersuasive expression that her own intuition concerning the ascription of 
hearer-knowledge in these two cases is at variance with the established view. 
Consequently, Lackey’s attack on reductionism and non-reductionism is not 
convincing enough to provide a basis from which to discard beliefs as 
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epistemically irrelevant. Nevertheless, there are positive lessons which can be 
learned from Lackey’s thorough engagement. It seems fair to say that both 
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts are able to respond to real challenges 
in the epistemology of testimony. Therefore, both sides of the debate could gain 
from an acknowledgement of the underlying premises on which the other account 
is built. To deny, completely, the rationality of the opposing view, may harm the 
defensibility of each position itself. 
In this spirit I shall claim in Chapter Four that the dichotomous division into 
a reductionist and a non-reductionist camp is unable to yield substantial progress 
on the topic (section 4.1). Instead, it may be possible to benefit from the 
respective strengths of both accounts. On the one hand, we therefore have to 
arrive at an understanding of the reductionist view according to which the hearer’s 
justification is not completely reducible to non-testimonial considerations. This is 
discussed in section 4.2.1. On the other hand, we also have to arrive at an 
understanding of the non-reductionist view which does not provide the hearer 
with an entitlement to a testimonial belief which is entirely independent from non-
testimonial considerations. This is the topic of section 4.2.2. 
In section 4.3, I shall then make the claim that reductionist and non-
reductionist viewpoints are not fully incompatible. To advocate this point I shall 
attempt to show that evidence has an important role to play in both accounts: it 
endows the basic rationale of acquiring a justified testimonial belief. It seems that 
in spite of their fundamental differences, reductionists and non-reductionists do, in 
fact, agree on their intuitive judgements (of whether or not a hearer obtains 
testimonial knowledge) in the vast majority of scenarios. This is because in 
ordinary cases, a hearer invariably has at her disposal a substantial amount of 
evidential information and is thus completely overwhelmed by reasons. The case 
in which a hearer is actually no longer vested with reasons for and against 
accepting a report seems to be impossible to imagine. Although such a tabula-rasa 
state-of-affairs would be precisely what reductionists and non-reductionists would 
fail to agree upon it seems safe to say that such a state is unattainable. 
The thesis closes with a brief upshot in section 4.4, where I sum up my main 
claims. 
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2. THE TRANSMISSION OF EPISTEMIC WARRANT 
2.1. BELIEFS VERSUS STATEMENTS 
In her (2008), Lackey makes a bold attempt to criticise the focus on beliefs in the 
analysis of testimonial cases. She takes the standard approach, which she labels 
the “belief view of testimony (BVT)” (2008: 37), to be too concerned with what a 
speaker believes and tries to substitute this view with a “statement view of 
testimony (SVT)” (ibid.: 72). According to the SVT, the problem of testimony is 
best conceptualised as the transmission of a statement, without referring to it as 
the expression of a belief. This shift would have the advantage that the concept of 
testimony could administer cases in which a hearer comes to know that p by the 
testimony of a speaker who asserts that p without knowing that p. 
Within the standard framework, in any successful speaker-hearer scenario a 
speaker transmits her belief that p along with the epistemic properties of that 
belief to the hearer (cf. Owens 2006: 123; Plantinga 1993: 86). Thus, according to 
the BVT, there are two layers to testimony: a transmission of the content as well as 
a transmission of the epistemic warrant or justification. On such a view, testimony 
is itself not a generative source of knowledge but in essence a means of 
transportation of beliefs plus add-on from one person to another. 
From such a perspective, the act of communication is described entirely in 
terms of a belief and its epistemic properties (the warrant or justification). 
Statements are the “vehicles [that] enable us to make public what would otherwise 
remain private” (Lackey 2008: 37). This implies that the epistemically significant 
bearer of a warrant or justification is the belief; the statement is merely used to get 
the message across without itself holding epistemic properties. Accordingly, then, 
if the speaker believes that p with justification she transfers both p and its 
justification in a successful act of communication. In turn, if the speaker does not 
know that p the hearer cannot come to know that p from her testimony. 
Lackey refutes this standard conception. Her analysis of the transmission of 
epistemic properties (TEP) is divided into two parts: a necessity dimension (TEP-
N) and a sufficiency dimension (TEP-S). According to the standard theory, a 
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hearer may only come to know that p on the basis of testimony if the speaker 
herself knows that p. Therefore, speaker-knowledge is necessary for hearer-
knowledge (TEP-N). Moreover, a speaker brings a hearer to know that p whenever 
she speaks from knowledge and the hearer accepts her report that p. Thus, 
speaker-knowledge is also sufficient for hearer-knowledge (TEP-S). Lackey 
refutes both branches of this transmission view of testimony (cf. ibid: 39-47). In 
the following section 2.2, I will argue in support of Lackey’s rejection of the TEP-
S thesis, leaving the discussion of the TEP-N thesis for section 2.3. 
2.2. LACKEY’S REJECTION OF THE SUFFICIENCY CLAIM 
Proponents of the TEP-S thesis hold that speaker-knowledge is sufficient for 
hearer-knowledge as long as the testimonial process is not distorted in a 
significant way. Defined in this way, however, there are at least two major 
problems with this view: firstly, it is definitely possible, and empirically often the 
case, that a speaker knows that p, that she tells an attentive listener that p, and yet, 
the hearer does not get to know that p right away. There is a plethora of possible 
reasons which keep the hearer from gaining knowledge, most of which have to do 
with an undefeated defeater10 on the hearer-side. Secondly, the idea that a belief – 
which is essentially a state-of-mind that is accessible only to the first person – is 
not only transferred to another individual but also »piggybacks« epistemic 
credentials lacks plausibility. Our notion of what a belief is makes a statement-
oriented view look prima facie desirable. 
Lackey addresses these shortcomings and rebuts the view that a hearer 
always comes to know from speaker-knowledge through testimony. Not only may 
the hearer have additional undefeated defeaters which the speaker does not 
possess; rather, the idea of a transmission of a belief plus epistemic properties 
appears to be in principle distorted. In order to rebut the TEP-S thesis Lackey uses 
                                                
10 The notion of an undefeated defeater is an important concept in epistemology. In essence, a 
defeater is a reason which overrides a person’s reason to belief that p. Since a defeater may itself 
be defeated (by a further reason which overrides the defeating reason), only undefeated defeaters 
are ultimately reasons which prevent a person from acquiring a belief that p. Cf. section 2.3.2 
below (especially part c) for a discussion of the distinction between psychological and normative 
defeaters. Cf. also section 3.2.1 for the no-undefeated-defeater condition in non-reductionism. 
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three counterexamples: »Compulsively Trusting«, »A Lucky Choice«, and 
»Almost a Liar« (ibid.: 66, 68, 69). 
a) »Compulsively Trusting« 
Her central argument against the sufficiency claim is put forward in the first 
philosophical counterexample in which a hearer is unable to detect any indication 
of unreliable testimony due to his emotional standing towards the speaker. The 
hearer’s incapability to distinguish between »good« and »bad« testimony in 
»Compulsively Trusting« thus prevents him from reacting to potential defeaters 
and renders him “insensitive in a way that is clearly incompatible with 
justification, warrant, and knowledge” (ibid.: 67). In Lackey’s original words: 
“Bill is a compulsively trusting person with respect to the testimony of his 
neighbour, Jill, in whom he has an obsessive romantic interest. Not only 
does he always trust Jill when he has very good reason to believe her, but 
he is incapable of distrusting her when he has very good reason to not 
believe her. […] Bill is such that there is no amount of evidence that 
would convince him not to trust Jill. Yesterday, while taking his afternoon 
walk, Bill ran into Jill, and she told him that she had seen an orca whale 
while boating earlier that day. Bill, of course, readily accepted Jill’s 
testimony. It turns out that Jill did in fact see an orca whale [and] that she 
is very reliable with respect to her epistemic practices […]. [H]owever, 
even if he had massive amounts of [counter]evidence available to him 
[…], Bill would have just as readily accepted Jill’s testimony.” (Ibid.: 66) 
I take it to be a plausible and intuitive argument against the TEP-S thesis that is 
put forward by Lackey here. The fact that the emotional standing of a hearer may 
undermine her ability to gain testimonial knowledge appears to be a non-
controversial assumption. Not only can we imagine cases, like Lackey’s, where a 
hearer has romantic feelings for the speaker (and thus naïvely believes almost 
anything she says), there is a multitude of feelings which would make a hearer too 
credulous in order for the testimonial exchange to function well enough so as to 
speak of knowledge. 
Arguably, the hearer’s emotions need not even necessarily be directed at the 
speaker for the testimony to fail. It would render a hearer just as epistemically 
insensitive if the hearer is emotionally loaded towards the person a certain 
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testimony is concerned with. For instance, a hearer who hates her neighbour for 
whatever reasons may be far too gullible concerning derogatory testimony about 
the neighbour for her to be regarded as a sensitive recipient of that piece of 
testimony. The point Lackey is trying to prove at this stage is “that while a 
speaker may be both a reliable believer and testifier, a hearer may be so 
constituted as to prevent the epistemic properties of a speaker’s belief from being 
transmitted to her” (ibid.). Therefore, cases where there is a distorting factor 
directly within the relationship between the speaker and the hearer are just one 
way of showing that there are numerous possibilities of how a hearer may fail to 
receive epistemic properties via testimony. 
b) »A Lucky Choice« 
The second case against the TEP-S thesis, »A Lucky Choice«, is a Gettier-type 
counterexample analogous to Henry’s fake-barn adventure (Goldman 1976). A 
person receives true information about the whereabouts of a building via 
testimony, yet knowledge cannot be attributed as the situation is altogether highly 
accidental and fortuitous. The key passage is this: 
“Upon arriving in Chicago for the first time, Pierre asks the closest 
passerby that he sees, Zoe, for directions to the Sears Tower and she 
reports that it is six blocks east. While Zoe knows that this is the case, and 
Pierre has no reasons to doubt [her testimony], she is the only reliable 
speaker in this part of Chicago, completely surrounded by incompetents 
and liars.” (Lackey 2008: 68) 
In essence, I agree with Lackey’s argumentation that a justified testimonial belief 
may be Gettierised and thus fall short of amounting to knowledge. It is imaginable 
that the acquisition of a (justified and true) testimonial belief is significantly  
fortuitous and this would arguably undermine hearer-knowledge even in case the 
speaker is both competent and sincere. It is this thought that Lackey wants to 
express in »A Lucky Choice«. In this respect, the example adds to the project set 
out by »Compulsively Trusting«. 
However, it has to be mentioned that this counterexample is not as 
intuitively appealing as »Compulsively Trusting«. The recipient of the 
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accidentally true testimony receives a report “[u]pon arriving in Chicago”, 
presumably at a train station or a bus terminal. Moreover, the piece of information 
he seeks out concerns a world-famous building, the whereabouts of which are 
supposedly known to most of Chicago’s inhabitants. In this regard, it is 
questionable how the abnormal proportion of unreliable testifiers is explicable. 
Arguably, Pierre might have run into a group of intoxicated drug addicts and 
fortuitously picked out their caretaker; or he might be amid completely ignorant 
tourists and luckily asked their tourguide. Although possible, I doubt that such 
circumstances would remain completely unnoticed by Pierre. However, Pierre 
could not ignore the fact that he is among people with a very low likelihood of 
informing him correctly if he was aware of this. Such practice would be 
epistemically irrational and the example would make a different case. 
I agree with Lackey that luck has a role to play in the assessment of whether 
or not a hearer comes to know from testimony. While her presentation of the case 
appears to be implausible to a certain extent, the general idea seems strong 
nonetheless. If I make a random choice in picking an informant and this informant 
happens to be the only reliable testifier among the group of potential informants, 
intuitively I do not come to know though my informant’s testimony. Imagine that 
I open the door to a compartment on a train to ask in which direction the 
restaurant car is. From the six strangers sitting in the compartment only one 
actually knows that I have to walk towards the front of the train and I randomly 
pick this person to give me directions. I hold that my knowledge about the 
restaurant car would be Gettierised in this case. Ultimately, neither Lackey’s 
example nor mine is free of problems but the general idea remains strong: 
speaker-knowledge does not necessarily result in hearer-knowledge.11 
                                                
11 Even in case that »A Lucky Choice« would fail completely, Lackey’s rejection of the TEP-S 
thesis could naturally rest on a single successful counterexample. So although I do not disagree 
with her argumentation in »A Lucky Choice« (or »Almost a Liar«, for that matter), her rejection 
through »Compulsively Trusting« – if accepted – would be sufficient by itself. I state this point 
because I believe »A Lucky Choice« and »Almost a Liar« are more controversial than 
»Compulsively Trusting«. 
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c) »Almost a Liar« 
The third example, »Almost a Liar«, adds to the first two by showing that a hearer 
may fail to gain knowledge if a speaker’s testimony is counterfactually insensitive 
to the truth (cf. Dretske 1971; Nozick 1981: 172-178). If a speaker tells a hearer 
that p regardless of whether or not p is true this fact alone suffices to prevent 
knowledge from being acquired by the hearer. The essence of the example is this: 
“Phil is […] from an epistemic point of view quite healthy […]. Yesterday, 
[he] ran into Jill just after Bill did and she also told him that she had seen 
an orca whale […]. It turns out that Jill did in fact see an orca whale [and] 
that she is very reliable with respect to her epistemic practices […]. 
However, in order to promote a whale watching business she is in the 
process of starting, she would have reported to Phil – in precisely the same 
manner – that she had seen an orca whale even if she hadn’t.” (Lackey 
2008: 69) 
The general idea is that as soon as there are close possible worlds in which the 
proffered testimony is the same, yet the truth-value of the underlying subject-
matter is not, then the hearer’s corresponding belief-formation is not  
counterfactually sensitive. If a speaker asserts that p regardless of whether p is 
true, a hearer cannot obtain testimonial knowledge. 
I am completely in line with Lackey on this third counterexample. It is 
beyond dispute that people often have a myriad of reasons not to speak the truth 
(be it because they are not able to or because they do not intend to). Building on 
this thought, we can imagine cases in which a speaker is prepared to assert that p 
without knowing that p (or knowing that ¬p) but by the time of the assertion she 
has actually come to know that p. The fact that the speaker was ready to assert 
that p under any circumstances would prevent the hearer from obtaining 
knowledge. 
A similar case to »Almost a liar« would be a best man on his way to the 
wedding who lost track of where the wedding rings are which he is supposed to 
hand over in the church. Anxious about admitting his mistake, he might be 
prepared to claim »I have the rings in my pocket« even if he does not believe that. 
If, then, he found the rings in the pocket of his jacket just before actually being 
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asked about the rings, his assertion »I have the rings in my pocket« would not be 
counterfactually sensitive and the hearer could not be said to come to know on the 
basis of this statement. 
As a result, I take also Lackey’s third example against the TEP-S thesis to be 
convincing. In her discussion of all three counterexamples Lackey is able, or so I 
hold, to show that reliable believers may nonetheless fail to provide reliable 
testimony. It is therefore true that the epistemic properties held by a speaker are by 
no means sufficient to establish knowledge on the side of the hearer. Insofar, 
Lackey’s counterexamples fulfil their purpose in laying bare unsupportable 
consequences that would follow from such a view. Faulkner (2009: 481) concurs: 
“I have no disagreement with denying the sufficiency claim; like Lackey I 
think that there is an ‘audience condition’ on the acquisition of testimonial 
knowledge: the acceptance of testimony must be rationally supported by 
other things an audience believes. And I think this for the same reason as 
Lackey; like her I think that the acceptance of testimony ‘in the complete 
absence of positive reasons can be just as epistemically irrational’ as belief 
in the face of counter-evidence.” 
Yet, the general conclusion Lackey derives from this appears to be too strong: 
“the words of speakers, not their beliefs, are what matter for an epistemology of 
testimony” (Lackey 2008: 71). Beliefs do matter – even though they are not 
sufficient for a hearer to successfully acquire knowledge through the testimony of 
others. Thus, Lackey’s rejection of the TEP-S thesis can be regarded as the strong 
point of her overarching rejection of the BVT but this point alone does not 
undermine the belief view. 
2.3. LACKEY’S REJECTION OF THE NECESSITY CLAIM 
For the BVT to be refuted both components, that is the TEP-S thesis and the TEP-N 
thesis, must be proven false. While Lackey is successful in providing a plausible 
argumentation for the rejection of the TEP-S thesis (see the previous section 2.2) 
her arguments against the TEP-N thesis fall short of her goal to focus entirely on 
statements instead of beliefs. 
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Six counterexamples are presented by Lackey to disprove that speaker-
knowledge is necessary in order for a hearer to acquire knowledge from 
testimony: »Creationist Teacher«, »Consistent Liar« (and the analogous 
»Doubting Thomas«), »Persistent Believer«, »Serious Student«, and »Dogmatic 
Believer« (ibid.: 48, 53, 58, 59, 61, 63). 
The first type of cases, which are discussed in the following section 2.3.1, 
includes the first three counterexamples. They are construed with characters who 
do not believe a certain piece of information yet testify very reliably on the 
subject matter. The respective testifiers lack belief due to their religious 
convictions (»Creationist Teacher«), because they were hard-wired by the 
science-fiction version of a neuro-surgeon (»Consistent Liar«), or because they 
are overly self-conscious (»Doubting Thomas«). Nevertheless they proffer highly 
reliable testimony to an audience because of their moral convictions, because they 
merely mechanically report (true) things if they choose to speak, or because they 
are brilliant scientists. All three of these cases appear to rely on implausible ad-
hoc solutions to their respective challenges within the testimonial process and 
therefore cannot provide a convincing argument against the TEP-N thesis. 
In section 2.3.2 I will discuss the second type of cases, that is 
counterexamples four to six. In those cases, the speaker has an undefeated 
defeater which prevents her from having knowledge about a certain proposition. 
The speaker testifies nonetheless and the hearer appears to acquire knowledge 
through testimony from a person who lacks the knowledge in question. However, 
much like the first three counterexamples, also these three cases seem to fail to 
provide a profound refutation of the TEP-N thesis. Predominantly, this stems from 
the fact that all three counterexamples have at their core a truncated presentation 
of the speaker’s belief. The speaker in each of these cases leaves out very crucial 
pieces of information about her current state of mind and about the nature of her 
belief. She does not mention that she has an undefeated defeater for her belief and 
it is only through this very omission of information that the hearer can obtain the 
testimonial belief in question. However, sweeping such information under the 
carpet cannot be the salient reason for a hearer to obtain knowledge. I will argue 
that in none of the cases testimonial knowledge is gained by the hearer. 
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2.3.1. The speaker lacks belief 
a) »Creationist Teacher« 
»Creationist Teacher« is at the very core of Lackey’s account. It is the 
controversial centrepiece and with its acceptance or refutation the whole chain of 
argument concerning the transmission principle of epistemic properties succeeds 
or fails respectively. Lackey’s overarching goal is to promote the importance of 
statements in the epistemology of testimony to a degree where the belief-centred 
TEP-N thesis can be given up entirely in favour of a statement-centred “Reliability 
of the Statement-Necessity thesis” (ibid.: 74). According to this view, the question 
whether or not testimonial knowledge can be attributed to a hearer is settled 
completely on the basis of a speaker’s proffered statement – the speaker’s belief is 
irrelevant, it has no role to play in deciding whether or not the testimony is 
reliable. What matters epistemically is merely the reliability of the truth-
conduciveness of the process by which the statement was produced.12 
To illustrate this point, Lackey designs a teacher who firmly believes in 
Young Earth creationism, yet testifies – ex hypothesi reliably – about the 
Darwinian evolutionary theory to her pupils. The example is worth quoting at full 
length: 
“Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher, and her religious 
beliefs are grounded in a deep faith that she has had since she was a very 
young child. Part of this faith includes a belief in the truth of creationism 
and, accordingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite this, 
she fully recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of scientific 
evidence against both of these beliefs. Indeed, she readily admits that she 
is not basing her own commitment to creationism on evidence at all but, 
rather, on the personal faith that she has in an all-powerful Creator. 
Because of this, Stella does not think that religion is something that she 
should impose on those around her, and this is especially true with respect 
to her fourth-grade students. Instead, she regards her duty as a teacher to 
involve presenting material that is best supported by the available 
evidence, which clearly includes the truth of evolutionary theory. As a 
result, after consulting reliable sources in the library and developing 
reliable lecture notes, Stella asserts to her students, ‘Modern-day Homo 
                                                
12 I will come back to this point in section 3.1.3 where I present my objections to Lackey’s critique 
of reductionism. 
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sapiens evolved from Homo erectus,’ while presenting her biology lesson 
today. Though Stella herself neither believes nor knows this proposition, 
she never shares her own personal faith-based views with her students, and 
so they form the corresponding true belief solely on the basis of her 
reliable testimony.” (Ibid.: 48) 
Since the two viewpoints, creationism and evolutionary theory, are mutually 
exclusive, the teacher has to suppress one stance whenever she is concerned with 
the other: when it comes to her belief, she is dedicated to creationism; when it 
comes to her testimony, however, she restricts herself to talk only about 
evolutionary theory. As a result, the teacher is in a position to reliably testify 
about something which she does not know because she does not believe it. 
It is true that there is an immediate appeal to the idea of shifting the 
requirement for reliability of testimony towards the statement itself. Lackey 
admits that Stella is in a “confused doxastic [state]” (ibid.: 118) and the problems 
of a speaker’s doxastic state could be avoided altogether if her belief did not play 
a role for the reliability of any testimony she proffers. However, I am convinced 
that this would be an ill-advised move. Its straightforward appearance 
notwithstanding, »Creationist Teacher« is actually quite a complex 
counterexample. In the light of this complexity, my claim is that there is no 
uncontroversial common intuition in favour of the correctness of Lackey’s verdict 
that the children come to know that p from Stella who does not believe that p. I 
argue that Lackey faces a dilemma in »Creationist Teacher« that prevents this 
conclusion from being accepted tout court: either, Stella does not actually believe 
that p (that creationism is true) or her testimony that q (that evolutionary theory is 
true) lacks reliability. 
The first horn of the dilemma is addressed by asking if Stella fully believes 
that Young Earth creationism is the most reasonable theory to accept as true. 
Stella must believe that evolutionary theory is false; otherwise the counterexample 
has no momentum. Yet, Lackey states that Stella recognises evolutionary theory 
as being “best supported by the available evidence” (ibid.). To believe something, 
in an epistemically meaningful way, must be tantamount to accepting it as true 
given the totality of relevant considerations that speak for and against accepting it 
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as true. This epistemic endeavour is concerned with a process of reasoning; we 
may accept as true something that is most reasonable to believe, all things 
considered. 
In Stella’s case, however, her belief is not responsive to evidence which 
clearly speaks against her belief being reasonable. Consequently, the way Lackey 
presents the scenario, Stella does not believe the theory of creationism in a 
relevant sense of the word. If we continue to speak of a belief in (the truth of) 
creationism, it is very questionable how Stella may recognise superiour evidence13 
for q, yet discard this when it comes to her belief-formation that p. Responding to 
Lackey’s earlier version of »Creationist Teacher« found in her (1999), Audi 
(2006: 30) calls this a “cognitive malfunction.” I agree with his idea that “to fail to 
believe on evidence one takes to be good (to the degree required by the case) is a 
kind of malfunction” (ibid.). This would be a cognitive failure which prevents her 
students from obtaining knowledge from her. 
Put differently, if Stella believes that q is more likely to be true than p in 
view of all relevant considerations, yet believes in the truth of p and in the falsity 
of q, I hold that such a cognitive malfunction is a feature of the case which 
undermines her audience to obtain knowledge from her statements. The way 
Lackey describes »Creationist Teacher«, Stella either does not believe (in an 
epistemologically relevant way) that creationism is true or she suffers from a state 
of doxastic confusion which generally undermines her pupils from acquiring 
knowledge from her reports. People may certainly believe something in spite of 
good evidence against the proposition at stake. However, this requires that the 
                                                
13 I think that part of the confusion concerning »Creationist Teacher« arises due to a too narrow 
conception of what counts as evidence. It has been brought to my attention that it is certainly not a 
contradiction to acknowledge good evidence for p and yet believe that ¬p. Imagine that my father 
is accused of shoplifting. I may reasonably accept that there is better evidence for this accusation 
than against it (such as witnesses testifying against him or the stolen item being found at his home) 
and yet believe that he is innocent. However, there must be reasonable considerations which lead 
to my belief (such as that my father has always been a good person, that he has no interest in the 
stolen item or that he assured me that he has not commited the crime). My argument is that as long 
as Stella recognises that evolutionary theory is more reasonable to believe all things considered, 
then she must actually believe in evolutionary theory. Failing to do so is equivalent to a cognitive 
malfunction. This is the first horn of the dilemma. If, on the other hand, she arrives at the 
conclusion that creationism is the most reasonable theory, then it is problematic to understand why 
she forms the corresponding belief that it is most reasonable to testify against her conviction. This 
is what I will discuss as the second horn of the dilemma. 
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available evidence is regarded as inadequate or incomplete. As soon as the 
evidence is considered to be good enough for the issue at hand, refusing to form a 
believe in accordance with this evidence is a malfunction. 
Still, for the sake of the argument we may assume that Stella fully and 
adequately believes in creationism. This entails that she thinks that the totality of 
information available makes creationism the more reasonable theory in 
comparison with evolutionary theory. Furthermore, she believes that creationism 
is more plausible than any third theory or the suspension of judgement. If that 
were the case, Stella reasonably believed in a creatio ex nihilo. On these grounds, 
the question arises how Stella can believe something and reasonably assert the 
opposite.14 This is the second horn of the dilemma. 
In essence, for Stella to believe that p and to assert that q requires that there 
be two separate paradigms within her belief system: one that she believes to be 
true and another that she believes to be the most appropriate to present as true in a 
certain context. Stella believes p to be true but she acknowledges that one part of 
her premises which lead up to her conclusion that p are controversial (her faith in 
God). While the acceptance of p as true critically hinges on the acceptance of 
these premises, Stella does not want to impose her view concerning these 
considerations on those around her, albeit she regards them as true. Thus, she 
continues to place credence in these premises, yet she separates them from other 
considerations, which are not purely faith-based. As a result, Stella arrives at two 
paradigms: one, with her faith-based considerations accepted as true; and another, 
with her faith-based considerations suspended. Stella is in a position to toggle on 
and off one part of her world-view (her Christian belief) and consequently arrive 
at different conclusions in different paradigms. 
Lackey proposes to have evidence in favour of such a case from a 2007 New 
York Times article (2008: 49 n. 24). However, even if we agree that such cases 
exist, it is very doubtful whether such a scenario is an example of reliable 
                                                
14 Cf. Lackey’s notion of the “Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion” (2008: 124-129) 
according to which a speaker “should assert that p only if it is reasonable for one to believe that p, 
and if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to 
assert that p” (ibid.: 125). While this norm is not violated by Stella’s assertion, it shows that 
Lackey recognises that a belief is held within the realm of reason. 
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testimony that may constitute knowledge for a hearer. Certainly, there is a major 
distortion in the way the testimony is produced which essentially results in a 
pathological form of communication between the teacher and the pupils. As Alvin 
Plantinga (1993: 82-83) and Arindam Chakrabarti (1994: 110) have argued, there 
is a fortuitous connection between the testimony of the speaker on the one hand 
and the belief-formation within the audience on the other which hinders the 
scenario from being reliable. 
Lackey (2008: 77-79) responds to this kind of objection by claiming that her 
modifications from the 1999 version to the 2008 version resolve the addressed 
problems. While the 1999-teacher testifies about evolutionary theory because it is 
required to do so by the school, the 2008-teacher does so because she recognises 
and values the scientific evidence in support of the Darwinian theory. However, 
this adaptation does not resolve the issues at hand: what Lackey offers is merely a 
shift in the underlying reason for the teacher to act upon from a factor which is in 
the teacher’s environment (her school) to a factor that lies within her cognitive 
system (her evaluation). Yet, this does not increase the reliability of the proffered 
testimony – it might even be argued that such a shift decreases the reliability if 
the teacher’s psychological goings-on are regarded as less stable than the school’s 
policy on what is to be taught. 
It seems fair to say that it is possible to believe one thing and assert another. 
Whenever a teacher acknowledges her school’s requirement to teach something 
she does not personally believe in, the discord in her cognitive system need not be 
very complex: she merely asserts that q because it is required to do so. This is 
Lackey’s original case from her (1999). If, on the other hand, Stella may teach 
whatever she deems to be the most reasonable theory available, and she arrives at 
this theory through her own research, then there has to be a proactive decision to 
switch between paradigms. In this sense, one would have to imagine two (or 
more) different paradigms between which a person can actively choose and pick. 
Indeed, this is the wording of Lackey’s cited example of a palaeontologist who 
claims: “‘I am separating the different paradigms’” (2008: 49 n. 24). As a 
consequence, a speaker’s decision to move from one paradigm (the one she 
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believes in) to another (the one she does not believe in) introduces a distortion 
which undermines the reliability of her testimony. 
In other words, there is a set of premises (concerning the belief in the 
creative powers of a Christian God) which can be considered true or false. 
Depending on whether one considers these premises (as true) or discards them (as 
false), the conclusion of what one believes to be true (evolutionary theory or 
creationism) will change. Naturally, Stella does not mention to her audience that 
her statement critically hinges on considerations of whether or not one accepts a 
set of background premises. Rather, she quietly makes a decision that the 
paradigm which she considers appropriate for herself is not appropriate for her 
students. In her private paradigm, the Christian premises are accepted as true and 
the best supported conclusion is that p is true (and q is false). In the testimonial 
paradigm, the premises are discarded as false and the best supported conclusion is 
that q is true (and p is false). This strikes me as a pathological form of testimony 
from which an audience cannot acquire knowledge. 
In order to make this point clearer, we can imagine that Stella takes a 
sabbatical to teach at a Jainist school for a semester instead. She might recognise 
that the accepted belief among Jainists is that the universe is eternal and has 
always existed. Of course, this is in stark contrast to her belief that a Christian 
God created the universe out of nothing. Stella would now have to make a 
decision which paradigm is the most appropriate to choose from when she speaks 
about the origins of life. If we assume that she is now not only aware of the 
Darwinian scientific paradigm and the Christian paradigm but also of the Jainist 
paradigm, the complexity of her decision-making process has increased. It appears 
to be an unsupportable view that Stella may still simply choose a paradigm which 
she regards as the most appropriate for her audience and testify accordingly. 
If a speaker deliberately picks one of a multitude of paradigms according to 
her audience then the testimonial scenario is severly deviant from an exemplar 
case. As such, »Creationist Teacher« can certainly not function as the spearhead 
of a new theory of testimony. The least we can say is that a case in which a 
speaker holds two or more contradictory paradigms in her cognitive system and 
chooses to adapt her statements according to her audience is a highly complex and 
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controversial scenario. I maintain that there are no clear intuitions about such a 
case and Lackey fails to show that an audience confronted with such a speaker 
comes to know from her statements regardless of the speaker’s beliefs. To come 
to know that p from a speaker’s statement that p requires that there be a reliable 
connection between p and the speaker’s testimony that p. This condition is 
violated in »Creationist Teacher«. The example fails to rebut the TEP-N thesis. 
b) »Consistent Liar« 
The second case adds to the project set out by »Creationist Teacher«. A girl 
suffers from a brain lesion which has the (far-fetched) consequence that, for any 
sighting of an animal {a1, a2, … an}, whenever she sees an animal as, she believes 
it to be a token of animal as+1. A neurosurgeon recognises this pathology and, 
believing this to be the best available option, creates a second lesion which lets 
the girl lie consistently about her beliefs. As Lackey puts it: 
“Unfortunately, Dr. Jones discovered during the surgery that he couldn’t 
repair the lesion – instead, he decided to modify her current lesion and 
create another one so that her pattern of lying would be extremely 
consistent and would combine in a very precise way with a pattern of 
consistent perceptual unreliability.” (Ibid.: 54) 
Thus, in every instance when the girl believes she saw as+1 she now lies and 
testifies that she saw as. This applies to the whole range of animals the girl 
possibly sees, {a1, a2, … an}. Concerning her belief, the type of animal is shifted 
to the »next« species (as+1); concerning her testimony, the type of animal is shifted 
back to the »previous« species (as+1–1). As a result, and in accordance with 
»Creationist Teacher«, the imaginary girl now reliably testifies about something 
she herself does not believe and thus not know.15 
An immediate objection to this case must arise by noting that there is no 
ordered list of animals {a1, a2, … an} in the world within which the girl’s belief 
and testimony can respectively shift to and fro. It is not clear why, as a result of 
the performed brain surgery, the girl would: see as, believe as+1 and report as rather 
                                                
15 I owe this form of presenting the case to some degree to Faulkner (2009: 482). 
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than: see as, believe as+1 and report as+x. Lackey acknowledges this fact when she 
says that, instead of the actual lie, the girl “could tell an unrelated lie” (ibid.: 55, 
emphasis added). However, Lackey does not give any indication as to why the 
unrelated lie is any less likely to be uttered by the girl other than her inclination to 
lie in the aforementioned pattern due to the brain surgery. The girl simply fulfils 
Nozick’s sensitivity condition (Nozick 1981) and Sosa’s safety condition (Sosa 
1996, 1999, 2002) ex hypothesi. In spite of the striking absurdity of the scenario 
on which this case rests, these issues shall be neglected for the moment as I 
believe there to be a far more fundamental problem with this counterexample. 
Lackey’s overarching project is to understand the nature of human testimony 
and to comprehend what epistemological role testimony plays in our reality. Put 
differently, Lackey tries to make explicit what conditions need to be fulfilled in 
order for a hearer to acquire knowledge through the testimony of a speaker. In 
order to evaluate the ascription of hearer-knowledge, Lackey then needs to respect 
the relevant societal and cognitive mechanisms which are at work when we try to 
understand the nature of testimony. 
Let me elaborate on what I mean by »the relevant societal and cognitive 
mechanisms«. Lackey acknowledges that a basic concept of human psychology is 
at the core of any speaker-hearer scenario. A testifier, in the true sense, is a person 
with intentional attitudes: 
“[T]estimonial beliefs are acquired from persons. Persons, unlike other 
sources of belief, have all sorts of different intentions, desires, goals, 
motives, and so on.” (Lackey 2008: 189) 
Bearing in mind the significant modification of the girl’s brain in Lackey’s 
example, it is therefore up for debate whether the hearer’s belief, that there is an 
animal as present, qualifies as a testimonial belief after all. The way the example 
goes, the speaker does not believe whatever statement she proffers and her saying 
so, although not consciously deceitful, is a case of leading others astray. The 
connection between the speaker’s intentional attitudes on the one hand and her 
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statements on the other is pathological to a degree where her personhood has 
become doubtful.16 
Although Lackey (ibid.: 55-56) argues that »Consistent Liar« is not a case of 
inferential knowledge, there is nothing in the case that suggests this verdict. 
According to Faulkner (2011: 74), Lackey can appreciate knowledge we acquire 
from Bertha’s reports as testimonial “only because she draws no distinction 
between such knowledge and inductive knowledge acquired from testimony.” 
Edward Craig (1990: 35-44) introduces a useful distinction for this matter: 
testifying that p without holding the belief that p – and without having any 
intention to convey the information that p –, the girl falls short of being a “good 
informant” about her animal sightings and she can merely be used as a “source of 
information.” Craig’s concept of an informant is roughly that of a person with an 
intention, a capacity to empathise with an enquirer and a propensity to cooperate 
with other people. Conversely, mere sources of information are “states of affairs 
[…] which have evidential value: information can be gleaned from them” (ibid.: 
35) “[but] they have none of the psychology of the prototypical informant” (ibid.: 
38). 
For Craig, the concept of testimonial knowledge is strongly tied to the idea 
of a good informant; beliefs acquired from sources of information, on the 
contrary, are not prototypical instances of testimony. At this stage, the 
consistently lying girl fits Craig’s description of a source of information like a 
glove: she has no intention of conveying a belief she holds, but rather there is 
merely a consistent pattern in her utterances which enables a hearer to extract 
information from her statements. 
Although probably not purposely, Lackey’s wording in her description of the 
case is consistent with Craig’s account: “[I]t is clear that [the girl’s] statements, 
unlike her beliefs, are an excellent epistemic source of information about wild 
animals” (2008: 55, final emphasis added). The consequences of these 
considerations for Craig are that the route to a reliable belief through a source of 
information is by far not as straightforward as via a good informant. Put 
                                                
16 I will reraise this issue in section 3.1.3 when I attempt a general refutation of Lackey’s critique 
of reductionism. 
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differently, a hearer is not entitled to testimonial knowledge from a mere source of 
information without additional background knowledge and supplementary 
(inferential) epistemic work. 
For Lackey, there are two possible strategies to respond to this objection: 
either, to insist that the girl, in spite of the profound modifications of her brain, is 
still a person in the full sense with beliefs and desires relevant for her statements; 
or, to work with a definition of testimony which directly and explicitly subsumes 
cases in which a speaker does not (necessarily) intend to convey the information 
that her statement reasonably contains. I take both of these strategies to fail. 
Concerning the first option, in order for the girl to be a person – and not, say, 
a mechanical instrument which has been hard-wired to function in only one, 
exactly foreseeable way – her intentional attitudes must be able to manifest 
themselves in the form of choices. In other words, the girl’s beliefs and desires 
must be given the chance to combine in a variety of ways which she can choose 
from and according to which she can act. Only when her intentional attitudes play 
a role in determining the course of her actions can we speak of a person in the 
full-blooded sense. However, the ascription of a certain leeway concerning beliefs 
and desires upon which the girl acts in combination with her absolute 
incompetence and insincerity must have a detrimental effect on the reliability of 
the truth-conduciveness of her statements. 
It is true that Lackey, being committed to her SVT, emphasises that a 
speaker’s competence and sincerity are not necessary conditions for a successful 
testimonial scenario. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that she holds that these two 
features – competence as a believer and sincerity as a testifier – are precisely the 
“two aspects that are often involved in rendering a speaker a reliable testifier” 
(ibid.: 189). Lackey does not provide an argument in favour of why neither the 
fact that the girl has no true beliefs nor the fact that she never says what she 
believes to be true affect the reliability of her testimony in a negative way. 
Presumably, the reliability of her statements has to suffer if the two salient 
conditions of Lackey’s example are fulfilled: she exclusively forms false beliefs 
and she lies about her false beliefs without exception. 
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Concerning the second option, Lackey could accept that the girl in her 
example does not act according to her intentional attitudes when she proffers her 
testimony while still being a person overall. Since Lackey admits that the notion 
of testimony is tied to the notion of a person, the consistently lying girl still has to 
have beliefs and desires in general – for only, Lackey might say, they play no role 
in this singled-out case of testimony. 
It is not clear, however, how Lackey would formulate an attempt to revise 
our concept of testimony by means of a philosophical counterexample when the 
very example she presents has to be regarded as an exception to the general rule. 
Claiming that the girl is a person with intentional attitudes in general – but that 
these intentional attitudes have no role to play in her reports about animal 
sightings – would make the whole endeavour of the counterexample 
contradictory. 
Lackey does, in fact, introduce a definition of testimony under which a 
speaker, qua person, does not have to intend in any way to convey the very 
information she is actually conveying. Under the description of her “disjunctive 
view of the nature of testimony (DVNT)” (ibid.: 35-36) it suffices that either the 
speaker “reasonably intends to convey the information that p” or the act of 
communication “is or should be reasonably taken as conveying the information 
that p.” Such a move would allow for precisely the kind of breathing-space 
Lackey needs: to let assertions count as testimony even in case that the speaker is 
not a person in the sense that her intentional attitudes are relevant in any way for 
her utterance. 
Yet, I regard this move to be too drastic. To broaden the scope of testimony 
by claiming that it is not necessary that a speaker “reasonably intends to convey 
the information that p” is tantamount to saying that testimony may stem from any 
source, not just from a person. As a consequence, Lackey has to reintroduce this 
as an extra condition – that testimony has to stem from a person – while 
maintaining that the personhood need not have any relation to the utterance in 
question. On Lackey’s terms, it suffices that the hearer supposes that a certain 
statement comes from a person even if the personhood of that person is not 
causally responsible for the proffered report. There is a sense in which this broad 
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definition of testimony is controversial as it makes it impossible to distinguish 
between a person who intends to tell the temperature outside and a thermometer 
with an audio output. I take the speaker condition of the DVNT as a necessary 
condition on testimony and thus reject the idea that »Consistent Liar« presents a 
purely (or even predominantly) testimonial scenario.17 
c) »Doubting Thomas« 
»Doubting Thomas« is merely a variation of the second case. Therefore, the same 
objections apply mutatis mutandis. At the core of the example is a brilliant 
scientist Thomas, who is crippled by severe self-doubt. As a result, he fails to 
believe his own findings, p, yet his audience is able to get to know that p via his 
testimony: 
“After uncovering evidence that [p], his doubts prevent him from coming 
to believe in the truth of this evidence. Nevertheless, his intellectual 
integrity leads him to feel an obligation to present his true and reliably 
acquired research to his colleagues, most of whom readily accept his 
testimony […].” (Ibid.: 58 n. 39) 
Naturally, as the example is not built around a modified human brain, the first 
objection from »Consistent Liar« (against Lackey’s treatment of actual societal 
and cognitive mechanisms) is to be dropped. Similarly, the initial concern that 
animals are not found in a list has no application here. Instead, however, there are 
analogous problems with how the situation is described: the presentation of new 
scientific findings which are to be added to the existing body of knowledge cannot 
be regarded as a straightforward, one-dimensional testimonial procedure where a 
speaker tells a hearer that p and the hearer gets to know that p by this process 
                                                
17 To be precise, Lackey (2008: 56 n. 35) insists that the girl in »Consistent Liar« fulfils not only 
the hearer condition of the DVNT but also the speaker condition: “[U]nlike non-testimonial sources 
of information – such as thermometers and odometers – [the girl] reasonably intends to convey 
information in virtue of the communicable content of her assertion, even if she does not intend to 
express the particular content that she does.” Such an understanding of the speaker condition, 
however, results in an insupportably wide notion of testimony. Under such a description, every 
instance of a slip of a tongue, every misunderstood acataphasy or misconceived blabber which is 
(for whatever reason) reliably true would arguably lead to testimonial hearer-knowledge – I take 
this to be an undesirable outcome. 
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simpliciter. The code of conduct would require a scientific debate as well as 
independent corroboration or rejection of the theses. As Johnathan Adler puts it: 
“[I]n any institutional setting, such as science, where information is 
acquired purposefully, application of testimony is to be expected, so that 
the dependence upon trust is soon swamped by success or failure in its 
use.” (Adler 1994: 267) 
Thus, hearer-knowledge on such grounds could never be purely testimonial. If, 
then, after a certain level of scrutiny and review, the researcher would still not 
believe his own (corroborated) results and disregard what is now commonly 
regarded as positive evidence, it seems that this would again be a case of a 
»cognitive malfunction« à la Audi. 
2.3.2. The speaker has an undefeated defeater 
The first three cases are about a speaker who testifies that p without believing that 
p due to an impossible ambiguity of her mental states (»Creationist Teacher«), 
surreal brain lesions (»Consistent Liar«) or inadequate scientific belief-formation 
processes (»Doubting Thomas«). All three of these examples are improper 
alterations of the reality Lackey is trying to understand. In contrast, the examples 
four, five and six deal with a scenario where a speaker has an undefeated defeater 
about a proposition (accordingly, the speaker does not know the proposition in 
question) which is not transferred to the hearer (so the hearer may have 
testimonial knowledge about the proposition). The result would be hearer-
knowledge without preceding speaker-knowledge. 
In order to reject Lackey’s refutation of the TEP-N thesis it is necessary that 
no counterexample is accepted as cast-iron proof against the belief view. In 
principle, it would suffice for her account if there were a single indisputable 
counterexample. Yet, I will argue that also the following three cases fall short of 
providing a compelling argument against the TEP-N thesis. 
a) »Persistent Believer« 
In the fourth example, »Persistent Believer«, a speaker testifies about her visual 
perception, and in so doing ignores the medical advice she received that her 
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perceptions are impaired after having undergone surgery. Lackey argues that 
knowledge, although missing on the side of the speaker, is nevertheless acquired 
by the hearer for he does not know anything about the surgery and any potential 
consequences for the speaker’s reliability. The argument is thus built on the idea 
that the speaker has a psychological defeater which is not transferred to the hearer. 
In Lackey’s formulation: 
“Millicent in fact possesses her normal visual powers, but she has cogent 
reasons to believe that these powers are temporarily deranged. She is the 
subject of a neurosurgeon’s experiments, and the surgeon falsely tells her 
that some implants are causing malfunction in her visual cortex. While she 
is persuaded that her present visual appearances are an entirely unreliable 
guide to reality, she continues to place credence in her visual appearances. 
She ignores her well-supported belief in the incapacitation of her visual 
faculty; [the beliefs she forms] are all, in fact, true and they are formed by 
the usual, quite reliable perceptual processes. […] On the basis of her 
visual experience, she forms the corresponding true belief that [p], and 
then later reports this fact to her friend Bradley without communicating the 
neurosurgeon’s testimony to him.” (Lackey 2008: 59) 
Construed in this way, however, the example downplays a crucial point: while 
testifying, the speaker leaves out very relevant pieces of information about her 
current state of mind. She was well aware of the fact that her vision is likely to be 
significantly impaired at the time – she believes her vision to be impaired –, yet 
omits this piece of information in her testimony. The speaker has a defeater which 
she decides not to mention alongside the content of the statement she proffers. 
This is deceitful and an epistemically reprehensible practice. Had the speaker been 
open about her situation and disclosed that she had been told (and that she 
believes) that she is currently unreliable when it comes to her visual perceptions 
this alone would have been enough to establish a defeater for the hearer. The 
hearer, then, would not be said to know, either. 
Lackey refuses to believe that defeaters are transferred to the hearer in 
testimonial scenarios. I concur with this view. Defeaters, much like a warrant, 
cannot hitchhike their way from person to person. Instead, there is an epistemic 
burden on the hearer to be sensitive to indicators of falsity when being told 
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something.18 The defeater for the hearer would have to be established anew, by 
and through the hearer herself. 
Consequently, in »Persistent Believer«, the question is not whether or not the 
speaker’s defeater is transferred to the hearer – it seems non-controversial that it is 
not – but rather whether Millicent’s deceitful report may reasonably constitute 
testimonial knowledge. Millicent is dishonest when she presents her true belief 
that p as knowledge that p when in fact she knew that she had a defeater for the 
belief in question. As I understand it, Millicent could have just as well based her 
belief that p on wishful thinking; she is convinced that the process which led to 
her belief that p was epistemically inadequate. Under such circumstances it is 
doubtful if Bradley can really come to know from her report. The relationship 
between what Millicent believes to be the case and what Millicent reports to be 
the case is entirely arbitrary. My intuition is that, for this reason, her reports fail to 
be reliably true. As a result, knowledge cannot be ascribed to the hearer. 
To counter Lackey’s example, imagine a case in which I stand at the patio 
window with my eyes closed (for the sake of the argument my eyes have been 
closed ever since I was standing at the window). On the face of it, I am looking 
outside when my friend asks me whether his dog is outside in the garden. 
Standing behind me, my friend is unable to see that I have my eyes closed and so 
takes me to be a good testifier on the subject. I could open my eyes and actually 
look outside, or I could tell my friend that I do not know because I have my eyes 
closed. However, since I am already annoyed by the repeated questions about the 
whereabouts of the dog, I decide to simply say: »Yes it is.« In fact, the dog is 
outside and my friend believes me that the dog is outside. What is more, my 
friend has good reasons to believe me when I say his dog is outside as I am 
usually very caring and thoughtful about my friend’s concerns. In fact, it was the 
very first time that I lost my temper about the dog and deceitfully gave an answer 
for which I had no grounds. 
In the described situation, certainly I did not know that the dog was outside. I 
had no grounds for such a belief since I knew my eyes were closed but I decided 
                                                
18 I take it that this minimum requirement is one which reductionists, non-reductionists, and 
dualists (like Lackey) could agree with. 
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not to mention this to my friend. By this very omission I consciously deceive my 
friend by presenting something as knowledge when actually I do not know the 
proposition in question. For this reason, I argue that neither my friend in the 
counterexample nor the hearer in Lackey’s case can gain knowledge through 
testimony as long as crucial parts of information are deceitfully omitted by the 
speaker. 
To speak with Nozick, there is a (relevant) close possible world in which the 
speaker’s defeater is mentioned and this alone would install a defeater for the 
hearer. It seems unreasonable to ascribe knowledge to the hearer with the 
epistemic basis for so doing being precisely the omission of epistemically relevant 
information. Had I honestly mentioned that my eyes were closed my friend would 
not have come to form a justified belief that the dog is outside. Likewise, had the 
girl mentioned her belief that she is presumably unreliable the hearer would not 
have justifiedly believed her testimony. 
b) »Serious Student« 
The main character of »Serious Student« has sceptical doubts. He does not know 
where the next Starbucks is simply due to the fact that he, qua sceptic, does not 
believe to hold any knowledge at all. His scepticism notwithstanding, the speaker 
testifies about the location of the next Starbucks without mentioning that he holds 
not to know this: 
“[…] Bartholomew finds himself in the grips of skeptical worries that are 
so strong that he can scarcely be said to know anything at all. […] Audrey 
[…] asks him where the nearest Starbucks is, and he reports that it is 
around the corner – which he believes from having seen it there himself – 
but does not report his skeptical worries to her.” (Ibid.: 61) 
Lackey’s aim, once again, is to create a scenario where a hearer gets to know that 
p via the testimony of a speaker who is ignorant concerning p. Her strategy in 
»Serious Student« is to situate the speaker and the hearer in different contexts so 
that the standards of knowledge attribution vary for the two people involved: 
“[A] testifier in one context may be able to impart knowledge […] that she 
cannot properly attribute to herself to a hearer in another context because, 
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relative to such contexts, they are held to different epistemic standards.” 
(Ibid.: 62) 
Following Lackey, the difference in the philosopher’s verdict between the hearer 
and the speaker stems from the idea that they find themselves in distinct epistemic 
contexts. The speaker, being a sceptic, may believe that p and also report that p, 
but he cannot himself know that p. The hearer, being an ordinary person without 
sceptical worries, may come to know that p on the basis of the speaker’s say-so. 
However, this presentation of the scenario is flawed for Lackey’s assessment 
suffers from a misunderstanding of contextualism. The alleged divergence in the 
verdict of the knowledge attribution between Bartholomew and Audrey can only 
arise from an illegitimate manipulation of the contextual standards. Ultimately, 
either both or neither of them know that p, depending on whether the judgement is 
made according to the sceptical or the ordinary standard. It is illegitimate to blend 
the two perspectives. 
The basic idea of contextualism is that the attribution of knowledge to a 
person will depend on minimum standards of what it is to know something. This 
will vary depending on features of the context of an interlocution (cf. DeRose 
1992, 1995). Accordingly, some conversational contexts require higher standards 
of knowledge than others. A person may know that p in one context and yet, if the 
conversational environment changes, fail to know that p in another. The context, 
here, is a function of various features which determine the frame of reference for 
the requirements of knowledge. 
A famous example to illustrate this idea is Dretske’s zoo (1970: 1015-1016): 
looking at what appear to be zebras, a man would normally claim to know that he 
is looking at zebras. However, if he were told that the zoo might have painted 
mules to look like zebras in order to fool its visitors, his knowledge is called into 
question. Therefore, whether or not the man knows that he is looking at zebras 
depends on how high the standard for such knowledge is set. This is a question of 
relevant alternatives: as long as the man is only asked to tell zebras from other 
well-known animals at the zoo, he can legitimately claim to know that he is 
looking at zebras. Then, as soon as somebody challenges him by asking if he 
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could distinguish between a mule which is cleverly painted to look like a zebra 
and an actual zebra, his most appropriate response may be to admit that he does 
not know that he is looking at actual zebras. In the second case, the difference is 
that the conversational context has been manipulated by raising the threshold for 
knowledge to a higher standard. 
At this point, it is important to note that, by default, not every alternative is a 
relevant alternative (ibid.: 1022). Had the man asserted, say, to his child that he 
knew that the animals in front of them are zebras, in ordinary conditions, his 
behaviour would certainly not be epistemically blameworthy. It is only after the 
features of the scenario are manipulated that his claim to knowledge would be 
intuitively false. As soon as the possibility of mules disguised as zebras is a 
feature of the scenario, it must be regarded as a relevant alternative for that 
interlocution. This alternative is irrelevant until it is introduced; it can be made a 
relevant alternative if some feature of the scenario changes and raises the standard 
for knowledge. 
This is where Lackey goes astray in »Serious Student«. The way the 
example is presented, there is (and can be) no feature of the conversational 
context which reasonably calls for a higher standard of what it is to know 
something. On the contrary: there are features of the interlocution between 
Bartholomew and Audrey which indicate that the only reasonable standard to 
apply is the ordinary standard (according to which Bartholomew knows where the 
nearest Starbucks is). 
Bartholomew’s sceptical worries are indeed capable of raising the standard 
of what can count as knowledge. Yet, nothing in the interlocution points to such a 
manipulation of the context. Bartholomew does not mention his sceptical worries 
to Audrey and he seems to have forgotten about them even for himself during the 
conversation. Without hesitating, he readily sends Audrey into the direction of 
where he believes the Starbucks to be. This is an indication for the fact that his 
sceptical worries do not play any role in the context of the interlocution. 
Indeed, Bartholomew is most probably aware of the fact that already the 
question asked by Audrey is meaningful only in a non-sceptical context. As a 
consequence, all contextual indicators suggest that the standard for knowledge is 
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not as high as philosophical scepticism would require and Bartholomew must 
acknowledge that according to such standards he knows where the nearest 
Starbucks is. His failure to acknowledge that would be epistemically unreasonable 
and would most likely result in a bizarre dialogue between Audrey and him.19 
The fact that maybe later – after Bartholomew arrived at home and looked 
through the notes from his philosophy class – he realises that he cannot rule out 
that he is a brain in a vat and therefore does not know anything does not change 
the context of the conversation he had earlier. If anything, a new assessment of the 
case under new circumstances will lead to a different verdict; but these two 
assessments cannot be blended into one. The epistemic context and with it the 
standard for knowledge are a function of contextual indicators. There must be 
features of a scenario which set this standard. An analysis of knowledge 
attribution must therefore respond to such contextual indicators and arrive at a 
conclusion about the adequate standard for knowledge. If, and only if, there are 
features of a scenario which indicate that philosophical scepticism is a relevant 
view for the situation which is to be assessed, the standard for the entire 
interlocution may be manipulated. 
As such, Audrey might have phrased her question differently, like: »Given 
what we learned today, do you really know where the nearest Starbucks is?« 
Likewise, Bartholomew might have had his sceptical worries in mind during the 
conversation and he might have responded by saying: »I remember having the 
visual sensation of a Starbucks around the corner. But given that I might be 
continuously deceived by a deamon, there may not actually be a Starbucks there.« 
Both of these formulations would have introduced philosophical scepticism as a 
relevant alternative for the attribution of knowledge to Bartholomew and Audrey. 
Without such changes, however, it seems clear that Audrey is not looking for 
certainty on the ontological status of the Starbucks in light of sceptical 
considerations; she is (merely) looking for (the sensation of drinking) a coffee 
                                                
19 Imagine, for instance, that Bartholomew answers: »I do not know where the next Starbucks is. I 
do not know anything because I cannot rule out the possibility that I am a brain in a vat.« The most 
appropriate response from Audrey would then be to say: »I do not care about the possibility of 
being a brain in a vat. I want to drink a coffee. For my purposes it completely suffices to find the 
nearest Starbucks according to an ordinary non-sceptical context.« 
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which clearly sets the standard low enough for Bartholomew to speak from 
knowledge. 
In this respect, the ordinary context is the only reasonable context for the 
matter in question and as long as the sceptical alternative is not made a feature of 
the case it cannot alter this context. The sceptical alternative is no relevant 
alternative in »Serious Student«. Making it a relevant alternative at a later, 
unrelated, stage is not apt to manipulate the context of the interlocution. 
Without any feature of the conversation between Bartholomew and Audrey 
relating to the possibility of being a brain in a vat, the standards of philosophical 
scepticism are not reasonable for the situation at stake (cf. DeRose 2009: 141-
142).20 There is no meaningful way in which Audrey could seek to be informed 
about the location of the nearest Starbucks according to the standards of 
philosophical scepticism. Arguably, the sceptical context may be introduced, but 
even then it cannot be regarded as a reasonable alternative if we presume that 
Audrey ultimately just wants to have (the sensation of drinking) a coffee. 
Bartholomew simply has to recognise that the nature of the question asked by 
Audrey only makes sense in non-sceptical terms. There is no meaningful way to 
even look for that information in the light of scepticism. The way »Serious 
Student« is presented, the sceptical context is irrelevant and Bartholomew speaks 
from knowledge when he tells Audrey about the Starbucks. It is for this reason 
that making the speaker a sceptic is not a viable pursuit to affect the TEP-N thesis. 
c) »Dogmatic Believer« 
The last counterexample against the TEP-N thesis, »Dogmatic Believer«, is 
analogous to »Persistent Believer« and effectively I take them to be the same. 
Lackey argues that the former contains a psychological defeater while the latter 
contains a normative defeater for the speaker. In »Persistent Believer«, as quoted 
above, the speaker “is persuaded that her present visual appearances are an 
                                                
20 DeRose does not fully endorse the view that one context is to be regarded as more reasonable 
than another. In general, I concur with his argument that such a view has the undesireable 
consequence that the sceptic and the ordinary context are in contradiction (that is: if one is true the 
other must be false). However, the examples DeRose mentions are in principle very different from 
»Serious Student«. The nature of the question asked by Audrey in »Serious Student« as well as the 
way the conversation between Bartholomew and Audrey goes lead me to think that the argument 
of reasonability is indeed an appropriate response to the challenge posed by Lackey. 
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entirely unreliable guide to reality [yet] she continues to place credence in her 
visual appearances” (ibid.: 59). In »Dogmatic Believer« the speaker “is told […] 
that her vision is extremely unreliable [yet] she refuses to accept this diagnosis” 
(ibid.: 62). I fail to see why one case results in a psychological, the other in a 
normative defeater. 
The key difference between normative and psychological defeaters lies in 
just how they constitute epistemic irrationality within a person’s belief-system. 
While both kinds of defeaters prevent knowledge concerning a certain proposition 
p, psychological defeaters do so “by virtue of being had by [a subject], regardless 
of their truth-value or epistemic status” whereas normative defeaters do so “by 
virtue of being doubts or beliefs that [a subject] should have (whether or not [she] 
does have them) given the presence of certain available evidence” (ibid.: 45). The 
upshot of this idea is that if a person has a psychological defeater or ought to have 
a normative defeater with regards to p (that is itself undefeated) this suffices to 
preclude this person from knowing that p. 
However, as Lackey’s argumentation is such that neither normative nor 
psychological defeaters are transferred via testimony it is, in any case, the same 
arguments that are to be put forward against her view. The non-transmissibility of 
a defeater is not the operative point of the argument; rather, »Dogmatic Believer« 
fails for the same reason as »Persistent Believer«: because Lackey provides an 
inadequate presentation of how a hearer can get to know on the basis of 
testimony. 
_______________ 
The upshot is that also the three examples in which the speaker has an undefeated 
defeater, »Persistent Believer«, »Serious Student« and »Dogmatic Believer«, are 
not apt to refute the TEP-N thesis. This is true for one of the two following 
reasons: either, the speaker’s testimony is to be regarded as the genuine basis of 
the hearer’s belief – then, however, the reason for which the speaker lacks 
knowledge is a fortiori a reason not to ascribe hearer-knowledge. The omission of 
the information about the speaker’s defeater is not compatible with the hearer 
obtaining knowledge. Or, the philosopher’s verdict is that the hearer does have 
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knowledge about the proposition in question – then, however, this knowledge can 
never be truly testimonial in nature. 
In this sense, whenever the hearer wants to acquire knowledge from an 
ignorant speaker quite a profound contribution on the hearer-side is necessary to 
establish knowledge in a reliable way. It is then merely corroboration, that is to 
say additional evidence, that a hearer can extract from such reports and the 
speaker depreciates from being a »good informant« to being a mere »source of 
information«. This is then the (quite different) story of a hearer who is well-
informed about a speaker’s defeater and, at the same time, possesses a defeater-
defeater in order to acquire the knowledge in question. Here, however, one would 
not be prone to speak of knowledge as being acquired purely (or even 
predominantly) on the basis of the proffered testimony.21 
2.4. TRANSMISSIBILITY AND THE BELIEF VIEW 
Throughout the previous two sections, I discussed Lackey’s philosophical 
counterexamples which she introduces to reject the views that speaker-knowledge 
is sufficient to establish hearer-knowledge (section 2.1) and that it is necessary to 
establish hearer-knowledge (section 2.2). Her three examples to reject the 
                                                
21 Lackey (2008: 63 n. 45) addresses this problem herself when she suggests that the speaker in 
»Serious Student« could be frank about his defeater. Similar to my view, Lackey acknowledges 
that a variation of the case where a hearer is in possession of a defeater-defeater “relies too heavily 
on the hearer’s background information and, thus, compromises the purely testimonial nature of 
the knowledge in question” (ibid.). Although I appreciate this conclusion, I believe Lackey is 
going astray in her analysis of this point. 
Concerning the two analogous cases »Persistent Believer« and »Dogmatic Believer« there are two 
options for the evaluation of (testimonial) hearer-knowledge: in the original presentation of the 
case (in which the speaker obscures the fact that she has a knowledge-defeating belief) the hearer 
does not get to know, either. The speaker’s defeater is a fortiori a defeater for the hearer. If the 
scenario is altered in that the speaker is open about her defeater this would prevent the hearer from 
knowing, too. If, ex hypothesi, the hearer knows anyway, this knowledge would not be testimonial 
in nature. Lackey provides this chain of argument for the »Serious Student« case. On my view, 
however, these options are available only for »Persistent Believer« and »Dogmatic Believer«. 
The scenario in »Serious Student« is a different one: whether or not the speaker is open about his 
sceptical doubts is not the critical feature of the case. His sceptical doubts, shared or not, do not 
defeat the practical knowledge about the location of the next Starbucks – neither for the speaker 
nor for the hearer. Consequently, if the speaker is said not to know where the next Starbucks is in 
a relevant kind of way, the defeater has to be anything but his sceptical tenor (cf. my 
argumentation above). Such a reinterpretation leads us back to the first two cases. Within the 
framework of Lackey’s argument, however, the speaker does know, and therefore the epistemic 
status of the speaker does not pose a problem for the evaluation of hearer-knowledge. 
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sufficiency claim make a strong case against the idea that a hearer always gets to 
know that p from the testimony of a speaker as long as the speaker knows that p. 
On the contrary, her six examples concerning the necessity claim fall short of 
providing a basis from which to rebut the view that speaker-knowledge matters 
for a successful testimonial exchange. 
The corollary of the discussion of these nine cases is that the rejection of the 
TEP-N thesis is Lackey’s weak point in her argumentation against the transmission 
principle. Her claim that it is possible for a speaker to reliably testify that p 
without holding the belief that p appears to be distorted. Judging from the 
provided counterexamples, it does not seem plausible in any of the scenarios for a 
hearer to come to know that p on the basis of the unknowing speaker’s testimony. 
I maintain that there are no clear, unequivocal intuitions which speak in favour of 
Lackey’s verdicts concerning her counterexamples. 
Since Lackey chooses to reject the belief view on the basis of philosophical 
counterexamples her analysis would have to provide an airtight proof of the 
shortcomings of the common BVT. Throughout this Chapter, however, I have 
attempted to show that this is not the case. Instead, Lackey merely manages to 
provide compelling arguments against the TEP-S thesis. Her examples against the 
TEP-N thesis raise critical questions about their respective interpretations and as 
such are not strong enough to function as a basis from which to unhinge the belief 
view. As Faulkner writes: 
“The problem is that in arguing against an established view – and it is 
important to the originality of Lackey’s position that the belief view is the 
established view – one inherits a burden of proof, so any argument by 
counterexample must involve a case that is entirely plausible and not open 
to reinterpretation. Lackey’s cases […] do not come near satisfying this 
desideratum.” (Faulkner 2009: 481) 
Essentially, there are two facets to Lackey’s project: the first point is her 
discussion of the impossibility of a transmission of epistemic warrant from a 
speaker to a hearer; the second point, which derives from the first point, is her 
attempt to shift the focus from beliefs to statements in the epistemological debate. 
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Lackey’s idea is this: if it doesn’t matter whether or not the speaker knows 
that p – because her justificatory basis for p is not transferable to the hearer in any 
kind of way – then a second step to disregard the intentional state the speaker is in 
appears to be the obvious next move. Yet, those two aspects are not as closely 
intertwined as Lackey would like them to be. There is a critical gap between those 
two facets; the SVT does not follow from the non-transmissibility of epistemic 
justification. 
It is a relevant distinction for any theory of testimony if, on the one hand, a 
person reports that p because she believes that p and she wants to provide a basis 
for the hearer to also come to believe that p or, on the other hand, if she reports 
that p in spite of believing that ¬p, or without holding the belief that p, or without 
having the intention to report that p, or without having the intention to report that 
p as true. 
In summary, I acknowledge that epistemic credentials are not transferable 
from a speaker to a hearer via testimony. I also acknowledge that speaker-
knowledge that p is not sufficient for testimonial hearer-knowledge that p. 
However, I hold that the BVT is not unhinged by Lackey’s discussion of the 
transmissibility of epistemic credentials as she fails to show that speaker-
knowledge is also not a necessary condition for testimonial hearer-knowledge. 
To claim that beliefs on the speaker-side do not matter epistemically for the 
hearer is equivalent to claiming that the speaker’s beliefs have no influence on the 
nature and quality of the proffered testimony. A person’s intentional attitudes, and 
thus a person’s beliefs, have a role to play in speaker-hearer scenarios. I find it 
undeniable that there are epistemologically relevant connections between what a 
person believes and what a person reports – Lackey tries to downplay this 
connection by her counterexamples in which actual psychological and 
sociological mechanisms remain unappreciated. 
As a result, Lackey oversimplifies the epistemology of testimony by 
sweeping the speaker’s intentional attitudes under the carpet. To argue, in a 
convincing fashion, that epistemic credentials do not piggyback off of the content 
of a proffered statement does not entail that these credential are negligible. Rather, 
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the corollary must be that, in any testimonial exchange, the hearer cannot delegate 
the full epistemic workload to the speaker. 
Even in a case in which the speaker has a profound justificatory basis for her 
belief that p the hearer cannot tap this basis or make it her own simply by 
acknowledging the content of the proffered testimony. Grosso modo, the hearer 
has to contribute and identify whether the testimony stems from a person, who 
intends to convey the message that p as true. The nature of this contribution is at 
the heart of the epistemological debate of reductionism versus non-reductionism. 
While reductionists claim that a hearer needs to have independent positive reasons 
to justifiedly believe the words of others non-reductionists hold that the absence 
of negative reasons to disbelieve a proffered statement suffices to obtain a 
justified testimonial belief. Chapter Three deals with this debate. 
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3. REDUCTIONISM VERSUS NON-REDUCTIONISM 
In Chapter Two, I tried to defend the view that testimony is best regarded as the 
expression of a belief, which is the standard view in the modern epistemology of 
testimony. Lackey (esp. 1999, 2008) provides an elaborate attempt to substitute 
this BVT with a statement-oriented perspective on testimony; as a result, in 
unorthodox cases – in which a hearer acquires a true belief from the testimony of 
a more or less defect believer – knowledge would be attributed to the hearer on 
Lackey’s grounds since it is the statement itself which carries the epistemic 
properties. However, throughout the previous Chapter, her arguments to install the 
SVT were shown to fail on a case-by-case basis as all of her philosophical 
counterexamples appear to be flawed in a significant way. 
At this stage, with the transmissibility of epistemic warrant rejected yet with 
the BVT intact, the scope of the investigation can be broadened to attend to what is 
the core of the present debate in the epistemology of testimony: “the problem of 
showing how it can be the case that a hearer on a particular occasion has the 
epistemic right to believe what she is told – to believe a particular speaker’s 
assertion” (Fricker 1994: 128, emphasis added). Traditionally, two strands have 
been available in the philosophical literature to address this problem: reductionism 
and non-reductionism.22 
The distinction between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts in the 
epistemology of testimony essentially hinges on two questions: first, are the 
epistemic properties of testimonial knowledge reducible to the epistemic 
properties of one or more of the allegedly more basic sources of knowledge – 
perception, memory and inference – and second, and relatedly, are independent 
positive reasons necessary for a hearer to acquire knowledge from a speaker’s 
testimony? Reductionists answer affirmatively to both questions while non-
                                                
22 Arguably, the dichotomy between reductionism and non-reductionism exists in a number of 
applications within and beyond philosophy. What interests us here, however, is a distinction 
entirely confined to the epistemology of testimony. Coady was the first to apply this comparison to 
the epistemology of testimony in his (1973). Although Coady coins the label »anti-reductionism«, 
I will stick to »non-reductionism« and take these two expressions to be synonymous. 
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reductionists deny each of the two claims. Consequently, reductionists put a 
greater responsibility on the hearer who has to continuously monitor a testimonial 
exchange for positive reasons to support a speaker’s testimony whereas non-
reductionists shift the attention towards the speaker who is faced with a hearer 
who is credulous by default. 
Lackey’s view of the discussion is that these two dominant views of the 
epistemic status of testimonial beliefs are equally misguided and that “insofar as 
we wish to make genuine progress in the epistemology of testimony, we need to 
move beyond the debate between reductionism and non-reductionism” (Lackey 
2008: 194). I entirely concur with this verdict. A dichotomous divide between the 
two strands is not able to yield the essence of the notion of testimony. 
I am convinced that there has to be a critique of reductionist positions as they 
are currently found in the philosophical literature. Lackey’s discussion, however, 
has inherent problems and thus falls short of its goal to rebuff reductionism. 
Likewise, there has to be a critique of the currently available non-reductionist 
positions in epistemology. Analogously, however, Lackey does not provide a 
solid basis from which to reject non-reductionism. In other words, while I agree 
with Lackey’s agenda to point out the limitations in both reductionism and non-
reductionism, I disagree with her concrete chains of argumentation against these 
two views. 
The following sections 3.1 and 3.2 will deal with what I regard as the 
shortcomings of Lackey’s discussion of reductionism and non-reductionism 
respectively. I will begin by introducing Lackey’s understanding and criticism of 
reductionism (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2) to then present my objections to her views 
(section 3.1.3). Accordingly, sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 illustrate Lackey’s 
understanding and criticism of non-reductionism, before I will argue against her 
presentation in section 3.2.3. 
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3.1. REDUCTIONISM 
3.1.1. Lackey’s understanding of reductionism 
Lackey acknowledges that there is a common distinction between two forms of 
reductionism: global reductionism (GR) and local reductionism (LR). GR relates 
back to passages of David Hume’s (2000) Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, and especially to his §§ 88 and 89 of section X, »Of Miracles«. 
Conveying the argument that (testimonial) belief in the truth of Christian 
Scripture must be regarded as far less evident than (perceptual) belief in the truth 
of objects we observe with our senses, Hume notoriously writes: 
“The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not 
derived from any connexion, which we perceive à priori, between 
testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity 
between them.” (Ibid.: § 89) 
On this view, we believe a speaker because we have become accustomed to a 
special accord between testimonial reports and what we believe (independently of 
those reports) to be true. As Coady maintains, such a view can be understood as a 
process by which the epistemic properties of testimonial knowledge invariably 
boil down to the epistemic properties of inference and ultimately to our direct 
perceptual observations: 
“[Hume’s] theory constitutes a reduction of testimony as a form of 
evidence or support to the status of a species (one might almost say, a 
mutation) of inductive inference. And, again, insofar as inductive inference 
is reduced by Hume to a species of observation and consequences 
attendant upon observations then in a like fashion testimony meets the 
same fate.” (Coady 1973: 149) 
The upshot of these considerations is that testimonial knowledge is always 
dependent upon other sources of epistemic justification and that any such source 
which justifies testimonial knowledge is regarded as epistemically more 
fundamental. Since, ipso facto, a testimonial source cannot provide ultimate 
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justifying reasons for a belief, testimonial justification inevitably reduces to 
justification from perception, memory and inference.  
The Humean view thus suggest a highly individualistic conception of 
knowledge as any agent would have to be in a position to justify her beliefs by 
reference to her own direct (non-testimonial) experience. Such a notion has been 
heavily criticised as, with strong evident limits about the reach of any person’s 
direct experiential observations, GR runs the risk of rendering the category of 
testimonial knowledge very narrow, or even resulting in testimonial scepticism.23 
In the tradition of Tony Coady (esp. 1992) and Alvin Goldman (esp. 2002) it is 
therefore widely accepted that “such sweeping global reductionism has gone out 
of fashion” (Gelfert 2009: 172). 
Lackey, in line with this view, does not think that a general reliability of 
testimony (as a unitary category) can be established as a justificatory basis for 
hearer-knowledge (Lackey 2008: 146-148). With GR out of the picture she thus 
focuses her rejection of reductionism on LR. Her main target is Elizabeth Fricker 
(esp. 1994, 1995). Fricker rebuts the idea that all-encompassing a posteriori 
knowledge serves to establish a general reliability of testimony. Instead, on her 
grounds, testimony reduces locally in that each and every instance of testimony 
requires its own corroborating positive reasons to be justified. 
Lackey does not explicitly give a summary of the full account she sets out to 
criticise. However, from her presentation of how the weaknesses of reductionism 
are to be overcome it can be understood that the following definition of LR is what 
Lackey has in mind: 
LR: A hearer is epistemically entitled to believe a speaker’s testimony 
that p iff 
                                                
23 Cf. Coady (1992: 82) when he writes: “[M]any of us have never seen a baby born, nor have most 
of us examined the circulation of the blood nor the actual geography of the world nor any fair 
sample of the laws of the land, nor have we made the observations that lie behind our knowledge 
that the lights in the sky are heavenly bodies immensely distant nor a vast number of other 
observations that [global reductionism] would seem to require.” In a similar spirit, Faulkner (1998: 
303) refuses to adopt testimonial scepticism: “[…] I do not merely believe that there is a major 
ocean current flowing from the Gulf of Mexico to North-West Europe but I know that there is. 
Likewise, I do not merely believe that there have been two World Wars this century, but I know 
that this is so.” 
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(1) the hearer comes to believe that p on the basis of the content of 
the speaker’s testimony; 
(2) there are no indications of insincerity of the speaker and the 
hearer is counterfactually sensitive to such indications; 
(3) either the hearer is in a developmental phase of her epistemic 
understanding, or24 the proffered testimony is about a mundane 
subject-matter, or the hearer has a posteriori, non-testimonial, 
positive reasons to believe that the speaker is competent with 
regards to the particular testimony at stake; and 
(4) the hearer has acquired these reasons as a combination of, on 
the one hand, relevant non-testimonial background information 
about the speaker and the occasion and, on the other hand, a critical 
psychological interpretation which, in the form of a minimal theory 
of the speaker, is apt to explain why the testimony has been 
proffered. 
Under this description, it is noteworthy that the hearer’s responsibility is qualified 
on two aspects: concerning sincerity, it suffices for any hearer to be 
counterfactually sensitive to indicators of its absence; concerning competence, 
there are two significant exceptions: firstly, toddlers and young children are 
excused from the LR arena as they are in their “developmental phase” (Fricker 
1995: 401-406) where they are still learning the very concepts needed to engage 
in critical epistemic scrutiny. Secondly, there are mundane subject matters which 
are trivial enough so that a default-acceptance is rational.25 Like in the case of 
sincerity, the speaker must nonetheless be counterfactually sensitive to any 
indication of a lack of competence even in the case of mundane testimony. 
                                                
24 Although logically there is no reason for these conditions to be mutually exclusive, for the 
coherence of LR it will factually be the case that the »or« is twice read as an exclusive disjunction. 
25 I borrow the term »mundane subject matters« from Weiner (2003: 262) who subsumes under 
this umbrella term “things that are readily available to speakers’ senses and memory, as well as 
things (such as one’s date of birth) that almost everyone is told by someone who saw or 
remembered it.” Fricker (1995: 405) illustrates her intention herself by enumerating “subject 
matters for which common sense psychological knowledge licences one to expect the speaker to 
be competent about […]: such as her name, where she lives, what she had for breakfast, what is in 
clear view in front of her, and so forth.” 
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Confining LR to mature recipients and non-mundane topics, the domain now 
excludes cases in which a default-acceptance view appears preferable. For every 
other scenario, the local reductionist argues that when a speaker asserts that p, it is 
possible (and actually feasible) for a hearer to obtain independent empirical 
evidence necessary and sufficient to warrant her in taking the speaker to be 
trustworthy (or not) with respect to the concrete assertion that p. In Christopher 
Insole’s words: 
“When considering the possibility of local reduction, there is no problem 
over and above that of establishing on a given occasion that the speaker is 
sincere and competent.” (Insole 2000: 48, emphasis added) 
Relevant background knowledge about the speaker and the occasion in 
combination with knowledge acquired directly through the scrutiny of the 
testimonial scenario then provide the hearer with an understanding of the 
trustworthiness of the speaker (concerning the testimony at stake). Put differently, 
the hearer must “engage in a piece of a psychological interpretation of her 
informant” (Fricker 1995: 404) in order to arrive at a common-sense “explanatory 
mini-theory” (ibid.: 405) of why the speaker makes a certain assertion. 
Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the mature hearer to put together 
enough of a model of the speaker and the occasion in order to construct an 
evaluation of the competence and sincerity she is faced with. Such an explanatory 
model is the local reductionist’s necessary condition to establish testimonial 
hearer-knowledge. A key passage of LR concerning such speaker-interpretation 
can be found in Fricker’s (1994) and is worth quoting at length: 
“In recognising an utterance by a speaker as a speech act of serious 
assertion, with a certain content, a hearer is ipso facto engaging in a 
minimal piece of interpretation of the speaker – ascribing to her an 
intentional action of a certain kind, and hence at the very least supposing 
the existence of some configuration of beliefs and desires which explain 
that action. The theme of my account is: the epistemically responsible 
hearer will do a bit more of the same. She will assess the speaker for 
sincerity and competence, by engaging in at least a little more 
interpretation of her.” (Fricker 1994: 148) 
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In view of what has been said, Lackey has as a target the following structure of 
premises and conclusions of the local reductionist’s argument: 
(P0) Testimony is a significant and rich source of knowledge. 
(P1) To trust a speaker with regards to her testimony either requires 
complementary empirical reasons to do so or a special presumptive 
epistemic right concerning testimony. 
(P2) There is no unconditional special presumptive epistemic right 
concerning testimony. 
(P3a) For toddlers and young children who are in the developmental 
phase of their epistemic understanding there is a special 
presumptive epistemic right which justifies a default-acceptance 
concerning testimony. 
(P3b) For mundane subject-matters there is a special presumptive 
epistemic right which justifies a default-acceptance concerning 
testimony. 
(C1) There is a need for complementary empirical reasons to justifiedly 
accept a speaker’s testimony26 unless the hearer is in a 
developmental phase of her epistemic life or the subject-matter is a 
mundane topic. 
And further: 
(P4) Empirical reasons are sufficient to justify the acceptance of a 
speaker’s testimony27 as long as these reasons are evidence about 
the speaker’s sincerity and competence regarding the particular 
item of testimony and relevant background information about the 
speaker and occasion. 
                                                
26 This is what Fricker calls the PR-N thesis: positive reasons are necessary to justify hearer-
knowledge. 
27 This is what Fricker calls the PR-S thesis: positive reasons are sufficient to justify hearer-
knowledge. In combination with the PR-N thesis, then, LR strongly relies on the idea that a 
posteriori reasons are both necessary and sufficient to justify a testimonial belief (PR-N&S). 
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(P5a) As mature hearers, we are in a position to directly evaluate a 
speaker’s sincerity and competence regarding the particular item of 
testimony in order to gain a corroborating (or defeating) belief 
about the trustworthiness of the report in question. 
(P5b) As mature hearers, we are in a position to deploy relevant 
background knowledge about the speaker and occasion in order to 
gain a corroborating (or defeating) belief about the trustworthiness 
of the report in question. 
(C2) As mature hearers, we are in a position to acquire complementary 
empirical reasons which are sufficient to justify the acceptance of a 
particular item of testimony. 
3.1.2. Lackey’s critique of reductionism 
Lackey criticises LR like she criticised the transmission of epistemic warrant, by 
way of a philosophical counterexample.28 »Nested Speaker« is directed at 
Fricker’s PR-S thesis (see P4 above) that a hearer’s adequate a posteriori reasons 
                                                
28 Lackey provides a second, sideline attack to Fricker’s account by arguing that the local 
reductionist’s exceptions to the PR-N&S thesis (people in their developmental phase – P3a; 
mundane subject-matters – P3b) are false. I concur with Lackey’s verdict. 
This, however, only affects an aspect of LR which is an exception to its core principle: by claiming 
that a posteriori reasons are not necessary under some circumstances the local reductionist 
succumbs to a non-reductionist tenet for this part of the project. Such exceptions are only fruitful 
as long as the non-reductionist does not encounter difficulties on the very turf where the 
reductionist seeks to smuggle in non-reductionism. As Lackey succeeds to show, this is not the 
case. 
Concerning toddlers and young children in their epistemic developmental phase, Lackey argues 
that the non-reductionist is in an even worse position to coherently show how it can be the case 
that toddlers and young children have testimonial knowledge (Lackey 2008: 207-211). Concerning 
mundane subject-matters, Lackey’s counterexample »Alien-2« (ibid.: 184-185) shows that LR is 
better off avoiding an exception for such cases altogether. Lackey provides a reformulation of LR 
so that hearers get to know from trivial hearsay not in spite of the absence of positive reasons, but 
rather “because we have a multitude of reasons for believing that reports about the mundane are 
appropriately truth-conducive” (ibid.: 185). Thus, in the case of mundane testimony, Lackey 
manages to strengthen Fricker’s account by referring back to its own principles and in the case of 
toddlers and young children Lackey helps Fricker to avoid a misleading distinction into mature 
and developmental phases. 
As a consequence, although Lackey succeeds in showing that non-reductionism is not in a 
privileged position over reductionism concerning these two aspects, the inclusion – and rejection – 
of such exceptions is of no import to the project of this Chapter. Ultimately, the reductionist 
position as such is not harmed by the critique of these exceptions and »Nested Speaker« remains 
the only attack on (the core of) LR. 
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are sufficient to justify the acceptance of a speaker’s testimony. Lackey thus 
rejects LR as a contender for the epistemology of testimony. 
In the example, Fred, the protagonist, is told that p by Pauline who is a friend 
of Fred’s friend Helen. Helen vouches for Pauline’s trustworthiness, thereby 
vesting Fred with positive reasons to accept Pauline's testimony: 
“Fred has known Helen for five years and, during this time, he has 
acquired excellent epistemic reasons for believing her to be a highly 
reliable source of information on a wide range of topics. For instance, each 
time she has made a personal or professional recommendation to Fred, her 
assessment has proven to be accurate […]. Yesterday, Helen told Fred that 
Pauline, a close friend of hers, is a highly trustworthy person, especially 
when it comes to information regarding wild birds. Because of this, Fred 
unhesitatingly believed Pauline earlier today when she told him that 
albatrosses, not condors (as is widely believed), have the largest wingspan 
among wild birds. It turns out that while Helen is an epistemically 
excellent source of information, she was incorrect on this particular 
occasion: Pauline is, in fact, a highly incompetent and insincere speaker, 
especially on the topic of wild birds. Moreover, though Pauline is correct 
in her report about albatrosses, she came to hold this belief merely based 
on wishful thinking […].” (Lackey 2008: 149) 
The case is such that reductionists would presumably reach the conclusion that 
Fred acquires a justified belief from accepting Pauline’s testimony while Lackey 
rejects this verdict. Fred has good reasons to place credence in Pauline’s word 
since Helen told him he can trust Pauline. Lackey, however, maintains that there 
is a defect in the truth-conduciveness of Pauline’s testimony for it was not brought 
about by a reliable process. The fortuitousness of the truth of Pauline’s testimony 
that p thus prevents Fred from acquiring a justified testimonial belief. 
Lackey uses the example of »Nested Speaker« to demonstrate that a hearer 
can fall short of being justified in accepting a speaker’s testimony regardless of 
how good her reasons in favour of accepting the testimony may be. The argument 
is carried by the idea that the reliability of the process by which the statement in 
question was produced may be undermined by a factor which has nothing to do 
with the hearer’s positive reasons. In Lackey’s words, “the possession of positive 
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reasons on behalf of a speaker’s report, even objectively excellent ones, does not 
necessarily put one in contact with testimony that is reliable” (ibid.: 150). 
For this reason, »Nested Speaker« shows that appropriate positive reasons 
are necessary for testimonial justification but not sufficient. There can be, on 
Lackey’s grounds, an asymmetry between the justificatory status of a testimonial 
belief and the positive reasons which reductionists say it must be reduced to. 
Since reductionists claim that positive reasons are not only necessary but also 
sufficient, LR does not allow for such an asymmetry. As a result, the PR-N&S 
thesis, and LR, are false. 
3.1.3. Objections to Lackey’s critique 
Lackey’s argument is built on the idea that a hearer can have excellent reasons for 
accepting a report yet fall short of being justified to accept it. Therefore, 
according to Lackey, positive reasons are necessary but not sufficient to establish 
a justified testimonial belief. 
I disagree with this argumentation against LR. My claim is that »Nested 
Speaker« is not apt to refute LR because the counterexample does not make a case 
which necessarily leads up to the unanimous verdict that Fred is not justified in 
holding his true belief in spite of having good reasons. There are two alternative 
ways to challenge this conclusion: one way is to argue that, against Lackey’s 
claim, Fred is not in possession of adequate positive reasons to be justified in 
believing Pauline. The alternative way is to acknowledge that Fred has indeed 
good reasons to accept Pauline’s testimony and at the same time argue that he is 
justified in his testimonial belief. Both strategies would undermine Lackey’s 
argumentation that a hearer’s positive reasons and her justification may diverge. 
While my intuition is with the second route, I believe that both of these responses 
are promising in that they both show that Lackey’s example is not fully 
convincing. It does not become clear that cases like »Nested Speaker« show that 
there is an asymmetry between a testimonial belief being justified and the reasons 
which provide the justification. 
Concerning the first possible response to Lackey’s counterexample, it may 
be argued that Fred has some positive reason, but that this reason is not adequate 
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to support Pauline’s report concerning albatrosses. Concretely, one could hold that 
Fred has excellent epistemic support to believe Helen’s testimony but only weaker 
support to believe testimony proffered by Pauline.  Ex hypothesi, Fred has 
acquired great reasons to think that Helen’s reports are mostly true. This can be 
understood in terms of propositional attitude and propositional content: Fred has 
an appropriate reason to believe (the propositional attitude) whatever it is that 
Helen reports (the propositional content). 
If, as it is the case in »Nested Speaker«, the testimonial chain has been 
extended, Fred is now confronted with two separate thoughts: he believes Helen 
when she asserts that Pauline is a reliable testifier; and he believes Pauline when 
she asserts that albatrosses have the largest wingspan. As the propositional content 
of Helen’s testimony is a recommendation for a propositional attitude towards 
Pauline, it could be thought that believing Helen and believing Pauline are equally 
warranted. However, concerning Pauline’s reports, Fred no longer has appropriate 
positive reasons to believe a certain propositional content; he merely has 
appropriate reasons to believe that he has appropriate reasons to believe a certain 
propositional content. Arguably, Fred’s reason to believe Pauline is epistemically 
weaker than his reason to believe Helen. 
How much weaker his reason ultimately is, is up for debate. In this regard, it 
is a possible line of attack against Lackey to claim that Fred’s reason to believe 
Pauline’s report on albatrosses is not appropriate. Accordingly, Fred would be 
justified in accepting Helen’s testimony about Pauline’s reliability, but his reasons 
to believe statements from Helen do not provide him with an adequate positive 
reason to believe Pauline’s concrete report. While Fred may have appropriate 
reason to his belief that Pauline is reliable in general, this reason is not strong 
enough for him to be justified concerning the concrete report at stake. Helen 
vouching for her friend does provide Fred with some reason to accept Pauline’s 
reports – but not enough to be sufficiently warranted. 
This attack on »Nested Speaker« is certainly not without appeal. Reasons 
about the reliability of a testifier are no claims to the testifier’s infallibility. A 
testifier may reasonably be held to be reliable although her testimony is false on 
occasion. If such a reason is extended to another testifier, the room for error 
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increases. This opens up the possibility to claim that Fred’s reason is not sufficient 
for him to be justified in accepting such extended (or nested) testimony. Overall, 
however, the second envisaged strategy seems to me to be an even more potent 
refutation of Lackey’s argument. My intuition on the case is that Fred indeed has 
an appropriate reason to believe Pauline’s claim about albatrosses and that he is 
indeed justified in accepting her testimony.29 
From an internalist viewpoint I take this judgement to be apparent. If 
justification has to come in a form that is “available in the cognitive repertoire of 
the subject” (Burge 1993: 459) a hearer’s positive epistemic reasons are the 
obvious lynchpin. Under such a description, there can be nothing to justification 
over and above the reasons available to the hearer. Yet, also if we are to adopt an 
externalist conception of justification Fred seems to be appropriately justified in 
accepting Pauline’s report. Ex hypothesi, “Helen is an epistemically excellent 
source of information” (Lackey 2008: 149) and Fred is well-advised to trust her as 
a speaker. What is more, Fred has accumulated a lot of positive reasons to believe 
Helen with regards to her recommendations of other speakers because her history 
of personal and professional assessments has proven to be accurate. Lackey 
acknowledges that a theory of epistemic justification must be primarily about “the 
connection between a belief’s being justified or warranted and its being likely that 
such a belief is true” (ibid.: 151). However, she fails to see that this connection is 
not in principle affected by Pauline’s unreliability. 
It is important to note, as Lackey does, that Helen’s testimony increases the 
probability of Pauline’s testimony to be true: 
“[A]s »Nested Speaker« is described, Fred does have reasons that […] 
render it objectively likely that Pauline’s testimony is true. In particular, 
Fred’s positive reasons place those beliefs from Pauline’s testimony in a 
category that contains beliefs that are or would be mostly true; namely, 
those beliefs that are supported by Helen’s testimony. For instance, were 
Fred to decide between accepting the reports of two different speakers, one 
of whom has the support of Helen’s testimony and another who lacks this 
support, most of the time Fred would do well to accept the reports of the 
                                                
29 In a footnote, Alvin Goldman (2010: 199 n. 9) also maintains that he does not fully endorse 
Lackey’s argument that Fred is unjustified and says that “[his] own intuition about this case is 
murky, by no means clear-cut in Lackey’s direction.” 
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former. That is, most of the time, forming beliefs from sources supported 
by Helen’s testimony would lead to the truth.” (Ibid.: 154) 
Unlike the first objection presented above, we may then agree with Lackey that 
Fred has appropriate epistemic reasons to believe Pauline’s report. Where 
Lackey’s perspective diverges from mine is on the question of what harm it does 
that Helen is wrong in her assessment of Pauline. While Lackey thinks that this, as 
a matter of principle, undermines Fred’s justification, I maintain that it is but an 
honest mistake, perfectly compatible with Fred being justified in his belief about 
albatrosses. More often than not, Helen’s vouching for a person is a good 
indicator of truth-conducive testimony from others. This, however, does not 
require infallibility from her. The good reasons she provides are, for Fred, a 
justificatory basis and they remain a justification even in the case that Helen errs. 
They need not be a guarantee that the justification always leads to the truth. It 
suffices that they are a reliable indicator of truth-conduciveness – and this is 
ultimately a matter of probability. 
A modification of the case can serve to illustrate this point: in the scenario of 
»Nested Speaker«, Fred's justification, under normal circumstances, would have 
resulted in a false belief. The way things would have gone under normal 
conditions is that Pauline’s testimony is false (since she knows little to nothing 
about ornithology and is a generally unreliable testifier) and Fred, although he had 
excellent positive reasons to trust Pauline, gains a false testimonial belief when he 
accepts her report. Yet, such falsity does not affect the justification but instead it 
merely violates the truth-condition of hearer-knowledge. Fred would gain a 
justified false belief and not, as Lackey would have it, lose his justification along 
the way. 
The confusion arises as soon as Fred’s belief turns out to be true by accident. 
It is fortuitous that Pauline’s report about albatrosses is true and thus there is a 
significant deficiency in the process by which Fred acquires his belief. However, 
as I have just argued, this deficiency does not damage Fred’s justification; Fred 
still holds a justified true belief. This justified true belief falls short of being 
 59 
knowledge but the way the problem has been presented it should be clear that 
»Nested Speaker« so becomes a Gettier-type case. 
In an attempt to demonstrate the difference between »Nested Speaker« and 
Gettier-examples, Lackey introduces »Unnested Speaker« which can non-
controversially be regarded as a Gettier-type scenario. The example is largely akin 
to »Nested Speaker«, however the hearer does not receive a report from a speaker 
his friend has vouched for but instead from his good friend directly: 
“Max has known Ethel for ten years and […] he has acquired excellent 
epistemic reasons for believing her to be a reliable source of information 
[…]. Currently, however, Ethel is in the midst of a personal crisis, which 
she effectively conceals from those around her, and her emotional state of 
mind leads her to report to Max that her purse has been stolen, despite 
having absolutely no evidence for thinking this to be the case.” (Ibid.: 152) 
Max readily accepts Ethel’s testimony and, fortuitously, her report turns out to be 
true. Now, for Lackey, the key aspect of »Unnested Speaker« which distinguishes 
it from »Nested Speaker« is that the hearer’s justification is not called into 
question since Ethel, but not Pauline, is a generally reliable testifier.30 
According to Lackey, a hearer may only be justified if, in addition to having 
epistemically adequate reasons to accept a report, the report itself “is reliable or 
otherwise truth-conducive” (ibid.: 74). Consequently, a hearer’s justification 
always includes a speaker-dimension, which ensures that the statement at stake 
has been formed by a reliable process. In case this speaker-condition is violated, a 
hearer’s positive reasons cannot result in a justified testimonial belief. Positive 
reasons are not sufficient for justification. This reliability thesis for statements is 
introduced as a replacement for the TEP-N thesis: because a speaker’s beliefs do 
not matter for the epistemology of testimony, Lackey demands that any report by 
a speaker must be produced in a reliably truth-conducive way. In this regard, there 
is room for an asymmetry in Lackey’s account as the epistemic status of a belief 
                                                
30 Lackey maintains that this is an interpretation which she would not share. Like in »Nested 
Speaker«, the report in »Unnested Speaker« is formed by an unreliable process and thus would not 
be justified on Lackey’s grounds. Yet, Lackey takes the example to illustrate that »Nested 
Speaker« cannot be seen as a Gettier-type case whereas such an interpretation would be open to 
somebody challenging »Unnested Speaker«. 
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(its being justified or not) does not ipso facto coincide with the hearer’s positive 
reasons (necessary for its justification). Due to this (alleged) asymmetry Lackey is 
in a position to give an explanation of »Nested Speaker« which does not involve 
Gettier-type reasoning. 
However, in section 2.3 I have shown that Lackey’s rejection of the TEP-N 
thesis is misguided. As a consequence, I also do not endorse her project to replace 
the TEP-N thesis with a requirement that demands the reliability of the statement 
in question. An understanding of justification with such a speaker-condition in 
place would essentially rephrase the testimonial scenario to a degree which is so 
externalistic that reductionists like Fricker would probably refuse to accept the 
problem description from the beginning. 
By this shift from the BVT to the SVT Lackey pays a high price in terms of 
explanatory power.31 Due to her commitment to the SVT, Lackey does not take 
into account a speaker’s beliefs and instead requires the proffered statement itself 
to be formed by a reliable process. Her primary motivation for rejecting LR is to 
factor in the speaker-side of a testimonial exchange. However, the result is the 
opposite: she obscures the speaker-side and drowns it out with a sweeping 
requirement for statements. Put differently, her enterprise is tantamount to first 
obscuring the process by which a statement is brought into existence and then 
demanding that this very process be truth-conducive. Lackey works with a 
definition of testimony which completely disregards how (and why) reports are 
made, yet she postulates qualifying conditions onto the process she ignores. 
This idea is entirely incompatible with the notion of testimony as statements 
made by persons whose intentional attitudes play a core role in explaining not 
only why a statement has been made but also how a proffered statement is to be 
assessed in terms of its epistemic credentials. I find it unappealing to mystify the 
speaker’s beliefs and desires in order to declare requirements for the statements 
directly. If Lackey is in the business of explaining a car the explanatory power of 
                                                
31 Cf. my discussion of »Consistent Liar« in section 2.3.1. According to the BVT, it is of epistemic 
import whether a speaker asserts that p because he is a competent believer and a sincere testifier 
concerning p. According to the SVT, a speaker is instead assessed solely in terms of being a truth-
conducive testifier. 
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her account has to suffer if she claims that she is not interested in the concept of 
an engine as long as the car moves reliably.32 
It is doubtful that statements (and their reliability) can be understood without 
an intimate connection to the speaker’s beliefs and desires. It appears to be an 
important factor of the truth-conduciveness of p whether or not a speaker actually 
believes p to be true and presents it as her true belief that p. Lackey, however, is 
not interested in an understanding of the process by which a report has been 
produced (as long as the resulting statement is truth-conducive). It can be any 
process, trivial or chimerical; it does not feature in her account of justification. 
This move is essentially a refutation of taking a speaker seriously qua person. Her 
intentionality becomes obsolete, the epistemic credentials are already in the 
statements themselves. It does not matter whether or not a proffered statement 
was uttered by a competent and sincere speaker because Lackey has given up this 
concept altogether. 
I believe that this is too stark a commitment. Asking for reliability or truth-
conduciveness is far more concessive than attempting a psychological explanation 
of the intentionality which is at the heart of such reliability or truth-
conduciveness. Following Lackey, the reliability of the process by which the 
statement was brought about has to be postulated without any reference to the 
speaker’s beliefs and desires. This means, Lackey does not care about any of the 
psychology which is involved in the production of the statement. Instead, she 
requires the (stringent) condition that the statement itself – be it a conscious lie, an 
attempt to deceive someone, a combination of words which is not even 
understood by the speaker, an acataphasy, a slip of the tongue – is somehow truth-
conducive. This leads us away from incorporating the speaker into an 
understanding of how testimony can function and onto epistemically mystified 
turf. 
Effectively, Lackey’s rejection of transmission and of the BVT leave her no 
room to incorporate irrationality on the speaker-side other than to require, in the 
                                                
32 The analogy is certainly not perfect. I do not want to give the impression that a statement, qua 
expression of a belief, is in any sense the output of a mechanical process. My claim is much 
weaker: I want to express that Lackey is ill-advised to try to address the statements »directly« 
when an assessment of their truth-conduciveness is at stake. 
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absence of an explanation, an appropriate truth-conduciveness which does the 
work per se. As a result, Lackey gives up too much to be able to continue to reject 
the BVT. I do not see an explanatory advantage in rejecting the TEP-N thesis and 
the BVT and replacing it with the SVT in combination with a condition that a 
hearer’s justification requires the reliability of the statement. Given that the BVT 
can be regarded as unscathed by Lackey’s counterexamples, her rejection of LR is 
equally unconvincing. 
3.2. NON-REDUCTIONISM 
3.2.1. Lackey’s understanding of non-reductionism 
Non-reductionism (NR) differs from reductionism in two crucial ways: one, while 
reductionists claim that for the acquisition of testimonially based knowledge a 
hearer must possess additional positive reasons to support the proffered testimony 
non-reductionists refuse such a condition. And two, whereas reductionists regard 
the epistemic properties of testimonially based knowledge as reducible to the 
epistemic properties of one or more of the allegedly more basic sources of 
knowledge non-reductionists see testimony as an irreducible – a basic – source of 
knowledge, on par with perception, memory and inference. As a result, the hearer 
is relieved from her task to actively monitor a testimonial scenario for 
independent positive reasons as NR shifts the epistemic burden towards the 
speaker. Consequently, the philosophical assessment of whether or not testimonial 
knowledge has been acquired in a given testimonial exchange is focused on 
requirements the speaker has to fulfil when faced with a credulous hearer. 
As it is commonly the case, Lackey attributes the initial formulation of NR to 
Thomas Reid who derives his view from witnessing the unconditional trust 
displayed by young children who have no other option than to rely on their 
protective caretakers and tutors: 
“Before we are capable of reasoning about testimony or authority, there 
are many things which it concerns us to know, for which we can have no 
other evidence. The wise Author of nature hath planted in the human mind 
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a propensity to rely upon human testimony before we can give a reason for 
doing so. This, indeed, puts our judgments almost entirely in the power of 
those who are about us in the first period of life; but this is necessary both 
to our preservation and to our improvement. If children were so framed as 
to pay no regard to testimony or authority, they must, in the literal sense, 
perish for lack of knowledge. It is not more necessary that they should be 
fed before they can feed themselves, than that they should be instructed in 
many things before they can discover them by their own judgement.” 
(Reid 1983: 281-282, emphasis added) 
Accordingly, there can be no general requirement for corroborating positive 
evidence which justifies accepting a piece of testimony because we accept 
testimony long before we understand (and challenge) the concepts of trust and 
authority. The argument in this crude form does, however, not systematically 
prevent a paradigm change once we grow up. After all, the postulation that 
children are merely a special case is still available (as discussed above, this sort of 
disaggregation is an integral part of Fricker’s LR). Yet, Reid recognises this, and 
he explicitly endorses a trusting stance towards our informants also at later stages 
in our lives and so promotes a default-acceptance of testimony which is not 
confined to children: 
“[W]hen our faculties ripen, we find reason to check that propensity to 
yield to testimony and to authority, which was so necessary and so natural 
in the first period of life. We learn to reason about the regard due to them, 
and see it to be childish weakness to lay more stress upon them than reason 
justifies. Yet, I believe, to the end of life, most men are more apt to go into 
this extreme than into the contrary; and the natural propensity still retains 
some force. The natural principles, by which our judgements and opinions 
are regulated before we come to use of reason, seem to be no less 
necessary to such being as man, than those natural instincts which the 
Author of nature hath given us to regulate our actions during that period.” 
(Ibid.: 282, emphasis added) 
In Reidian terms, it is a common principle of human nature that, within a 
reasonable society, people can rely on one another and expect from others a high 
propensity to speak the truth. As a result, also at later stages in life, when our 
cognitive faculties are already developed to engage in critical review, “a 
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disposition to confide in the veracity of others” (ibid.: 95) is nonetheless a 
reasonable and indeed necessary attitude.  
More recent accounts of NR still maintain that positive reasons are not 
necessary to obtain a justified testimonial belief, yet they explicitly require a no 
undefeated-defeater condition. As Burge formulates it: 
“A person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true 
and that is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do 
so.” (Burge 1993: 467, original emphasis omitted) 
Without any empirically acquired evidence, it is thus the natural a priori attitude 
to accept a proposition as true unless there is a more compelling reason not to. 
For Burge, it is justified to expect in other members of our epistemic society the 
same principles of rationality as we ascribe to ourselves and any utterance of an 
interlocutor can thus be prima facie taken as rational and truth-conducive.33 
Effectively, then, positive reasons are not needed as a supplement to underwrite a 
proposition, but they may enter the stage as defeating reasons, in the presence of 
which a belief would be irrational to take up. In accordance with this principle, 
Matthew Weiner (2003: 257) writes: “We are justified in accepting anything that 
we are told unless there is positive evidence against doing so.”34 
Lackey acknowledges this no-undefeated-defeater condition and adds to the 
requirement that a hearer has to be susceptible to defeating counterevidence which 
appears during the testimonial exchange. A no-defeater condition is toothless as 
long as the hearer is not responsive to such reasons. At the very least, a hearer 
must be sensitive to the presence of potential indications which undermine the 
truth-conduciveness of a report. 
Therefore, Lackey (2008: 160-164) explicitly rules out cases in which a 
hearer “trivially, irrationally, [or] luckily” (ibid.: 164) possesses no undefeated 
defeaters. If a hearer does not have a defeater simply because she lacks the 
                                                
33 In this perspective, Burge is in the tradition of W.V.O. Quine (1960) and Donald Davidson 
(1973) who propose a »Principle of Charity« to interpret and understand other participants in a 
common language community. 
34 Similar expressions can be found notably in Coady (1992), Goldberg (2010), Goldberg and 
Henderson (2006), and McDowell (1998). 
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capacity of having defeaters the requirement becomes futile. In fact, in order for 
the no-undefeated-defeater condition to gain any force, a hearer must display, in 
general and in the particular scenario in question, an appropriate level of 
sensitivity to the presence of such defeaters. I take her counterexamples 
»Compulsively Good-Natured« (ibid.: 160) – where a hearer is entirely incapable 
to be sensitive to defeaters – and »Compulsively Paranoid« (ibid.: 161-162) – 
where a hearer is inappropriately oversensitive to defeaters – to make a 
sufficiently compelling case for the inclusion of the condition that “the agent must 
substansively satisfy the no-defeater condition” (ibid.: 161). 
Still, even in the case that a hearer has no undefeated-defeaters for a 
particular report and that she is appropriately sensitive to the presence of such 
defeaters there might be ways of acquiring a testimonial belief which are 
significantly deficient. For Lackey, such cases, in which a hearer fails to be 
justified in obtaining a testimonial belief, hinge on one of two possible 
dimensions: either, the testimony has been produced in an unreliable way or, the 
environment is unsuitable for the reception of testimony. To illustrate this, Lackey 
provides two more counterexamples: »Incompetent Agent« (ibid.: 158) and 
»Insular Community« (ibid.: 164-165). 
In »Incompetent Agent« a speaker is epistemically extremely unreliable, 
which means she is frequently forming false beliefs regardless of their source. A 
high percentage of her beliefs are in fact produced or sustained in an unreliable 
fashion and there is no appropriate connection between her beliefs and the truth. 
As a result, her statements (which, ex hypothesi, are somehow derivative from her 
beliefs) do not yield hearer-knowledge plainly for the fact that the process by 
which the proffered testimony has been produced was insupportably defective 
(note that while Lackey holds that the speaker’s belief as such is irrelevant for the 
testimonial case – recall the SVT – she insists that the production of the testimony 
has to be reliably truth-conducive nonetheless). Lackey thus demands a condition 
on the testimony itself which explicitly requires the testimony to be “reliable, 
truth-conducive or otherwise epistemically acceptable” (ibid.: 159, original 
emphasis omitted). 
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With a similar strategy, Lackey makes a case for the inclusion of a condition 
on the environment in which the testimonial exchange takes place. Consider, for 
example, the following situation from »Insular Community«: 
“One evening, while on a road trip, Marvin stops in a small town to find a 
hotel for the night and he encounters a large group of people gathered for 
an annual neighbourhood parade. Out of this large crowd, Marvin quite 
fortuitously focuses on Alfred, the only member of this epistemic 
community who reliably shares information with ‘outsiders,’ and asks him 
where they are. Alfred tells Marvin that they are in Smithville.” (Ibid.: 
164-165) 
In this respect, a person may be offered a piece of testimony in a (systematically) 
very unreliable community which would render it highly accidental if she happens 
to obtain a true testimonial belief. Lackey therefore regards it as necessary to 
require explicitly that the overall conditions of the scenario must allow for the 
reception of reliable testimony. 
Lackey’s complete conception of NR is thus a testimonial scenario in which, 
without a posteriori reasons, “properly functioning recipients of testimony may 
defeasibly acquire knowledge from the true reports of reliable speakers in an 
epistemically suitable environment” (ibid.: 167-168). The argument can be 
summarised in the following way: 
(P0) Testimony is a significant and rich source of knowledge. 
(P1) To trust a speaker with regards to her testimony either requires 
complementary empirical reasons to do so or a special presumptive 
epistemic right concerning testimony. 
(P2a) As hearers, we are often not capable of or not in a position to 
gather additional positive reasons to confirm the trustworthiness of 
a speaker. 
(P2b) As hearers, we are generally capable of recognising positive 
defeating reasons to challenge or rebut the trustworthiness of a 
speaker. 
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(C1) There is a special presumptive epistemic right concerning 
testimony unless there are positive defeating reasons which the 
hearer has no defeaters for. 
And further: 
(P3a) The speaker potentially precludes the acquisition of a justified 
testimonial belief by offering testimony that falls short of being 
reliable, truth-conducive or otherwise epistemically acceptable. 
(P3b) The hearer potentially precludes the acquisition of a justified 
testimonial belief by falling short of substantially satisfying the 
condition to be a properly functioning recipient of testimony who 
shows an appropriate level of sensitivity to defeating reasons. 
(P3c) The environment in which the testimonial exchange takes place 
potentially precludes the acquisition of a justified testimonial belief 
by being unsuitable for the reception of reliable testimony. 
(C2) There is a special presumptive epistemic right concerning 
testimony unless there are positive defeating reasons which the 
hearer has no defeaters for or the testimony fails to be reliable, 
truth-conducive or otherwise epistemically acceptable or the hearer 
falls short of being a properly functioning recipient of testimony or 
the environment in which the testimonial exchange takes place is 
unsuitable for the reception of reliable testimony. 
Lackey thus defines what she perceives as the most tenable non-reductionist 
position like this:35 
NR: A hearer is epistemically entitled to believe a speaker’s testimony 
that p iff 
                                                
35 Lackey (2008: 167). Lackey’s formulation differs from mine in that in her definition there is an 
additional truth condition because Lackey defines testimonial knowledge. In line with my 
discussion of reductionism, however, I will stick to the definition of testimonial justification 
instead. This need not worry us here. 
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(1) the hearer comes to believe that p on the basis of the content of 
the speaker’s testimony; 
(2) the hearer has no undefeated-defeaters for the speaker’s 
testimony; 
(3) the speaker’s testimony is reliable, truth-conducive or 
otherwise epistemically acceptable; 
(4) the hearer is a properly functioning recipient of testimony and 
as such appropriately sensitive to the presence of defeaters; and 
(5) the environment in which the testimonial exchange takes place 
is suitable for the reception of reliable testimony. 
3.2.2. Lackey’s critique of non-reductionism 
The method Lackey chooses to rebut NR is naturally to contrast our intuitions 
about illustrative philosophical counterexamples with the minimum requirements 
set out by the definition of NR. Should there be an non-controversial intuitive 
denial of hearer-knowledge even in case all conditions are sufficiently met this 
would appreciably challenge the notion of NR. 
Lackey puts forward two counterexamples in her attempt to rebuff NR: 
»Alien« and a modification thereof which we shall call »Sally«. In »Alien«, a man 
finds a diary which he knows nothing about other than that it was written by an 
alien. It is now up to the philosopher to decide whether or not the alien’s 
testimony (which prima facie appears to be in English) can constitute knowledge 
under the non-reductionist description provided above. Since the example is the 
lynchpin of Lackey’s rejection of NR I shall quote it in full: 
“Sam, an average human being, is taking a walk through the forest one 
sunny morning and, in the distance, he sees someone drop a book. 
Although the individual's physical appearance enables Sam to identify her 
as an alien from another planet, he does not know anything about either 
this kind of alien or the planet from which she comes. Now, Sam 
eventually loses sight of the alien, but he is able to recover the book that 
she dropped. Upon opening it, he immediately notices that it appears to be 
written in English and looks like what we on Earth would call a diary. 
Moreover, after reading the first sentence of the book, Sam forms the 
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corresponding belief that tigers have eaten some of the inhabitants of the 
author's planet during their exploration of Earth. It turns out that the book 
is a diary, the alien does communicate in English, and it is both true and 
reliably written in the diary that tigers have eaten some of the inhabitants 
of the planet in question. Moreover, Sam is not only a properly functioning 
recipient of testimony, he is also situated in an environment that is suitable 
for the reception of reliable reports.” (Ibid.: 168) 
Lackey makes a case against the ascription of knowledge since accepting 
testimony in the complete absence of information about a testifier, as she claims is 
the case with an unknown alien species, is epistemically speaking highly 
irrational. In so doing, Lackey rejects the general conclusion of the non-
reductionist argument (C2): even under the condition that all requirements of NR 
are fulfilled this does not necessarily lead to testimonial justified belief. In 
particular, even if the testimony in question is truth-conducive, the hearer is an 
epistemically functioning recipient of testimony and the environment is apt for the 
reception of reliable testimony a hearer may still fall short of acquiring a justified 
belief in the complete absence of a posteriori reasons. 
In order to forestall any objections on the grounds that »Alien« does not 
affect an epistemology of testimony which is concerned with a human society 
because it operates with an unknown extraterrestrial species, Lackey offers a 
modified version of the scenario in which the alien is replaced by a girl called 
Sally: 
“Sally has been in a coma for the past two months and, upon waking, 
discovers that she has lost all of her previous knowledge except for her 
competence with the English language. Upon leaving the hospital, she 
stumbles upon a diary of an unknown author and begins reading it. Now, 
ex hypothesi, Sally no longer has common-sense beliefs about human 
psychology, she no longer has beliefs about the general reliability of 
humans as testifiers, she no longer has beliefs about how diaries function 
in our society, and so on. Is Sally justified in accepting the contents of the 
diary?” (Ibid.: 174) 
Ultimately, Lackey’s goal is to point out a discrepancy between the verdict of 
non-reductionists and her own intuition. On the face of it, all conditions of NR are 
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fulfilled and thus the non-reductionist must come to the conclusion that Sam and 
Sally obtain a justified belief. On the contrary, Lackey holds that neither Sam nor 
Sally would be justified in holding their belief since they are entirely ignorant of 
the systematic circumstances under which the respective testimony has been 
produced. Lackey regards it as epistemically irrational to trust a proffered report 
without any reason to believe that the institutional context in which the speaker, 
the hearer and the piece of testimony are embedded is in any way reliable. 
Therefore, because neither Sam knows anything about Aliens nor Sally anything 
about humans, their respective beliefs are unjustified. NR is false. 
3.2.3. Objections to Lackey’s critique 
In her case against NR, Lackey argues that accepting testimony in the complete 
absence of information about its truth-conduciveness constitutes epistemic 
irrationality. A hearer cannot come to know from testimony if its reliability is 
entirely inscrutable for the hearer. In the scenario of »Alien« the inscrutability 
arises because the hearer has no conception of (the psychology of) extraterrestrial 
species; in the case of »Sally« it arises because the hearer has lost her entire 
conception of (the mechanisms of) human interlocution. Lackey then maintains 
that her counterexamples reveal a discrepancy between her (negative) intuition of 
whether or not hearer-knowledge is yielded in her cases and the (positive) verdict 
at which a non-reductionist must arrive. 
I do not agree with Lackey’s argumentation to refute NR. I agree that 
epistemic irrationality may undermine hearer-knowledge. I also concur that the 
complete absence of information about the systematic goings-on of the testimonial 
exchange are suitable to establish such irrationality. Yet, I believe that both of 
these claims are largely non-controversial. Lackey does not have to prove that 
there is the concept of epistemic irrationality which may undermine justification 
but instead she has to find a compelling example in which the non-reductionist 
arrives at a counterintuitive verdict about this justification. I hold that Lackey fails 
to provide such an example. 
In particular, I shall argue that »Alien« and »Sally« pose (at least) three 
significant problems to Lackey’s undertaking. Firstly, the way these two 
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counterexamples are designed, they either contain an inherent contradiction or 
they fall short of pointing out an unreasonable verdict under the description of NR. 
Secondly, and relatedly, the scenarios are overly chimerical which undermines 
their force to rebut NR even in case their premises and conclusions would be 
acceptable. And thirdly, and most importantly, Lackey does not take into account 
the features of individual sophisticated non-reductionist accounts like those of 
Tyler Burge or John McDowell. Instead, she sets up a strawman – her own 
description of NR – without posing a real threat to any established non-
reductionist position. 
The first point I shall raise concerns what I perceive as an inherent 
inconsistency in the two scenarios which Lackey presents. This aspect can be 
developed in the form of a stronger or a weaker claim. The strong claim is to say 
that both examples, »Alien« and »Sally«, are de facto impossible as they involve, 
at a crucial point in their stories, a contradiction. In »Alien« this contradiction 
arises in Lackey’s description of what Sam knows about the extraterrestrial. As 
quoted above: 
“Although the individual's physical appearance enables Sam to identify her 
as an alien from another planet, he does not know anything about either 
this kind of alien or the planet from which she comes.” (Ibid.: 168) 
Lackey needs to construct the scenario in a way which prevents Sam from having 
any reason for or against accepting a speaker’s report. Therefore, Lackey has to 
create a speaker about who Sam is entirely ignorant and about who he has 
acquired no a posteriori reason to trust or distrust. At the same time, however, 
Lackey has to vest the hearer with the capacity to identify this speaker as being 
exactly of the type about which he has no information at all. I believe this is 
impossible. 
»Sally« does not provide a remedy for this problem. There is an equally 
puzzling absurdity also at the core of this counterexample which makes it 
impossible to accept the features Lackey presents. The decisive element in the 
case is that Sally “has lost all of her previous knowledge except for her 
competence with the English language” (ibid.: 174). I fail to see how something 
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even remotely close to such a state should be possible. Lackey has to find a strong 
formulation – that Sally has lost everything she once knew – in order not to 
provide her with any form of reason about the diary she finds. In so doing, 
however, Lackey acknowledges that Sally does not know what a person is, what a 
society is, what communication is, what a language is and so forth. This is 
tantamount to saying that Sally does not – can not – still master the English 
language. How could she possibly utter a sentence like »This is a book.« if the 
very concepts referred to in such a statement are beyond her understanding? 
Naturally, the same applies to her as a hearer: she could not understand the 
sentence »This is a book.« plainly because she has lost every conception of what 
each part of that sentence means. This is equal to claiming that Sally has no 
competence as a language-using member of a community anymore. To postulate 
that she does, ex hypothesi, evokes a contradiction. 
Still, one might object that for such counterexamples to demonstrate a 
certain chain of thought it suffices for them to be merely grosso modo workable 
rather than genuinely possible. In order to give such counterexamples a real 
chance, so it could be argued, we need to apply a very clement reading of what is 
intended to be expressed by the depiction of the scenario; the actual phrasing is of 
secondary importance.36 While I do not share this view, I shall still provide an 
argument against it. We thus arrive at the weaker claim against »Alien« and 
»Sally«: even if we accept – on whatever grounds – that the counterexamples are 
not logically impossible, they would not accomplish a refutation of NR. 
                                                
36 Concerning the case of »Alien«, the scenario could be understood along the following science-
fiction lines: we are in a year in the distant future and by now, scientists have found what seems to 
be evidence that there are alien species which are in some (epistemically relevant) respect 
comparable, if also not similar, to humans. What is more, although nothing conclusive has been 
found about just what those beings look like, such aliens generally have a bright purple shimmer 
which gleams from their top end. Sam, who is aware of those scientific findings, identified a 
silhouette with a shimmer gleaming from it when he was walking through the woods and thus has 
some reason to assume that what he saw was an alien. Yet, neither scientists nor Sam know 
anything more about such extraterrestrials. 
Concerning »Sally« I find it harder to imagine what kind of clement reading could result in a more 
benevolent understanding. 
I am generally speaking not convinced by such fanciful embellishments along the lines of science 
fiction novels. Yet, more and less philosophically trained debaters often seem to sympathise with 
such ideas which is why I want to show that they are, at least in this case, no adequate response to 
my objections to »Alien« and »Sally«. 
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Lackey rejects the idea that the fact that testimony stems from an alien is a 
defeater which can override the default acceptance of the report. This is because 
denying aliens would beg the question of whether or not we have positive 
epistemic support for the acceptance of such testimony (ibid.: 174). Still, if we are 
to accept, if only for the sake of the argument, that there is something like an alien 
which Sam can identify without having any conception of the alien or its 
epistemic practices then surely the definition Lackey provides of NR is not met to 
a full degree: the sudden apparition of an alien’s diary is without a doubt a more 
profound incision in a hearer’s life than Lackey is ready to admit and it is most 
certainly a profound challenge with respect to the epistemic suitability of an 
environment. The alien is the first contact Sam has with extraterrestrials – 
otherwise he would have gathered a posteriori reasons concerning aliens – and the 
epistemic environment is rendered unsuitable by this very unique apparition. If 
»Insular Community« suffices to describe an environment in which “the epistemic 
circumstances are not suitable to the reception of reliable testimony” (ibid.: 165) 
because most testifiers have a tendency to lie then Sam’s knowledge that the 
report stems from an alien must do the same. If a neighbourhood parade is a 
compelling reason to dismiss an environment as epistemically suitable then, a 
fortiori, the introduction of an alien must push us in the same direction. As a 
result, non-reductionists and Lackey would come to the same conclusion 
regarding »Alien«. 
Concerning »Sally«, the recipient of the report is defective so that she is no 
longer in a position to judge whether or not a statement is in any form reliable. Ex 
hypothesi, “she has lost all of her previous knowledge” which means that she “no 
longer has common-sense beliefs about human psychology” (ibid.: 174). I take it 
to be apparent that the hearer condition which Lackey introduced to NR is violated 
under such circumstances. It is sufficient for Lackey for a hearer to be overly 
good-natured or overly paranoid with respect to proffered reports (ibid.: 160-164). 
By the same token, a hearer who has no grasp of her epistemic surroundings 
whatsoever, who has no reasons on which to base any epistemic evaluation – and 
who is thus very likely to make unreasonable judgements about pieces of 
testimony which are offered to her – would violate the condition that a hearer 
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must be a properly functioning recipient of testimony. The hearer-condition of NR 
is clearly not met and so non-reductionists (as described by Lackey) and Lackey 
alike come to the conclusion that Sally falls short of obtaining knowledge. The 
scenarios do not exemplify a discrepancy in the verdicts of Lackey on the one 
hand and non-reductionists on the other. 
The second point I shall raise is related to my first objection in that it is an 
attempt to show that the counterexamples, even if we accept their premises, fail to 
make a compelling case against NR. »Alien« and »Sally« are arguably the most 
chimerical and fanciful counterexamples in Lackey’s book. By painting a very 
unorthodox picture, Lackey allows for the fact that there is a high degree of 
ambiguity in her description of the scenarios (e.g. in questions such as what the 
alien is like, how Sam is able to identify her as an alien, what the book looks like, 
what exactly Sally knows and understands and what she does not, how she arrives 
at an understanding of a piece of testimony and so forth) which has as a 
consequence that intuitions will vary across judges of these cases. There will be 
no one unanimous outlook on the two examples for the very fact that the 
ambiguous way in which they are described opens up a whole range of possible 
interpretations (cf. Faulkner 2009: 481). Intuitive ascriptions of knowledge will 
depend upon characteristics of Lackey’s presentation which are vague and 
unclear. 
As a result, »Alien« and »Sally« must be conceived as borderline cases 
which do not yield obvious and non-controversial judgements concerning the 
epistemic justification of the recipient of testimony (cf. Kusch forthcoming). But 
not only are such borderline cases controversial for they trigger different 
reactions, they are so a-typical that it is hard to see how an established view 
should be overthrown merely on the basis of such a counterexample. It seems that 
cases as chimerical as »Alien« and »Sally« simply lack the force to rebut a 
recognised concept. The examples are too anti-prototypical and it appears to me 
that it takes more of a paradigm case to replace an established view by a novel 
theory. 
In this sense, every concept seems to encompass paradigm cases as well as 
borderline cases. Paradigm cases are clearly determined by the intension of the 
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theory whereas borderline cases can be seen as belonging within the extension for 
which the theory is true or (if also only just) outside the extension (ibid.). It seems 
to be an unreasonable endeavour in the first place to try to refute a concept merely 
on the basis of a case for which it is not fully clear that it lies within he intuitive 
extension. It has been regarded with scepticism (e.g. Craig 1993: 9-43) whether 
such projects could ever yield fruitful results for the progress of a philosophical 
debate. Therefore, it seems fair to stipulate that Lackey would have to present 
more of a paradigmatic scenario to truly provide a threat to NR. 
The third point I shall raise is my most central argument of why I think 
Lackey fails to provide a compelling line of reasoning against NR. As such, it is 
independent from my previous objections. Even if »Alien« and »Sally« are 
regarded as neither contradictory nor chimerical this does not in principle 
undercut appreciation for the following objection. 
Lackey (2008: 155-168) makes a strenuous effort to develop a non-
reductionist position which she deems to be the most tenable position available to 
non-reductionists. As such, Lackey does not characterise any specific non-
reductionist position, but instead she sets forth those conditions which she thinks 
any non-reductionist should endorse as the most defensible necessary and 
sufficient conditions for NR. Kusch (forthcoming) argues that this strategy makes 
it impossible for her to appreciate the specific nuances of any individual non-
reductionist account and results in a “low argumentative resolution.” I want to go 
one step further and accuse Lackey of setting up a strawman which then burns 
down all too easily. 
Lackey deliberately renounces a comparison between her understanding of 
the background conditions in a testimonial exchange and the understanding of 
actual non-reductionist views. The two most sophisticated non-reductionist 
positions I have in mind are Burge (1993, 1997) and McDowell (1998). Although 
Lackey mentions these accounts, she forces them into a framework which is not 
apt to maintain a genuine non-reductionist account. The structure Lackey provides 
is geared towards her own view, labelled »dualism«. It has as a starting point a 
number of premises which are diametrically opposed to the premises non-
reductionist positions rely on. 
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Lackey denies the transmission of epistemic credentials from a speaker to a 
hearer via testimony (cf. sections 2.2 and 2.3 above). On Lackey’s grounds, a 
justification or warrant which a speaker holds for a certain belief is not transferred 
to the recipient of the testimony via the speaker’s say-so. Instead, Lackey 
promotes the SVT, according to which the epistemic significance is in the report as 
such. Therefore, a hearer learns from words; the statements are carrying the 
epistemic weight. The speaker, in turn, is stripped from her epistemic import. Her 
beliefs are no longer relevant for the question of whether or not the hearer can 
gain a justified belief from her because the focus is shifted onto the report 
simpliciter. 
The speaker’s intentionality, that is her beliefs and desires, are negligible in 
such an account. What matters is merely the reliability of the truth-conduciveness 
of whatever statement may be proffered. As long as the report is eo ipso reliable, 
the speaker would not need to be a full-blooded intentional being. Although 
formally, Lackey does insist that testimony must come from a person37 she does 
not take the consequences of this requirement seriously throughout her attempted 
rejection of NR. Being a person, for Lackey, is required yet irrelevant. For Burge 
and McDowell, however, the speaker’s personhood is a salient aspect for an 
understanding of their accounts and not merely a toothless postulation. My claim 
is therefore that Lackey’s arguments are not suitable to rebuff sophisticated non-
reductionist positions like those of Burge or McDowell who properly 
acknowledge the notion of personhood in their accounts. 
Applied to the scenario of »Alien«, the primary concern for an 
epistemological assessment has to be the question whether or not the alien sighted 
by Sam is a person. If the alien is not a person, Burge and McDowell (and indeed 
also Lackey) would regard the case as lying outside the realm of testimony. If, on 
the other hand, the alien is a person a clear discrepancy arises between the 
outlooks of Lackey and Burge.38 While Lackey holds that Sam unmistakably fails 
                                                
37 Cf., again, Lackey (2008: 189). 
38 I will focus on Burge throughout the first part of this third line of objections (on »Alien«) and on 
McDowell throughout the second part (on »Sally«). This is a contingent choice I make for the sake 
of convenience. I do believe that both authors are equally well suited to reject either 
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to acquire a justified belief Burge would come to the conclusion that Sam is in 
fact justified in placing credence in the alien testimony. The underlying thought is 
complex and worth citing at length: 
“[W]e have a general a priori prima facie (pro tanto) entitlement to rely 
on seeming understanding as genuine understanding. And we have a 
general a priori prima facie (pro tanto) entitlement to believe putative 
assertions that we seem to understand. These are two rational default 
positions. They can be overridden in particular cases if (possibly 
empirical) counterconsiderations arise. But if one lacks 
counterconsiderations, and if one has a minimal level of conceptual know-
how, one is entitled to rely on one's seeming understanding of particular 
putative assertions. And one is further entitled to believe seemingly 
understood putative assertions – because prima facie they come from a 
rational source whose backing supports belief (assuming no 
counterconsiderations). If the seeming understanding is intellectual, one 
can, in the relevant particular cases (no counterconsiderations), be a priori 
entitled to rely on one's seeming understanding of putative assertions as 
genuine understanding of genuine assertions. And under the same 
conditions, one can be a priori entitled to accept particular putative 
assertions as true.” (Burge 1997: 21) 
In short, provided the alien is a person, Sam has an a priori prima facie pro tanto 
entitlement to obtain a justified belief about the contents of the diary. What 
Lackey fails to recognise is that this is not an unconditional entitlement in the 
absence of all reason but rather an entitlement which crucially hinges on the 
principle features of the interlocution in question. The fact that Lackey arrives at 
the verdict that Sam “clearly” (2008: 169) does not gain a justified belief in 
»Alien« results from her unawareness of critical features of the account Burge 
provides. 
Burge’s right to accept a report depends on a number of critical 
presumptions: putative understanding of a linguistic item can be regarded as 
actual understanding as long as there are no counterconsiderations which speak 
against such a move. Equally, the (putative and hence actual) understanding of a 
putative assertion can be regarded as the understanding of an actual assertion 
                                                
counterexample. But for my purposes I think it would be redundand to always weigh off three 
positions against one another. 
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(again, unless there are counterconsiderations which speak against this). 
Whenever a subject understands an assertion (as a result of the presumptions just 
explained) it is legitimate to assume that this assertion stems from a rational 
source. And ultimately, whenever it is legitimate to assume that an assertion stems 
from a rational source it is equally legitimate to presume it is true. 
Such entitlement, however, is qualified as “pro tanto” (for the particular 
linguistic item at stake) and “prima facie” (tentative and as such subject to 
counterconsiderations). In the concrete case of »Alien« this would mean that Sam 
is tentatively justified to accept the particular report at stake because he is entitled 
to presume that it is true because he is entitled to presume that it comes from a 
rational source because he is entitled to presume that it is an assertion which he 
understands because he seemingly understands the linguistic item as a putative 
assertion. 
We have thus arrived at a reasonable description of NR under which Sam is 
justified in accepting the alien’s testimony. Although Lackey recognises the 
sophistication of such a description she deliberately describes the scenario in a 
way which is incompatible with Burge’s account. What Lackey does is deal with 
the case as if the alien was a person; yet, in her depiction of the scenario she strips 
away everything that would lead to this very conclusion. If Sam is in no position 
to judge whether the alien is a person – and Lackey needs this degree of ignorance 
on the part of Sam for her counterexample to have any momentum – »Alien« does 
not pose a problem to Burge’s presumptive epistemic right in his version of NR. 
As Kusch maintains: 
“Not knowing anything about the alien’s psychology means not knowing 
whether the alien has beliefs, intentions or desires. But then, by Lackey's 
own criteria, Sam does not know whether the seemingly linguistic items 
produced by the alien are testimony at all – never mind whether they are 
good or bad testimony.” (Kusch forthcoming) 
In summary, Lackey criticises Burge’s presumptive entitlement as if it was an 
unconditional entitlement. Burge, however, makes it very clear that a number of 
presumptions are of utmost importance in order to arrive at any entitlement to a 
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default-acceptance. These presumptions are responsible for providing a rationale 
for how to deal with the testimony at stake. Lackey needs to strip away precisely 
this rationale in order to claim that the hearer has no reason whatsoever to rely on. 
Finally, there are two routes available to Lackey: either, she maintains her 
depiction of the scenario in »Alien« and acknowledges that the alien is not a 
person – then, however, the counterexample is situated outside the realm of 
testimony. Or, she explicitly claims that the alien is a person – then, however, her 
depiction of the scene is not sustainable. Under the presumption that the alien is 
indeed a person, it is by far not as clear as Lackey claims that Sam’s acceptance of 
the testimony (prima facie and pro tanto) is a case of epistemic irrationality. But 
under such a description the epistemological account used to capture the scenario 
must give due credit to the notion that the speaker’s beliefs and desires are 
epistemically relevant. This goes against Lackey’s understanding. 
»Sally« does little more in this respect than to provide the same attack from a 
different angle. The modification Lackey applies to »Alien« lies mainly in the 
shift from the speaker to the hearer with regards to what prevents the hearer from 
having a reason to accept the testimony in question. In »Alien« it was the 
peculiarity of the speaker; in »Sally« it is the fact that the girl has lost her every 
conception of human psychology which, for Lackey, undermines the reasonable 
acquisition of hearer-knowledge. 
Yet, as much as (sophisticated) NR requires that a hearer may only obtain a 
justified testimonial belief under a set of presumptions, it requires that the hearer 
is intellectually aware. Such awareness is conceived of in terms of a responsible 
hearer, someone who is intellectually capable to discriminate between different 
kinds of reports and to accordingly understand the rationality behind accepting a 
report as true. This was the evident foundation for Burge’s idea of a hearer and it 
is at least as explicit in the account of McDowell: 
“A person sufficiently responsible to count as having achieved epistemic 
standing from someone else’s words needs to be aware of how knowledge 
can be had from others, and rationally responsive to considerations whose 
relevance that awareness embodies. That requires his forming beliefs on 
the say-so of others to be rationally shaped by an understanding of, among 
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other things, the risks one subjects oneself to in accepting what people 
say.” (McDowell 1998: 434-435) 
Thus, for McDowell, knowledge can only be acquired by someone who is not 
doxastically irresponsible in accepting the speaker’s report. Such doxastic 
responsibility can be fleshed out as a reasonable standing towards other people. At 
this point, the line of argument which was put forward against Lackey’s 
discussion of »Alien« can be recycled: if, on the one hand, we assume that Sally is 
a person, an analysis according to McDowell would yield the result that Sally has, 
indeed, an a priori justification to believe the report as true as long as there are no 
counterconsiderations which render this doxastically irresponsible: 
“If one’s takings of things to be thus and so are to be cases of knowledge, 
they must be sensitive to the requirements of doxastic responsibility. Since 
following the dictates of doxastic responsibility is obviously an exercise of 
rationality, this can be a partial interpretation of the thought that 
knowledge [and its] specific epistemic positions […] are standings in the 
space of reasons.” (Ibid.: 429) 
On the other hand, if we assume that Sally is, even in principle, incapable of 
discriminating reports in a doxastically responsible fashion due to her complete 
ignorance concerning the workings of social interaction and human psychology 
we are no longer in the business of analysing a testimonial scenario. 
Like in »Alien«, Lackey needs the protagonist to be within the extension of 
»a person with intentional attitudes« and outside the extension at the same time. 
Sally has to sufficiently count as a person for the counterexample to be an 
instance of testimony and simultaneously fall short of being a person for the 
counterexample to gain momentum against NR – otherwise there would not be a 
complete absence of reason. This is a problem for Lackey for when Sally is not 
regarded as a person the counterexample is obviously toothless and when Sally is 
regarded as a person Lackey does nothing more than state a standoff of intuitions. 
In this standoff, however, I take it that Lackey’s description is the more 
problematic view. 
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Bearing in mind her general rejection of the BVT, Lackey thus maintains that 
the speaker needs to have beliefs in general, yet any particular belief concerning 
the report at stake is irrelevant for the epistemological assessment of the 
testimonial exchange. I find this unconvincing. At best, Lackey refutes her own 
description of NR (against the background of her SVT) with »Alien« and »Sally«, 
but she does not provide a compelling objection to the individual non-reductionist 
accounts of Burge and McDowell. The speaker’s intentional attitudes are a salient 
feature in cases of human interlocution for Burge and McDowell. If this aspect is 
appropriately appreciated, »Alien« and »Sally« both fail to provide more than an 
unpersuasive expression that Lackey’s intuition concerning the ascription of 
hearer-knowledge in these two cases is at variance with the established view. 
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4. BEYOND THE DIVIDE 
In Chapter Three I have argued that Lackey has not been successful in refuting 
reductionism and non-reductionism on the grounds of her philosophical 
counterexamples. In particular, concerning reductionism, my claim was that a 
hearer’s adequate positive reasons are precisely what provide a justification for 
accepting a report as true. Lackey’s attempt to show that there is an asymmetry 
between the positive reasons and the epistemic status of a hearer’s belief has not 
proven to be convincing. Concerning non-reductionism, I have argued that 
although I agree that epistemic irrationality may undermine hearer-knowledge 
Lackey does not find a compelling description of how such irrationality may be 
constituted. I accept it as a rather non-controversial insight that the complete 
absence of information about the systematic goings-on of a testimonial exchange 
(or of interlocution in general) are suitable to establish such irrationality. Yet, 
Lackey’s argumentation appears to fall short of presenting a compelling example 
in which a non-reductionist analysis would arrive at a counterintuitive verdict. 
Concretely, I have accused Lackey of presenting cases which are contradictory, 
overly chimerical and directed at her own definition of NR rather than at any 
individual sophisticated non-reductionist position. 
At this point, it is important to recall that Lackey’s attack on reductionism 
and non-reductionism is motivated by her agenda to promote a purely statement-
oriented view of testimony. However, Lackey’s objections have not shown to be 
convincing enough to provide a basis from which to discard beliefs as 
epistemically irrelevant. A person’s intentional attitudes, and thus importantly a 
speaker’s beliefs, have a role to play in interlocution. The hearer’s contribution to 
a successful act of testimony must then include an assessment of whether or not a 
proffered report stems from a person, who intends to convey the message that p as 
true. A speaker’s beliefs, as one part of her intentionality, cannot be given up 
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light-heartedly.39 Consequently, LR, NR and the BVT have all remained essentially 
unscathed and continue to be contenders for an epistemology of testimony. 
In this final Chapter, I shall present what I think are the ramifications of my 
objections to Lackey’s critique. My aim is to show that by focusing on the 
strengths of LR and NR instead of their limitations there appears to be a common 
ground in the form of a minimum requirement which both reductionists and non-
reductionists can endorse: that the hearer engages in the development of enough 
of a theory of the interlocution to provide a rationale for her acceptance of the 
report. 
4.1. POSITIVE LESSONS LEARNED 
I maintain that Lackey fails to rebut not only reductionism and non-reductionism 
but also to reject the focus on beliefs in the epistemological debate on testimony. 
Yet, it would certainly be wrong to hold that this is due to poor argumentative 
execution or that her enterprise could be saved simply by providing a better line of 
reasoning. Lackey’s (2008) is widely recognised as one of the most densely 
argued and thorough studies on testimony in the recent philosophical literature 
and my objections are not meant to challenge this appreciation. Rather, as I see it, 
the problem of her endeavour is a matter of principle. 
Lackey’s engagement with the epistemological problems of testimony aims 
to show that neither LR nor NR are tenable. Even though I hold that the 
presentation of her objections is flawed, positive lessons can be learned from the 
in-depth analysis she provides. The flaw, according to my critique, is her 
endeavour to rebut LR and NR on the basis that beliefs are no salient feature in 
testimony. This appears to be counterproductive. The opposite strategy – to stress 
                                                
39 In my understanding, the issue of describing the epistemology of testimony as either 
transmissive or generative is a wider issue than the problem of deciding between the BVT and the 
SVT. My intention is to stay neutral (as far as possible) on the subject of individualist and 
comunitarian conceptions of knowledge throughout this thesis as I believe this is a subject beyond 
the scope of my investigation. Yet, it is important to me to object to Lackey’s attempt to promote a 
generative view on testimony by means of installing the SVT. I maintain that the SVT is misguided 
and I see no fruitful endeavour in trying to redescribe the epistemology of testimony in terms of 
statements. 
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the strong points of both positions and understand how they respectively 
incorporate the intentionality of a speaker and a hearer in interlocution – may 
yield better results. Ultimately, it seems more appropriate to acknowledge that 
both LR and NR are able to respond to shared intuitions about interlocution 
scenarios, instead of stating that neither is capable to do so. Both positions answer 
to real testimonial challenges, although they do so by taking diametrically 
opposite starting points. In this regard, they try to negate the opposing stance by 
arguing against its respective plausibility. Axel Gelfert says it best: 
“As I see it, both sides in the reductionism/anti-reductionism debate 
struggle to make sense of two very real, and – at least on occasion – 
rational attitudes towards testimony: the possibility of rational rejection of 
an instance of testimony, on the one hand, and the rationality, on occasion, 
of simple acceptance on trust.” (Gelfert 2009: 171) 
A large proportion of testimonial cases are comprehensible from reductionist and 
non-reductionist positions alike. It is reasonable to assume a default acceptance as 
much as it is reasonable to understand such acceptance in a frame of reason. The 
incompatibility arises with each position denying the rationality of the competing 
epistemic posture. A corollary of this denial, however, is that reductionists and 
non-reductionists at some point encounter cases where their own description 
appears either too austere or too permissive: 
“By overemphasising one of these reactive attitudes at the expense of the 
other, each side not only neglects the intuitions corresponding to the 
competing side; rather, […] it also stretches its own paradigm beyond the 
point where it is sustainable by its own standards.” (Ibid.) 
Put differently, reductionists and non-reductionists alike could gain from an 
acknowledgement of the underlying premises on which the antagonistic account is 
built. Given a certain testimonial scenario, one or the other position may be 
preponderant as regards a common intuition of how to best interpret the scenario. 
On the other hand, to deny, completely, the rationality of the opposing view, may 
harm the defensibility of each position itself. It seems fair to say that one and the 
same testimonial transmission could be justified under either description, the 
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difference being merely in the underlying thought where the analysis of its 
justification begins. In this respect, Adler writes: 
“The anti-reductionist moves from an antecedent specifying a certain 
natural position or relation to a normative consequent. The reductionist 
requires a normative condition in the antecedent […], although this may 
take the form of [a default acceptance] on a normative reading of ‘normal 
conditions’. Strictly, the [sic] reductionism and anti-reductionism need not 
be incompatible.” (Adler 2006: section 5) 
The non-reductionist (Burge, McDowell) holds that our natural stance is such that 
there is an entitlement to accept a proffered report without a concrete 
corroborating reason. The reductionist (Fricker), on the contrary, holds that in 
case we have a reason we may believe the report. Yet, this disparity seems to arise 
merely from a difference in the respective understanding of what constitutes a 
good starting point for the analysis, in terms of a paradigm scenario of an 
interlocution (cf. the examples given in the introductory section 1.3). 
As a result, the dichotomous division into a reductionist and a non-
reductionist camp may be unable to yield substantial progress in the debate. 
Instead, in the form of a positive appraisal, we have to apply a meticulous reading 
of the concrete reductionist and non-reductionist positions available and prioritise 
their respective strengths over their limitations. 
4.2. A DEFENSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND 
This positive appraisal I am advocating can be approached from both sides of the 
divide: on the one hand, we have to arrive at an understanding of LR which is less 
demanding on the hearer. Therefore, I shall argue that already the Humean 
reductionist position has been misinterpreted to a certain extent and that Fricker’s 
account, in this tradition, may not place as austere conditions on the hearer as is 
often criticised. On the other hand, we also have to arrive at an understanding of 
NR which is more demanding on the hearer. Thus, I shall claim that the 
sophisticated non-reductionist accounts of Burge and McDowell require the 
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hearer to have a theory of the speaker which enables her to identify the source of a 
statement as a rational being whose motivation is to proffer a statement qua 
“presentation-as-true” (Burge 1993: 472). In this sense, the hearer needs to be 
aware of how knowledge can be gained from others and interpret the other person 
to a degree which is sufficient to establish a presumption of rationality. There 
seems to be at least a silver lining as regards a common ground between LR and 
NR. 
4.2.1. On the understanding of reductionism 
To begin with, it is questionable if Hume’s posture on the epistemology of 
testimony is as dismissive as it has been interpreted. There seems to be a 
noteworthy disagreement over the strong and selective readings of Hume by 
Coady (1992) and Goldman (1999, 2002). The passages cited by Coady and 
Goldman suggest a decidedly individualistic conception of testimonial knowledge 
which is severely sceptical and condemns any form of credulism. Hume does 
condemn credulism (most notably in Hume 2007: § 1.3.9). But with respect to 
Hume’s comments on testimony, it must not be overlooked that they are mainly 
found in the section »On Miracles« (Hume 2000: §§ 86-101) where Hume’s key 
enterprise is to negate that a miracle could ever be proven true by the sheer act of 
reporting this miracle.  
It is clear that Hume’s theory of knowledge is empirical in that our 
knowledge of the environment depends on the regularities of nature which we 
may observe. Accordingly, testimonial justification is a matter of an observable 
causal relationship between an assertion and the event which led to the assertion. 
Given that we also observe human nature to be uniform, it is because of our 
experience of human nature (which is such that we usually respect this 
relationship between our statements and the underlying events which lead to those 
statements) that we may place credence in the reports of others (Faulkner 1998: 
305-307). In this sense, Hume writes in the Treatise of Human Nature: 
“When we receive any matter of fact upon human testimony, our faith 
arises from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, 
and from effects to causes; nor is there anything but our experience of the 
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governing principles of human nature, which gives us any assurance of the 
veracity of men.” (Hume 2007: § 1.3.9) 
A miracle, however, is a violation of the uniformity of nature. As soon as we 
jettison the idea that nature is uniform – by postulating an irregularity in the form 
of a miracle – we also have to give up our general credence in the very testimony 
which declares the miracle. The presumption of the uniformity of human nature is 
dependent upon the (stronger) presumption of the uniformity of nature in general. 
Consequently, testimony is not a suitable means to prove a miracle true: 
“There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous 
event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a 
uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and 
full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; 
nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by 
an opposite proof, which is superior. The plain consequence is (and it is a 
general maxim worthy of our attention), ‘That no testimony is sufficient to 
establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its 
falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to 
establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, 
and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, 
which remains, after deducting the inferior.’” (Hume 2000: §§ 90-91) 
The discussions of Coady and Goldman are strongly focused on this refutation of 
Hume. Yet, Hume does not want to establish a sceptical posture towards 
testimony in general but rather formulate a substantive counterargument against 
blind gullibility concerning Christian Scripture. As regards Hume’s more general 
remarks on testimony, he holds that “men commonly [have] an inclination to truth 
and a principle of probity [which are] qualities inherent in human nature” (ibid.: § 
88). Such general truth-conduciveness can however be overridden “when the 
witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; 
when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony 
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with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations” (ibid.: § 89). 
These are fundamentally social and essentially non-reductive remarks.40 
In order to find indications that a reductionist position need not be entirely 
incompatible with non-reductionist views it does, however, not suffice to question 
the exegesis of the Humean account. Rather, it must be shown that Fricker’s LR 
can be understood in a way which does not place as austere conditions on the 
hearer as her critics say.41 The lynchpin for this discussion is Fricker’s idea of a 
critical assessment of the speaker which every responsible hearer has to perform. 
Fricker explains this notion in the following way: 
“In claiming that a hearer is required to assess a speaker for 
trustworthiness, I do not mean to insist, absurdly, that she is required to 
conduct an extensive piece of M15-type [sic]42 ‘vetting’ of any speaker 
before she may accept anything he says as true […]. My insistence is much 
weaker: that the hearer should be discriminating in her attitude to the 
speaker, in that she should be continually evaluating him for 
trustworthiness throughout their exchange, in the light of the evidence, or 
cues, available to her. This will be partly a matter of her being disposed to 
deploy background knowledge which is relevant, partly a matter of her 
monitoring the speaker for any tell-tale signs revealing likely 
untrustworthiness.” (Fricker 1994: 149-150) 
The relevant speaker-assessment thus comes in two parts: a continuous reference 
to relevant background knowledge and a requirement to monitor the speaker 
during the interlocution. It is the latter of these conditions which has been 
criticised as too austere. Specifically, from a non-reductionist perspective, it can 
be argued that a hearer has done enough by simply deploying adequate 
                                                
40 In accordance with this presentation, Saul Traiger (1993: 136) suggests that it is doubtful 
whether the Humean account, at any point, intends to promote a reductive view: “Hume’s 
empiricism does not commit him to epistemic individualism. [His] own theory of belief is 
decidedly social.” Cf. also Traiger (2010). In a similar fashion, Adler (94:269) regards the standard 
reading of Hume as biased: “While there is some textual support for their interpretation [Coady 
(1992: chapter 4); Stevenson (1993: 437); Webb (1993: 261-262)], none of them attempts to show 
how that interpretation is required for Hume’s main argument in ‘On Miracles’.” 
41 I shall refrain from judging whether or not Fricker actually intends to be conducive to a less 
stringent understanding of the hearer’s contribution in testimonial cases. My weaker claim that her 
writing can be understood in such a way suffices for the moment. 
42 I believe Fricker meant to refer to the MI5 vetting process which is employed at the UK national 
security intelligence agency, formerly known as MI5. 
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background considerations which potentially preclude the acceptance of a report. 
As Audi illustrates the Reidian view: 
“[Our background beliefs] play a mainly filtering role: they prevent our 
believing testimony that does not ‘pass’, for instance because it seems 
insincere; but if no such difficulty strikes us, we ‘just believe’ (non-
inferentially) what is attested. These filtering beliefs are like a trap door 
that shuts only if triggered; its normal position is open, but it stays in 
readiness to block what should not enter.” (Audi 1997: 406) 
However, it is a matter of dispute how such “readiness to block” can be fleshed-
out. Fricker describes this in action-vocabulary as for her it resembles a process 
more than a disposition. As such, the requirement for any (mature) hearer to 
engage in such a monitoring process is an integral part of LR. It is precisely 
through her critical evaluation that the hearer precludes gullibility and gains a 
reason which can justify her testimonial belief. In contrast to Fricker, Kusch 
points out that the responsibility of the hearer cannot be phrased in terms of 
»active monitoring« but rather that a latent passive filtering of the things we are 
told is sufficiently critical (2002: 26-27). 
The disagreement is in large part due to the fact that Fricker (akin to 
everyone else) leaves an extensive room for interpretation of how this assessment 
is carried out. In spite of her explanation of the notion as “active” (1995: 405), 
Fricker expresses her intuition that monitoring need not be a conscious process: 
“[The] monitoring for signs of untrustworthiness in a speaker is typically 
conducted at a non-conscious level. And while its results can generally be 
fished up into consciousness and expressed, albeit roughly, in words (‘I 
didn’t like the look of him’; ‘Well, she seemed perfectly normal’), no 
doubt the specific cues in a speaker’s behaviour which constitute the 
informational basis for this judgement will often be registered and 
processed at an irretrievably sub-personal level.” (Fricker 1994: 150) 
At the same time, any such monitoring has to remain enough of an achievement 
which is attributable to the hearer in order for the resulting belief to count as 
knowledge (cf. Pritchard 2006). It is very hard to capture just how “irretrievably 
sub-personal” Fricker’s monitoring can be given that it is the decisive factor 
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which distinguishes the critical from the gullible. Fricker indeed adds that, in case 
somebody was to confront the hearer, her basis for the acceptance or rejection of a 
certain item of testimony must be available to her in that she must be able to 
defend herself and the judgement she made (Fricker 1994: 150; cf. Mackie 1970). 
Still, with the hearer’s critical stance being the centrepiece of LR, it is unclear how 
Fricker may conceive of the monitoring requirement as passive and non-
conscious. If the reductionist requirement becomes too weak, it seems fair to say 
that “the mere wholesale ability to ‘fish up’ such judgments in an unspecific way 
is not enough to underwrite the rationality of either rejection or acceptance of a 
given piece of testimony” (Gelfert 2009: 178). 
LR appears to face a dilemma. The monitoring requirement has to be 
formulated in a strong enough way in order for the hearer to actually achieve a 
justification for her testimonial belief. At the same time, the burden on the hearer 
cannot be too heavy as a vetting process is clearly an absurd constraint. 
Fricker circumvents this dilemma (to put it mildly) by remaining vague to 
the greatest possible extent in her concrete formulations of the monitoring 
requirement. Certainly, a hearer has to have a reason to accept a report and this 
reason is constituted by her filtering (on the grounds of background beliefs) and 
monitoring (on the grounds of detectable cues). Nonetheless, it remains fairly 
obscure how the process of critical assessment can be “active” and “sub-personal” 
at the same time and how the judgement (but not the underlying cues) must be 
“available” to the hearer but still has to be “fished up” before it can be expressed. 
Consequently, Fricker’s description of what she posits as subconscious 
psychological mechanisms remains at a minimum in terms of an explanation. It is 
simply not defined how a hearer can really engage in a critical monitoring 
process. The idea is stuck somewhere between being theoretically feeble (if 
construed as too loose) and psychologically implausible (if construed as too 
narrow). 
In turn, this opens up the opportunity to understand LR in a moderate way, so 
that its premises are not taken beyond the point where they are no longer 
epistemologically sustainable. Monitoring, in essence, enables the process of the 
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evolvement of a theory of the speaker. The resulting theory, then, serves to 
explain why a certain statement has been proffered: 
“Indeed the primary task for the hearer is to construct enough of a theory 
of the speaker, and relevant portions of her past and present environment, 
to explain her utterance: to render it comprehensible why she made that 
assertion, on that occasion. Whether the speaker’s assertion is to be trusted 
will, generally speaking, be fall-out from this theory which explains why 
she made it; and it is difficult to see how sincerity and competence could 
be evaluated other than through the construction of such an explanation.” 
(Fricker 1994: 149) 
Now, according to LR, this theory cannot exclusively rely on background beliefs 
to provide the necessary susceptibility to the epistemic credentials of a report. 
There also needs to be an active engagement (of some sort) with the very act of 
the interlocution. While the filtering according to background beliefs must yield 
the starting point of an interpretation qua explanatory theory, a hearer has to 
remain responsive to the concrete scenario of the interlocution. 
My proposal is this: Fricker understands every interlocution as an activity 
which is necessarily accompanied by circumstantial evidence. Not every hearer 
shows an adequate level of susceptibility to the cues which constitute this 
evidence. Making observations – by being responsive to information concerning 
the speaker, the scene, the subject matter and so forth – is therefore a critical 
action which distinguishes a responsible hearer from a gullible hearer. Engaging 
in the process of making observations about the circumstantial evidence available 
to the hearer, even if this process is to a certain degree non-conscious and sub-
personal, thus puts a hearer in a position to arrive at a basic interpretation which 
serves as an explanation why the report in question was proffered. This very 
process is the local reductionist’s monitoring requirement. It enables a hearer to 
obtain a justified testimonial belief. 
4.2.2. On the understanding of non-reductionism 
Having talked about how the monitoring requirement of LR can be understood as 
being less austere, it is now time to aim for an understanding of NR which is not in 
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principle at odds with this notion. Thus, I shall claim that the sophisticated non-
reductionist accounts of Burge and McDowell are not unconditional default-
acceptance views. Rather, they require the hearer to have a basic theory of the 
interlocution which serves as a fundamental enabling condition for any default 
entitlement to accept a report. 
In order to comprehend NR, it is imperative to understand what the 
explanandum of the theory is. NR is interested in an analysis of the nature of a 
posited default entitlement to accept the content of a proffered report. Such an 
entitlement provides a rationale behind the thought that a hearer may acquire a 
justified testimonial belief in spite of having no corroborating empirical evidence 
to back up the claim of the report through which the belief has been produced (cf. 
section 3.2). This entitlement is in itself not an a posteriori reason to accept a 
statement, but instead an entitlement in the absence of such a reason. 
In this respect, according to the theory, there is an a priori rationale behind 
believing a speaker. However, the scenario of an interlocution has to be 
recognisable as endowing such a rationale. In other words, the hearer has to be 
part of a testimonial exchange in order to be entitled to her belief. This seems 
obvious. What is less obvious is how this condition can actually manifest itself in 
any concrete interlocution. Certainly, such a condition must come apart from any 
a posteriori evidence concerning the contents of the report in question. To demand 
empirical support for p – as opposed to directly and immediately coming to know 
that p by someone’s telling that p – is precisely what non-reductionists deny. 
Instead, NR requires a basic grasp of the fundamental goings-on of the 
interlocution. As such, anything that provides a basis for the hearer’s judgement 
that she is confronted with the rational forces of a testimonial scenario functions 
as “a causal enabling condition” (Burge 1997: 23). This condition is indispensable 
for NR. 
As has been indicated, the hearer’s conceived rationality is naturally not 
fleshed-out in terms of empirical reasons which add to the justificatory force of 
the a priori entitlement. In the form of a fundamental requirement, it enables the 
entitlement. In this regard, although the conception of the underlying rationality of 
an interlocution has something to do with the hearer’s empirical susceptibility to 
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his environment, NR is not threatened to be misinterpreted as an a posteriori 
notion of testimony. The considerations which put a hearer in the position of 
being a (rational) hearer, the “enabling conditions”, have nothing to do with the 
idea that testimonial knowledge is inferential in any way. Both Burge and 
McDowell explicitly rule out the idea that we infer our testimonial beliefs, even 
only unconsciously or implicitly, from a proffered statement. Reports are not 
merely premises to an argument in which we infer the proposition in question as 
its conclusion. Acquiring a testimonial belief remains epistemically immediate 
and basic. 
The key corollary of these considerations is that conceiving the underlying 
rationality of testimony is as much a matter of understanding the content of a 
report as understanding the process of learning from a report itself. There is an 
important sense in which the aspect of presentation is a feature of interlocution: 
“In interlocution, the understanding that perception triggers and to which 
the entitlement attaches is an understanding of an event, a presentation of 
content, not merely understanding of a content abstracted from any 
instantiations. […] At issue is understanding both the presentation of 
content and the presentation’s mode.” (Burge 1997: 24, emphasis added) 
The claim here is not that empirical considerations add to (or even sufficiently 
constitute) the force of the entitlement – this would be a straightforward 
contradiction to the principles of NR – but rather that a hearer has to find herself 
as being in a testimonial situation before such an entitlement even enters the 
picture. There has to be a rationality in taking a scenario to be a testimonial 
scenario and this rationality is attributable to the hearer’s capabilities of 
identifying herself as being in such a scenario. Burge distinguishes between a 
hearer’s perception and her understanding: 
“Strictly speaking, we do not perceive the assertive mode, or the 
conceptual content, of utterances. We understand them. These are 
exercises of intellectual capacities. We understand events as assertions by 
perceiving other aspects of assertions. We understand the concepts in 
assertions, by perceiving expressions of them. But here perception is part 
of the condition for exercising the intellectual capacity, not – or not 
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normally – part of the warrant for the individual’s relying on his 
understanding. It is a necessary triggering mechanism, but it is not the 
understanding itself.” (Burge 1997: 31, emphasis added) 
Once again, the idea of such a “triggering mechanism” does not conflict with the 
notion that a hearer need not have a posteriori support for being entitled to a 
belief. It is the entire enterprise of an a priori entitlement which is conditionally 
dependent on a presumption of rationality. This presumption is constituted by 
appealing to the hearer’s intellectual capability to understand testimony as a way 
of gaining knowledge from others which is confined by the forces of its own 
underlying rationale. Thus, a hearer needs to be aware of how knowledge can be 
gained from others and sufficiently sensitive to (empirical) considerations which 
come apart from the content of a report (its presentation) to establish this very 
presumption of rationality. 
The key question to ask is: at what stage in the intellectual process does the 
momentum change from the establishment of the rationality to the default 
acceptance of the report? The way NR is described, it is a theory which 
characterises the nature of the a priori entitlement to believe a statement. In this 
sense, the starting point of the investigation is the entitlement. However, it is a 
vital consideration that this entitlement rests on a presumptive basis which ensures 
that a default acceptance is a rational attitude given the circumstances. In his more 
general remarks on knowledge McDowell says: 
“[T]here are no immediate standings in the space of reasons – no absolute 
starting points. An absolute starting point would be a position in the space 
of reasons that one could occupy without needing a suitable rational 
sensitivity to its surroundings.” (McDowell 1998: 430) 
The rationality of being in a position to accept a report without empirical support 
hinges on the understanding of what it means for a hearer to obtain knowledge. A 
hearer needs a basic sensitivity of her current epistemic position in order for her to 
obtain a testimonial belief that is a priori justified. This is partly a matter of 
understanding an assertion and partly a matter of  being sensitive to circumstantial 
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evidence which constitutes the epistemic framework in which a certain testimonial 
scenario takes place. 
“[T]he epistemological role of the rational sensitivities that I have summed 
up under the head of doxastic responsibility is to cash out this idea of 
taking cognitive capacities into the space of reasons – to apply a 
background that must be in place […].” (McDowell 1998: 433) 
The understandings of interlocution of Burge and McDowell are such that the 
workings of these “rational sensitivities” are already carried out when the concrete 
testimonial exchange is analysed. The investigation sets off with the default 
acceptance in place – the entitlement is truly a priori and as such a function of the 
basic cognitive capacities of any rational being. The conditions which enable the 
entitlement are established and thus not actually part of the analysis. 
Epistemology is therefore concerned with a situation in which the hearer merely 
has to be responsive to counterconsiderations which may override this default 
acceptance. For that reason, the analytical focus of such an account is on 
explaining testimonial knowledge with the entitlement already established. This is 
illustrated also by Fricker’s direct critique of Burge’s view: 
“Burge takes it to be pretty much an epistemological datum that a hearer is 
entitled, in the absence of defeaters, to believe what she is told as such. 
[…] The task for the epistemologist of testimony, as Burge conceives it, is 
not to offer a suasive argument to establish, in the face of real doubt, that 
we are entitled to believe what we are told as such; rather, it is to offer 
some further explanation of this datum.” (Fricker 2006: 79) 
In this regard, non-reductionists appear to focus on a different point of the 
analysis of the epistemology of testimony in comparison with reductionists. As I 
understand it, also under the description of NR a hearer must rely on the fact that 
her default-acceptance presumes the rationality of an adequate testimonial 
scenario. This presumption is the rational force that enables a hearer to be a priori 
entitled to a justified testimonial belief. 
Ultimately, then, NR commits to the same idea that there has to be a mini-
theory of the interlocution involved, providing a rationale for accepting a report. 
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The relevant epistemic surrounding of the interlocution provides a context and 
thus information, which the hearer needs to incorporate in her theory. As 
discussed in the previous section about LR, there is then a critical distinction 
between an epistemically responsible hearer, who engages in a process of critical 
observation by being responsive to information concerning the speaker, the scene, 
the subject matter and so forth, and a gullible hearer, who refrains from this 
action. It is the process which the default entitlement presumes for which also the 
non-reductionist has to admit the necessity of engaging in the action of making 
observations about the circumstantial evidence available to the hearer. This is a 
matter of causal, not temporal, precedence. And although there remain significant 
differences in the respective conceptions between LR and NR, there appears to be a 
common notion of a minimum requirement: that the hearer arrives at an 
understanding of the interlocution (and not only an understanding of the proffered 
assertion) that provides the rationality in her acceptance of the report. 
4.3. POSITIVE REASONS AND COUNTERCONSIDERATIONS 
4.3.1. Corroborating and enabling a posteriori reasons 
Early on in the debate, Leslie Stevenson pointed out that in the end, there may not 
be a very big difference in practice between reductionism and non-reductionism. 
Having a reason to believe versus having no reason to doubt that there is an 
appropriate epistemic justification in the testimonial chain that was responsible for 
the production of the report in question “may come down to not much more than a 
vague impression of the general, quite unspecific likelihood of there being an 
appropriate chain behind most human assertions” (Stevenson 1993: 449). 
Although this formulation was presented before the concrete accounts of LR 
and NR were developed which are the subject of this investigation, I take 
Stevenson’s suggestion to be of practical importance. This is because the “vague 
impression” of an “unspecific likelihood” of the epistemic appropriateness of a 
received report can be understood in terms of empirical back-up (LR) as well as in 
terms of an underlying fundamental presumption (NR). This relates back to the 
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distinction introduced in the previous section: depending on the perspective, 
having a theory of the epistemic rationality behind testimony will be a matter 
either of retrospect – when looking »back« onto the presumptive basis on which 
the entitlement to accept a report rests – or of prospect – when looking »ahead« 
onto the cues and indications which constitute the reason to believe. 
As mentioned before, there is an immediate appeal to both perspectives. 
Getting to know via testimony is a question of direct, immediate and non-
inferential understanding. At the same time, accepting testimony at face value 
without any considerations concerning its rationality is tantamount to crude 
gullibility. The plausibility of both positions therefore insinuates that establishing 
the rationality behind the acceptance of a report is as much the result of positive 
evidence as it is the result of the absence of undefeated defeaters. This part of the 
debate boils down to how we define evidence and defeaters. My intuition is that 
these two forms of reason are really just two sides of the same coin – positive 
reasons are generally called evidence while negative reasons are called defeaters.43 
However, and this is important, reductionists and non-reductionists seem to apply 
these terms from their respective viewpoints. As such, there is a key difference 
between how a posteriori evidence is conceived of in LR and NR which is due to a 
disparity concerning what the proponents of each view use the term for. It is for 
this disparity that non-reductionists maintain that a hearer need not have positive 
reasons while reductionists insist that positive reasons are exactly what endow the 
rationality behind the acceptance of a report. 
In essence, positive reasons and negative reasons are two manifestations of a 
posteriori evidence. Consider a case in which a person tells me she ate a 
magdalena for breakfast today. My accepting her testimony is a function of a 
cognitive process which renders my testimonial belief justified. This is true for LR 
                                                
43 Lackey (2008: 183 n. 10) suggests that this is a broadly held view when she writes that “it is 
readily acknowledged that average epistemic agents have acquired ample inductive evidence for 
believing that certain conversational features, such as nervousness, lack of eye contact, and 
confused behavior, suggest incompetence, insincerity, and unreliability. But positive reasons are 
just the flip side of defeaters. For just as we have accumulated this type of negative inductive 
evidence, we have also accumulated positive inductive evidence for believing that certain 
contextual features are indicators of competence, sincerity, and reliability.” She then adds that 
“negative reasons are just positive reasons against believing a proposition, i.e., positive reasons to 
not believe a proposition” (ibid.: 199 n. 5). 
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and NR. If the process did not take place, it would undermine the justification for 
my belief because I would lack a critical attitude which keeps me from being 
gullible. In this regard, I need to be aware of any considerations which may affect 
– for the better or for the worse – the reliability of the proffered report. From a 
positive-reasons perspective, this cognitive process would yield questions like: 
»Does her voice sound normal?«, »Does she look in my eyes?«, »Is it plausible 
that she could buy a magdalena this morning?«, »Does she usually tell me things 
like this?« and so forth. If the answers to those questions are (sufficiently) 
positive, there is corroboration to accept her statement as true due to the presence 
of positive reasons. In turn, from a negative-reasons viewpoint, the cognitive 
process would trigger questions such as: »Does her voice sound strange?«, »Does 
she avoid looking in my eyes?«, »Is it implausible that she could buy a magdalena 
this morning?«, »Does she have anything to gain from telling me things like 
this?« and so forth. Then, if the answers to those questions are (sufficiently) 
negative, there is no defeater which speaks against accepting her statement as true 
due to the absence of negative reasons. 
What I suggest is that this characterisation of reasons is the non-reductionist 
way of describing an interlocution. Within the theory, positive reasons (»I noticed 
that her voice was normal«) and (the absence of) negative reasons (»I did not 
notice anything strange about her voice.«) contribute to the same epistemic 
project. In reference to the hearer’s default-acceptance, the nature of these a 
posteriori reasons is purely corroborating – in the positive case – or overriding – 
in the negative case. All a hearer has to do is to ensure a basic sensitivity to the 
presence of such reasons; in turn, if there are no such reasons, the hearer is 
perfectly justified in her default-stance. Yet, under this description, claiming that a 
hearer does not need positive reasons to accept a report is equivalent to the idea 
that once the rationality of a testimonial scenario is established, there is no need 
for further a posteriori corroboration. A mere susceptibility to the presence of 
undefeated defeaters is sufficient to be justified to a testimonial belief. 
Even though this is not in principle at odds with LR, the situation would not 
be described in the same way from a reductionist point of view. The reason for 
this is that the reductionist’s hearer has no stance (in the form of an entitlement) at 
 99 
the beginning of her analysis which could be corroborated or overridden. Positive 
reasons can certainly play the same corroborating or defeating role also in LR. 
Yet, before this function can be carried out, positive and negative reasons must 
endow a rationality or irrationality concerning a report. In this respect, the prime 
usage of the term in LR refers to an enabling reason rather than a corroborating 
reason. The reason why a posteriori considerations play such a salient role in LR 
(but not in NR) is that the focus of the analysis is on the establishment of the 
rationale which is the basis for the hearer’s understanding of testimony as a source 
of knowledge. These considerations play the same role in NR. However, 
concerning a posteriority, the non-reductionist is already a step ahead in her 
considerations. The focus is shifted away from the establishment of the underlying 
rationale (the default-acceptance is a presumption which is already in place) and 
onto any supplementary considerations which may but affect the default-stance. 
For non-reductionists, there are two constituents to the analysis of testimony: 
one is the default entitlement qua a priori presumption; the other is the 
interlocution which is conditionally dependent on the default entitlement. The 
hearer’s entitlement is a priori because it is not dependent on the empirical 
considerations discussed in the breakfast-case. Yet, this a priori entitlement 
critically hinges on the condition that the hearer has already established the 
rationality of the testimonial scenario as such. This will be, grosso modo, a matter 
of identifying the source of a report as a person. There is then a clear need for 
positive reasons to arrive at the point where the hearer can rely on a default 
entitlement: 
“[T]he non-reductionist might agree that the hearer needs positive reasons 
for the belief that he is confronted with a person, and thus with testimony, 
while still denying that the hearer need positive reasons for being prima 
facie entitled to his or her testimonial belief.” (Kusch forthcoming) 
Effectively, the hearer must be confronted with a statement proffered from a 
rational source qua presentation-as-true. I take it to be apparent that the 
understanding that one is in such a situation cannot be free from empirical 
considerations. To understand that a report comes from a person is the result of an 
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empirical process. The establishment of the underlying condition that enables an a 
priori entitlement is itself not a priori. 
LR frames the epistemic goings-on differently. The analysis does not 
distinguish between the two constituents in the way NR does. The questions »Am 
I confronted with the report of a rational source?« and »Does her voice sound 
normal?« are both empirical considerations which constitute the rationality of 
accepting the report. For the non-reductionist, these two questions do not belong 
to the same class of empirical reasons. Non-reductionists distinguish between 
(necessary) enabling a posteriori reasons and (supplementary) corroborating a 
posteriori reasons. Conversely, reductionists put all of their eggs in one basket. 
Effectively, then, non-reductionists do not claim that a hearer need not have any a 
posteriori reasons to acquire a justified testimonial belief; the much weaker claim 
is that a hearer need not have corroborating a posteriori reasons once the default 
entitlement is established. 
4.3.2. Cases of overdetermination 
As indicated, the distinction between enabling and corroborating evidence is not a 
distinction between two different notions of empirical reasons. Rather, it is the 
distinction between how reductionists and non-reductionists seem to 
predominantly make use of the term in their respective theory. This distinction 
matters because it demonstrates why non-reductionists can maintain their position 
that a posteriori reasons are not necessary for a justified testimonial belief. To be 
precise, the full claim would have to be that there are no further a posteriori 
reasons necessary for a justified testimonial belief over and above the reasons 
which provide the hearer with the understanding that she is confronted with the 
rational report of a person. 
However, since the distinction between an enabling and a corroborating 
reason is not a distinction between two different kinds of reasons there is the basic 
problem of defining what exactly constitutes the rationality of the default 
acceptance. Understanding that one is confronted with the rational report of a 
person will be the outcome of being confronted with all sorts of information 
which indicate (rather than fully define) the personhood of the speaker. Being a 
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person is not a distinct property of the speaker which the hearer has to detect; it is 
a theoretical construct which the hearer may appropriately apply once a number of 
features of the speaker allow for the presumption that the source of the report is 
actually a rational being. 
As regards NR, any information which contributes to the understanding that 
the presumption of personhood is rational is a necessary part of establishing the 
underlying presumptive right concerning testimony. However, any information 
beyond this point is merely supplementary support for an already established 
entitlement to accept a report. The hearer does not need such supplementary 
reasons. Once the core rationale is established, there is no additional requirement 
to collect further evidence. This is not a problem as long as we consider cases in 
which the hearer is confronted with a plethora of empirical evidence which she 
can employ as arguments for and against the reliability of a statement. 
Overdetermination does not do any harm; NR may still claim that the presence of 
additional evidence is not a salient feature of the hearer’s epistemic justification.44 
A corollary of this is that reductionists and non-reductionists do, in fact, 
agree on their intuitive judgements in the vast majority of testimonial scenarios. 
Under »regular« circumstances, the hearer has at her disposal a substantial amount 
of evidential information some of which may establish the basic rationality of the 
interlocution, some of which may corroborate the hearer’s default entitlement, 
some of which are defeating counterconsiderations and some of which may be 
defeater-defeaters which override those counterconsiderations. As Burge puts it: 
“I do not hold that we adults are in a high proportion of cases a priori 
entitled, all things considered, to particular beliefs acquired in 
interlocution. Perceptual elements are very frequently partly constitutive of 
our understanding. So understanding is often not purely intellectual. And 
our a priori prima facie entitlement to accept what we are told commonly 
needs empirical supplementation to override counterconsiderations. But 
we are sometimes so entitled.” (Burge 1997: 23) 
                                                
44 Note that while the presence of additional evidence is not a feature of NR, the hearer’s basic 
sensitivity to such evidence, were it there, is still necessary. 
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Fricker’s position on this subject fits Burge’s description that a hearer is usually 
overwhelmed with evidence and defeaters. LR had better stay clear from the idea 
that a hearer has to undertake an onerous epistemic effort to obtain positive and 
negative reasons. This is why Fricker maintains: 
“[O]n almost any actual occasion of testimony, a normally knowledgeable 
adult will be absolutely awash with relevant circumstantial evidence 
bearing on the question of whether the speaker is to be trusted on her topic. 
[…] Any background beliefs of the hearer which are evidence, whether 
circumstantial or direct, against the speaker’s trustworthiness on her topic 
must be put onto the scales for the epistemic weighing of the reliability of 
the potential source of new belief, the current telling. Equally, any 
background beliefs which are evidence in favour of the trustworthiness of 
the speaker must be added on the pro-reliability side of the scales. In short, 
any relevant information in the possession of the hearer must properly 
count, and be counted, in her evaluation of the trustworthiness of the 
speaker.” (Fricker 2002: 380-381) 
In her attempt to promote a dualist view on the epistemology of testimony, 
Lackey fully acknowledges this processing of available information and 
emphasises that the rationality for a hearer to accept a proffered statement has to 
be established as a response to reasons which come in a large variety of forms. 
There is typically a myriad of epistemically relevant reasons which the 
responsible hearer must be sensitive to. And even if those reasons are not directly 
available to the hearer in the form of a concrete conscious belief “they nonetheless 
play a crucial role in our epistemic lives, as we tacitly discriminate among and 
evaluate pieces of incoming information, and compare such input with our 
background beliefs” (Lackey 2008: 183). 
Ultimately, then, epistemologists of all corners seem to agree (on whether or 
not a hearer obtains a justified testimonial belief) in (ordinary) cases where the 
hearer is in possession of a plethora of reasons for and against a certain report. 
The responsible hearer is one who distinguishes between reliable and unreliable 
testimony in an adequate fashion by taking into account this very information. In 
such cases, there is no need to single out the force of the epistemic contribution of 
the hearer’s default entitlement. 
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4.3.3. The ignorant traveller and the strange passer-by 
With the standard case being such that there are countless epistemically relevant 
positive and negative reasons available, the key disagreement between LR and NR 
is often not the crucial factor for the analysis of whether or not a hearer gains 
knowledge. The differences only arise over cases in which the hearer is no longer 
vested with any such reasons. Therefore, there have been many attempts to 
describe a scenario in which a speaker truly lacks any relevant reasons for and 
against accepting a given report. 
It is worth examining some of the most notable descriptions in order to see 
that there is a fundamental dilemma none of them is able to escape: one 
alternative is to strip away, ex hypothesi, all empirical considerations, so that a 
hearer has absolutely no grounds from which to even investigate the rationality 
behind a report; the other alternative is to envisage a case in which a hearer only 
has a reason to believe she is confronted with testimony – but no other evidence 
which affects her default entitlement in any way. The former strategy is that of 
»Alien« and »Sally« where a hearer truly lacks any conception of her situation 
and is allegedly confronted with an isolated piece of testimony. I discuss these 
cases in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above where I explain at some length why I am 
not convinced by Lackey’s argumentation. The latter strategy appears to be the 
more promising route. Yet, in the remainder of this section I shall argue that such 
a case – where a hearer has just enough reason to be rational in her acceptance of 
a report, but no further reason of any kind – is equally unsuitable to advocate a 
purely a priori conception of testimony. 
The standard example which has been suggested is that of a traveller who 
arrives at a place which she is not at all acquainted with and asks a person who is 
completely strange to her about directions. Take McDowell’s scenario: 
“Consider a tourist in a strange city, looking for the cathedral. He asks a 
passer-by, who is in fact a resident and knows where the cathedral is, for 
directions, hears and understands what the passer-by says, and finds the 
cathedral just where his informant said he would.” (McDowell 1998: 417) 
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McDowell’s outlook on the case is that it cannot depend on anything like 
evidential information (about the speaker, the environment and so forth) that we 
attribute the hearer with knowledge about the whereabouts of the cathedral. 
Rather, the case shows, according to McDowell, that the understanding of the 
utterance, together with an understanding of the obvious risks attached to 
believing a person, directly and without mediation results in hearer-knowledge. 
Lackey presents an analogous example in which a tourist tries to find the 
Sears Tower: 
“Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to 
obtain directions to the Sears Tower. He looks around, approaches the first 
adult passer-by that he sees, and asks how to get to his desired destination. 
The passer-by, who happens to be a Chicago resident who knows the city 
extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the 
Sears Tower by telling him that it is located two blocks east of the train 
station. Morris unhesitatingly forms the corresponding true belief.” 
(Lackey 2007: 352)45 
Lackey’s verdict is that although Morris can be said to know where the Sears 
Tower is, he does not deserve credit in any form for his knowledge, the reason for 
this being that he has done nothing which could count as a cognitive achievement 
in the process of getting to know where the Sears Tower is. Like McDowell, 
Lackey holds that any processing of empirical information which is available to 
the hearer is not responsible for the production of the testimonial belief, but 
instead the epistemic burden is carried by the speaker. The hearer gains a justified 
belief as a result of a combination of his a priori entitlement and the pure absence 
of counterconsiderations. 
I am not convinced by these examples. Certainly, McDowell and Lackey 
have to acknowledge that the hearer in their cases is vested with the confidence of 
being in a testimonial scenario. This confidence endows a default rationality to 
accept a speaker’s report – but it is itself a result of considerations which lead up 
to the conclusion that the framework is indeed that of testimony. Being a priori 
                                                
45 A variation of this case, which I have discussed in section 2.2 above, is presented in Lackey’s 
(2008: 68). Pritchard (2006: 17-18) also discusses this example. 
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entitled to a testimonial belief hinges on the condition that the speaker is a person 
and her utterance can be understood as a presentation-as-true. In the two cases, the 
satisfaction of this condition obviously depends on evidential information, such as 
that the speaker looks like a human being, that the speaker is not on a theatre 
stage, that the speaker is a serious-looking adult and so forth. The default 
entitlement to accept the report is certainly not established by an isolated 
understanding of the assertion as a presentation-as-true. 
Similar but somewhat more elaborate attempts to present examples in which 
a hearer appears to have no positive evidence yet arrives at a justified testimonial 
belief have been put forward by Pritchard and Faulkner. Pritchard shares my view 
that in the two cases above there is a significant amount of evidence involved 
which plays a relevant role in the acquisition of the hearer-knowledge. Therefore, 
he tries to design a scenario which remedies this shortcoming by further stripping 
away what could serve as cues for the hearer. In reference to Lackey’s 
presentation, he calls the main character of his example Jennifer: 
“[L]et us imagine that what Jennifer is trying to find out is not directions in 
an unfamiliar town, but rather the answer to the question of what ‘Il pleut’ 
means. Her situation is one of complete ignorance. She does not have any 
idea of what this phrase might mean, nor even what language it is in. 
Moreover, she is dropped in an unfamiliar place and given no information 
about the people who occupy this region. Furthermore, just for good 
measure, all the people in that region are disguised such that there is no 
way for Jennifer to know what sort of person she is talking to, young or 
old, male or female, etc. Suppose now that Jennifer asks the first person 
she meets for an answer to her question and this person, knowledgeable 
about the French language, informs her that the phrase means ‘It’s 
raining’.” (Pritchard 2006: 22-23) 
An equally clever move is Faulkner’s idea to move a conversational scenario into 
a warzone. He thereby establishes something like a bare epistemic landscape in 
which a hearer cannot distinguish between informants that can and cannot be 
trusted: 
“Suppose that you do not presume to trust strangers even on unloaded 
topics; maybe this is wartime and you are in an occupied land. 
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Nonetheless, needing to find a certain landmark you approach a passer-by 
to ask for directions. It seems intuitive, if you understand what is said, that 
the passer-by could communicate her knowledge of the whereabouts of 
this landmark.” (Faulkner 2002: 359) 
Concerning Pritchard's example, his own conclusion is that knowledge cannot be 
gained in such a situation because “Jennifer is unable to bring her relevant 
cognitive abilities to bear but must instead rest content with her belief’s epistemic 
support being entirely testimonial” (2006: 23). Pritchard uses this case to show 
that in order to gain knowledge from testimony, a belief must always be integrated 
into a set of beliefs which are not entirely testimonial. Since the situation for 
Jennifer, however, is such that all she could do is go and ask the next masked 
stranger, testimonial knowledge is not to be had by her for the lack of non-
testimonial support. I take this verdict to be non-controversial, yet I want to make 
use of the example for a different point.46 Regardless of whether or not a 
testimonial belief needs non-testimonial support, the scenario is still full of 
relevant evidential reasons which are available to Jennifer and which will without 
a doubt occupy her mind and be important concerning her belief-formation 
process. There must be a myriad of thoughts going through Jennifer's head, being 
dropped off in an unfamiliar place. Depending on how she got into this situation, 
my intuition is that she will be absolutely alert and highly sensitive to any positive 
and negative reason she can grasp. Be it out of fear (e.g. if Jennifer was 
kidnapped) or out of excitement (imagine she takes part in an adventurous game), 
I tend to believe that her ability to absorb information in such an extreme case is 
actually higher than it would normally be. As a result, there will be thoughts 
triggered in her head which speak for the acceptance of the report (»These people 
are human.«, »The environment is not hostile« etc.) and even far more thoughts 
which speak against it (»I don’t know where I am.«, »All people are completely 
disguised.« etc.). Those considerations are empirical by their very nature. 
                                                
46 Thus, this is not meant as a direct refutation of Pritchard’s considerations. I will simply employ 
his example for my purposes, as the case of Jennifer might be seen as providing a compelling 
variation of the ignorant traveller-case. Here, I want to show that it is not. 
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Faulkner, in his discussion, appears to concur with my explanation. His 
account of testimonial knowledge is such that even in a case which is seemingly 
radically novel for a hearer (who thus does not have any background experience 
about the reliability of the truth-conduciveness of a proffered report) there is still 
what he calls a “communicative context [which] can supply reasons for 
acceptance or otherwise” (Faulkner 2002: 360) of a proffered statement. As such, 
there are, even cases like the ones discussed in this section, features about the 
interlocution which provide reasons that can be picked up by a responsible hearer. 
My claim is thus that a reflection of the presented scenarios shows that even 
in principle it seems impossible to imagine a type of case in which the hearer 
acquires a justified testimonial belief in a completely a priori fashion, without 
appealing to empirical considerations. The default entitlement of NR can never be 
understood as an independent epistemic rationale which justifies a hearer in 
scenes of a complete evidential void. It is also not a viable option for the non-
reductionist to downplay available a posteriori information to mere supplementary 
reasons for and against a belief. A portion of a hearer’s evidence will – always – 
play a constitutive role in establishing the rationality of the entitlement to a 
testimonial belief. 
It is true that the examples of an ignorant traveller who confronts a strange 
passer-by are suitable to show that there are inherent difficulties in evaluating 
epistemic scenarios. Given the circumstantial complications, intuitions will vary 
across philosophers, as well as across philosophically untrained people, who are 
confronted with these examples. Still, the difficulty lies in the fact that the 
information the hearer is confronted with is conflicting to a certain degree. The 
examples do not reveal the hard problem that a hearer can get to know in the 
absence of a posteriori reasons; instead, there is the conceptually far easier 
problem that there will not be a clear unanimous intuition about the cases since 
some information available to the hearer speaks for the rationality of accepting the 
report, and some of it against it. 
The envisaged scene of the hard problem is one of a clean slate where the 
hearer is confronted with an isolated piece of information free of any hints or 
indications about its truth-conduciveness. A genuine tabula-rasa state-of-affairs 
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would be precisely what reductionists and non-reductionists would fail to agree 
upon. A scenario in which a hearer truly fails to possess evidence but still obtains 
a justified testimonial belief on the grounds of the rational forces of testimony is 
essentially the only case in which reductionists and non-reductionists arrive, in 
principle, at distinct verdicts about whether or not the hearer is entitled to her 
belief.  But such a state is unattainable.47 
Testimony never comes engraved on a clean slate. There is no 
epistemologically relevant scenario which is entirely (or even sufficiently) free of 
both rebutting and reinforcing information, contextual as well as concerning 
background considerations, in which the hearer may still rationally obtain a 
testimonial belief. In this regard I completely concur with Fricker that “[a]ny 
alleged a priori warrant to trust the speaker on no evidence is simply superseded 
by a rich dossier of evidence for or against trustworthiness in the hearer’s 
possession” (2002: 381, second emphasis added).48 Ultimately, the idea that there 
has to be enough of a reason to render the understanding of a statement rational in 
order for the resulting belief to be justified is a common notion of both LR and NR 
which can be appreciated under the description of either account. 
                                                
47 In this respect, Fricker speaks of a case in which “a message [is] beamed in; as if it were from 
Mars” (2006: 82). Her argument is that NR cannot explain why and how a heaer may obtain a 
justified testimonial belief because there are no such states-of-affairs “where [n]o appeal to more 
embedded, contextual features of our human psychology, individual and social is made” (ibid.). 
Consequently, NR is false. My claim is weaker than that: while Fricker maintains that we do not 
have intuitions about an a priori justification in the absence of reasons, I maintain that such an a 
priori justification cannot be the absolute starting point of the investigation. A hearer’s 
justification does not rise like a phoenix. In this regard I agree with Fricker when she says that “an 
illuminating account of human testimony – its nature, and as a corollary its epistemology – must 
start from the actual social institutions of language-use, and the social norms and conventions 
governing human linguistic exchange; not from an utterly abstract conception of the commingling 
of rational minds” (ibid.). 
48 The counterargument that young children are unable to satisfy such a description is also 
unconvincing. Already at an early age, children seem to trust testimony in a selective way that is 
sophisticated enough to doubt that they can be called credulous. Even young children seem to 
employ reasons to evaluate the trustworthiness of a speaker rather than relying on a default-
acceptance (cf. Harris 2002; Koenig et al. 2004; Koenig and Harris 2005). If, however, the non-
reductionist sill denies the child the capacity to have reasons it is equally doubtful if the same child 
is able to satisfy the condition to demonstrate an appropriate level of sensitivity to the presence of 
defeaters. Non-reductionism is susceptible to the very same objection (cf. Lackey 2008: 196-200). 
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4.4. UPSHOT AND CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this thesis was to express my views on how knowledge may be 
obtained through the testimony of others. This question has been addressed 
mainly in the form of a dichotomous divide between Humean and Reidian 
conceptions of testimonial knowledge. The standard enterprise has thus been to 
side with either Hume’s reductionist account or with Reid’s non-reductionist 
account and consequently find an argument why the opposing view is false. This 
disagreement has been a fashionable topic in the recent philosophical literature. 
One of my key claims in this thesis was that a high proportion of why there 
was a seemingly insurmountable gap between reductionists and non-reductionists 
relates to differences in the understanding of what constitutes a paradigm 
testimonial scenario. My grappling with Lackey’s seminal (2008) Learning from 
Words was thus focused to a large extent on these differences about the scope of 
testimony. In her book, Lackey’s project is to provide an innovative perspective 
on the topic by suggesting a collaborative, »dualist« view of testimony, according 
to which there is a distribution of the epistemic work between the speaker and the 
hearer: roughly, the speaker has to produce, in a reliable fashion, a truth-
conducive utterance and the hearer has to understand this utterance and display an 
appropriate sensitivity towards epistemically relevant positive and negative 
evidence. In her account, Lackey rejects the established view of testimony as a 
transmission of a belief from a speaker to a hearer in order to promote an 
alternative account that concentrates entirely on a speaker’s statements. With the 
epistemological spotlight on the statements, dualism may help to overcome some 
of the problems of the traditional debate between reductionism and non-
reductionism. 
I strongly concur with Lackey’s agenda that interlocution has to be 
understood as a process which requires both the speaker and the hearer to 
contribute epistemically in order for the hearer to be able to acquire knowledge 
via the proffered testimony. A corollary of this thought is that a hearer’s 
justification for her testimonial belief is neither completely recoverable in non-
testimonial reasons (as this would neglect the speaker’s contribution), nor is it 
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fully separable from empirical considerations (as this would neglect the hearer’s 
contribution). In Lackey’s own words: 
“[T]estimonial justification or warrant is neither reducible to nor 
independent from sense perception, memory, and inductive inference. 
Thus, insofar as we wish to make genuine progress in the epistemology of 
testimony, we need to move beyond the debate between reductionism and 
non-reductionism.” (Lackey 2008) 
Where my agreement with Lackey ends is that she takes it to have shown by her 
counterexamples that dualism can successfully replace the presently available 
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts. I maintain that her rejection by means 
of philosophical counterexamples falls short of providing sufficiently compelling 
cases to refute those views. The main reason for this is that I find her strategy to 
conceptualise testimony as the transmission of a statement – without referring to it 
as the expression of a belief – to be a step in the wrong direction. While I agree 
with Lackey that a speaker’s epistemic credentials are not simply transmitted to a 
hearer via testimony, her claim that a speaker’s beliefs do not matter epistemically 
for the hearer contradicts with the notion that the concept of a person is a key 
component of a substantive epistemology of testimony. A person’s intentional 
attitudes, and thus prominently a speaker’s beliefs, have a role to play in speaker-
hearer scenarios. One part of the hearer’s contribution to a successful act of 
testimony must therefore be to identify whether the report stems from a person, 
who intends to convey the message that p as true. 
In contrast to this, Lackey tries to show that a speaker’s beliefs are entirely 
overshadowed by the reliability of the truth-conduciveness of the statement that is 
proffered. This, however, seems to me to be false. Lackey simply demands, for 
any interlocution, that a speaker’s assertion has to be truth-conducive. Unless this 
condition is fulfilled, a hearer cannot acquire a justified testimonial belief. I have 
argued that a hearer’s positive reasons to accept a report (and not the reliability of 
the report itself) are what constitute justification. As a result, Lackey’s proposal to 
replace the established BVT with her SVT does not seem compelling. The 
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counterarguments which provide the argumentative foundation for this move are 
not plausible to a degree that would justify the shift from beliefs to statements. 
Ultimately, my verdict was that Lackey’s attack on reductionism and non-
reductionism is not convincing enough to provide a basis from which to discard 
beliefs as epistemically irrelevant. Instead, there appears to be available a 
common notion of a minimum requirement on testimony which both reductionists 
and non-reductionists endorse: in order for a hearer to gain a justified testimonial 
belief, she needs to engage in the development of enough of an understanding of 
the interlocution to provide a basic rationale behind her acceptance of the report. 
Under this view, the rationality of believing a speaker appears to be as much a 
matter of the presence of positive evidence – the reductionist’s position – as it is a 
matter of an a priori entitlement to accept testimony – the non-reductionist’s 
position. It seems that these two viewpoints are not necessarily incompatible. On 
the one hand, also the accounts in the tradition of Hume can claim that testimonial 
knowledge is direct, non-inferential and epistemically basic. On the other hand, 
positive evidence has an important role to play also in the accounts in the tradition 
of Reid, namely to endow the basic rationale of being in a testimonial scenario. 
One of the reasons why the epistemological debate has focused on the 
differences between reductionism and non-reductionism instead of appreciating 
such common ground is certainly the taxonomy of both views. The way in which 
reductionists speak about testimony as a derivative source of knowledge which is 
entirely dependent on positive, non-testimonial evidence is in stark contrast to the 
non-reductionist description which sees testimony as a basic source of knowledge, 
on par with perception, memory and inference. Also the differences in their 
respective narratives of reasons and rationality suggest a seemingly 
insurmountable gap between the Humean and the Readian conceptions of 
testimony. 
Such disparities notwithstanding, reductionists and non-reductionists do, 
however, agree on their intuitive judgements in the vast majority of testimonial 
scenarios. This is due to the fact that in ordinary cases, a hearer inevitably has at 
her disposal a plethora of evidential information and is thus completely awash 
with reasons. I have argued that the development of a case in which a hearer is no 
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longer vested with any reasons for and against accepting a report seems to be 
impossible to imagine even in principle. There would have to be a type of case in 
which the hearer acquires a justified testimonial belief without appealing to any 
empirical considerations. Such a tabula-rasa state-of-affairs would effectively be 
what reductionists and non-reductionists would fail to agree upon. Yet, it seems 
safe to say that such a state is unattainable. Ultimately, the idea that there has to 
be enough of a reason to render the understanding of a statement rational in order 
for the resulting belief to be justified is a common notion both reductionists and 
non-reductionists appreciate. 
My argument that the clean-slate scenario is an impossible state-of-affairs is 
however not tantamount to saying that reductionism and non-reductionism 
collapse into one and the same position. The notion of a posteriority is but one 
aspect of an epistemological account. My claim that empirical considerations are 
invariably a vital ingredient to both Fricker’s view (this is apparent) and Burge’s 
and McDowell’s views (in the form of enabling conditions which endow a basic 
rationale of a testimonial scenario) merely highlights the fact that both positions 
are ill-advised to attempt a rejection of the opposing view on the basis of their 
respective conception of what reasons are. Both notions respond to real challenges 
in the epistemology of testimony and both notions have their limitations. My 
proposition is therefore that a real understanding and a true appreciation of the 
strengths of the opposite position will ultimately be more beneficial for the 
progress of the debate on testimony than the continued attempt to reject the 
antagonistic position as fundamentally irrational. 
I am convinced that testimony is as basic a source of knowledge as 
perception, memory and inference. As responsible hearers, we can obtain a 
justified belief from another person’s say-so and the acquisition of this belief is 
not more or less dependent on a wider body of considerations as any perceptually, 
memorially or inferentially acquired belief. What is more, we may obtain a 
justified testimonial belief directly, that is to say non-inferentially. Testimony 
does not come out inferior in comparison with our non-social sources of 
knowledge. 
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What is important, however, is that any belief (testimonial or not) must be 
produced under appropriate conditions. Therefore, the direct acquisition of a 
testimonial belief hinges on the fact that a testimonial scenario has been 
established. The “seeming understanding of putative assertions” (Burge 1997: 21) 
which leads up to the hearer’s entitlement to accept a report as true (in the absence 
of counterconsiderations) is a function of the empirical goings-on of an 
interlocution. There will be no scenario where a hearer arrives at a seeming 
understanding of the proffered statement without appealing to her experience of 
the situation in which the interlocution takes place. 
In this sense, naturally, testimony depends on non-testimonial 
considerations. Inferences from background beliefs, memories from the past or 
perceptually obtained beliefs will play a constitutive role in establishing the 
underlying rationale which provides a hearer with the entitlement to accept a 
statement. More than anything, this will be a matter of understanding the 
proffered statement as an assertion from a rational being. Yet, this does not make 
testimony a second-class citizen or epistemically less fundamental than the other 
sources. The same dependence certainly exists concerning our individual sources 
of knowledge. As Peter Strawson asks: 
“If we are to say, as we must, that the knowledge we derive from 
testimony depends on perception, must we not equally say that the 
knowledge we derive from perception depends generally on testimony 
[…]?” (Strawson 1994: 26) 
Reducing testimony to perception, memory and inference seems to be an ill-
advised manoeuvre. As a result, the eponymous reductio of reductionism appears 
to be fundamentally misguided. Testimony is not recoverable in completely 
testimony-free terms. Neither is testimony a self-sufficient source of knowledge. 
For any belief – testimonial or not – there is a strong dependence on a wider body 
of beliefs which may have been obtained through any source of knowledge. For 
these reasons, both reductionism and non-reductionism describe rational attitudes 
of our epistemic lives. The key is not to stretch their respective paradigms beyond 
a point where they are still tenable. 
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APPENDIX A: ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) 
Testimony is a rich source of knowledge. It is therefore an important 
epistemological task to explain how we can obtain knowledge through the spoken 
and written words of others. 
In the recent philosophical literature, the issue of how a person may 
reasonably acquire a justified testimonial belief has fostered a complex and 
controversial debate. On the one side, reductionists claim that it is reasonable to 
believe a proffered statement in view of the substantive body of inductive 
evidence that is provided by experience. On the other side, non-reductionists 
maintain that we may come to know from a report because our putative 
understanding provides an a priori entitlement to accept a statement as true. 
In grappling with Jennifer Lackey’s seminal (2008) Learning from Words, 
my main claim in this thesis is that a dichotomous divide between the reductionist 
and the non-reductionist camp is unable to yield substantial progress in the 
epistemological debate. By means of philosophical counterexamples, Lackey tries 
to reject both views and shift the focus in interlocution from a speaker’s beliefs to 
her proffered statements. I argue that her rejections fail. In particular, I hold that 
her counterexamples are not convincing enough to provide a basis from which to 
refute the established view that testimony is best conceptualised as the expression 
of a belief. 
Ultimately, Lackey’s project to discard a speaker’s beliefs as epistemically 
irrelevant appears to be misguided. In order to understand how knowledge may be 
obtained through the testimony of others it is important to appreciate the speaker’s 
intentionality. With the notion of personhood taken seriously, both reductionism 
and non-reductionism seem to be able to respond to real and relevant challenges 
of interlocution scenarios. In this regard, the idea that there has to be enough of a 
reason to render the understanding of a proffered report rational in order for the 
resulting testimonial belief to be justified is a common notion both camps can 
appreciate. 
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APPENDIX B: ABSTRACT (GERMAN) 
Zeugenschaft ist eine zentrale Quelle von Wissen. Es ist daher eine wichtige 
Aufgabe der Epistemologie, zu erklären, wie wir durch das gesprochene und 
geschriebene Wort anderer zu Wissen kommen können. 
In der jüngeren philosophischen Literatur hat die Fragestellung, wie eine 
Person vernünftigerweise eine gerechtfertigte Meinung durch Zeugenschaft 
erlangen kann, zu einer komplexen und umstrittenen Debatte geführt. Auf der 
einen Seite behaupten Reduktionisten, dass es vernünftig sei, eine getätigte 
Aussage im Hinblick auf den reichhaltigen Schatz an induktivem Beweismaterial, 
das uns durch unsere Erfahrung gegeben ist, zu akzeptieren. Auf der anderen Seite 
verteidigen Nicht-Reduktionisten die Ansicht, dass wir durch die Aussagen 
anderer Wissen erlangen, weil unser vermeintliches Verständnis eine apriorische 
Berechtigung darstellt, eine Aussage als wahr zu akzeptieren. 
In der Auseinandersetzung mit Jennifer Lackeys wegweisendem Buch 
Learning from Words (2008), ist die Hauptaussage meiner Diplomarbeit, dass eine 
dichotome Unterteilung in ein reduktionistisches und ein nicht-reduktionistisches 
Lager nicht in der Lage ist, substantiellen Fortschritt in der epistemologischen 
Debatte herbeizuführen. Durch philosophische Gegenbeispiele versucht Lackey, 
beide Ansichten zu widerlegen und den Fokus bei Unterredungen weg von den 
Überzeugungen des Sprechers, hin zu den Aussagen selbst zu verlegen. Ich 
behaupte, dass dieser Versuch erfolglos bleibt. Insbesondere behaupte ich, dass 
ihre Gegenbeispiele nicht überzeugend genug sind, um die etablierte Ansicht zu 
widerlegen, dass Zeugenschaft am besten als Ausdruck einer Überzeugung gefasst 
wird. 
Letztendlich erscheint Lackeys Entwurf, die Überzeugungen von Sprechern 
als epistemisch irrelevant zu verwerfen, unfruchtbar. Um zu verstehen, wie 
Wissen durch Zeugenschaft anderer erlangt werden kann, ist es wichtig, die 
Intentionalität von Sprechern zu begreifen. Nimmt man Sprecher als Personen 
ernst, scheint sowohl Reduktionismus als auch Nicht-Reduktionismus in der Lage, 
auf richtige und relevante Herausforderungen von Unterredungsszenarien 
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antworten zu können. In diesem Sinne ist die Idee, dass es eine hinreichende 
Begründung geben muss, um das Verstehen einer Aussage als rational begreifen 
zu können, ein Gedanke, den beide Lager begrüßen können, damit eine daraus 
resultierende Überzeugung gerechtfertigt sein kann. 
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